CHAUFFEURS, U. NO. 364 v. Ruan Transp. Corp.
Citation | 473 F. Supp. 298 |
Decision Date | 16 July 1979 |
Docket Number | No. S 78-216.,S 78-216. |
Parties | CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS LOCAL UNION NO. 364, Plaintiff, v. RUAN TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
John E. Doran, South Bend, Ind., Edward J. Fillenwarth, Jr., Frederick W. Dennerline III, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff.
David R. Melton, Lawrence C. DiNardo, South Bend, Ind., Jerald R. Cureton, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
The Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 364 represents certain employees of Ruan Transport Corporation. The union has brought this action against Ruan Transport to secure compliance with the grievance awards of two contractually established grievance bodies. These grievance bodies are arbitrators whose awards are subject to confirmation, vacation, modification, or correction under Title 9 of the United States Code. The grievance awards which the union is seeking to have confirmed were made after grievances were filed with the arbitrators by members of the union pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the union and Ruan Transport. The grievances alleged the defendant's violation of that collective bargaining agreement. Both bodies ruled for the union and against Ruan Transport. As an affirmative defense to this action to confirm the awards the defendant claims that the arbitrators were biased and that the arbitration proceedings were unfair and irregular. More than three months elapsed between the filing of the grievance award and the filing of the affirmative defense.
The plaintiff now moves to strike this defense on the grounds that it is barred by 9 U.S.C. § 12, which provides, "Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon the adverse party or his attorney within three months after the award is filed or delivered . ." For the reasons set out below, the motion to strike will be denied.
There are at least two district court cases which have ruled that the three month limitation period provided in 9 U.S.C. § 12 does not apply to the defense of a motion to confirm an arbitration award. Both cases rely for authority on a single Court of Appeals case. The district court cases hold that while 9 U.S.C. § 12 limits to three months the time during which an aggrieved party may attack an arbitration award by means of a motion to vacate, 9 U.S.C. § 12 does not limit the time during which an aggrieved party can defend a motion to confirm. The union has argued that these cases are incorrectly reasoned. Because the union's argument has some appeal, this Court has deemed it advisable to discuss the issue in some detail.
The cases in question are Paul Allison, Inc. v. Minikin Storage of Omaha, Inc., 452 F.Supp. 573 (D.Neb.1978), and Riko Enterprises, Inc. v. Seattle Supersonics Corporation, 357 F.Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y.1973). In the most recent case, Paul Allison, Inc., the court considered itself bound by, and relied exclusively on, Riko Enterprises, Inc., and The Hartbridge, 57 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1932), in holding that the three month limitation did not apply to the defense of a motion to confirm an arbitration award. And in Riko Enterprises, Inc., the court relied exclusively on The Hartbridge. Thus, both Paul Allison, Inc., and Riko Enterprises, Inc., relied exclusively on The Hartbridge in ruling that the three month limitation did not apply to the defense of a motion to confirm.
The union argues that this reliance on The Hartbridge was misplaced. The Second Circuit remanded The Hartbridge and ordered the trial court to allow the motion to confirm to be defended even though more than three months had elapsed between the filing of the arbitrator's award and the filing of any defense to the motion to confirm. But the court expressly refused to rule on the three month limitation issue which this court now faces. While noting that some state courts had ruled that the expiration of the time period for moving to vacate did not preclude the defense of a motion to confirm, the Second Circuit declined to follow these state court rulings.
57 F.2d at 673-74 (emphasis added; citations deleted). By ruling that the three month limitation period did not run while the arbitrator's decision was on appeal, the court avoided the three month limitation question which this Court now faces. The language of The Hartbridge which has apparently been misinterpreted in Paul Allison, Inc., and Riko Enterprises, Inc., is concerned with an entirely different issue: whether a district court is required to grant confirmation of an arbitration award summarily when the filing of a motion for an order confirming the award precedes the filing of a motion for an order vacating the award. The confusing language is as follows:
57 F.2d at 673. The court was there concerned with the grounds on which a motion to confirm could be defended. The ruling was that the grounds were the same as those on which a party could base a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award. The court was not concerned with whether a motion for an order confirming an award could be defended on these grounds after the three month period had elapsed. That issue the court expressly avoided. Thus, Paul Allison, Inc., and Riko Enterprises, Inc., rely for authority on a case which does not stand for the proposition for which it is cited. Similar erroneous interpretations of The Hartbridge have been made by other courts in dicta. See Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 279 F.Supp. 573 (W.D.Pa.1967), Cocotos Steamship of Panama, S. A. v. Hugo Neu Corporation, 178 F.Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y.1959).
But whatever problems there may be with the reliance by these cases on The Hartbridge, an inquiry into the legislative history of the statute in question will reveal that the ultimate rulings were correct.
Title 9 of the United States Code is positive law. It was enacted as such by the Arbitration Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, § 1, 61 Stat. 672. The underlying statute was the Arbitration Act of February 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 885. The 1947 act was not intended to modify any of the provisions of the 1925 act. House Report No. 255, April 14, 1947, reprinted at 1947 U.S.Code Congressional Service, p. 1515. Therefore, in determining how the legislature intended 9 U.S.C. § 12 to be applied, we may look to the underlying 1925 statute. Because specific language of the 1925 statute will be helpful in this discussion, it will be quoted. The pertinent language reads as follows:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Service Employees Intern. Union, Local No. 36, AFL-CIO v. Office Center Services, Inc.
...statute which had relied on The Hartbridge rested on a misreading of the case. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 364 v. Ruan Transport Corp., 473 F.Supp. 298 (N.D.Ind.1979); Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 135 v. Jefferson Trucking Co., 473 F.Supp......
-
Cody Farms, Inc. v. Deerman (In re Deerman)
...award in defense to an action to confirm an arbitration award. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 364 v. Ruan Transport Corp., 473 F.Supp. 298, 303 (N.D.Ind.1979) (holding that Section 12 of the FAA “only limits the time during which the party against......
-
Warren v. Geller
...Inc. v. Seattle Supersonics Corp. , 357 F.Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ; Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 364 v. Ruan Transport Corp. , 473 F.Supp. 298 (N.D.I.N. 1979).125 Rec. Doc. 381-1 at 11 (citing Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Services, Inc. , 324 F.......
-
Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v. Newspapers, Inc.
...to collective bargaining contracts. Botica v. Floyd Steel Erectors, Inc., 485 F.Supp. 334 (N.D.Ill.1980); Teamsters Local 364 v. Ruan Transport Corp., 473 F.Supp. 298 (N.D.Ind.1979). This court has held that the Act's exclusion relates only to workers in transportation industries. Pietro Sc......