Chaves v. Cogent Med. Lab., LLC
| Decision Date | 28 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | SA-19-CV-00861-ESC |
| Parties | TONI CHAVES, Plaintiff, v. COGENT MEDICAL LABORATORY, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Before the Court in the above-styled cause of action is Plaintiff Toni Chaves's Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment as to Cogent Medical Laboratory, LLC and Memorandum in Support Thereof [#34]. The undersigned has jurisdiction to enter this order due to the consent of both parties to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge [#9, #10]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion.
This court has federal-question jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this case arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. ("FLSA"). (Am. Compl. [#22] at ¶ 3.3.)
Plaintiff Toni Chaves filed this action against her former employer, Cogent Medical Laboratory, LLG, on July 18, 2019, alleging that Defendant failed to compensate her in compliance with the overtime requirements of the FLSA. Defendant timely filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, and a Scheduling Order was entered to control the course of this case.Plaintiff moved for leave to amend her pleadings, which was granted, and filed an Amended Complaint against Defendant on January 31, 2020, adding a claim for FLSA retaliation.
Shortly thereafter, Defendant's counsel, Michael V. Galo, Jr., moved to withdraw his representation due to Defendant's lack of responsiveness to any communication from counsel and a past due balance with counsel's law firm. Because Defendant, as an LLC, cannot represent itself in federal court, the Court ordered Mr. Galo to formally advise Defendant of the risks associated with the withdrawal. Mr. Galo provided the Court with a sealed copy of a letter sent to Defendant, advising Defendant that it must find substitute counsel or face the possibility of a default judgment, and the Court permitted Mr. Galo to withdraw. The Court also ordered Defendant to file an advisory on or before March 18, 2020 indicating whether it had obtained substitute counsel.
No advisory was filed, and Defendant has not obtained new counsel or filed an answer or other responsive pleading to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. On April 15, 2020, Plaintiff moved for and obtained a clerk's entry of default against Defendant. On June 26, 2020, Plaintiff filed the motion for final default judgment currently before the Court. Plaintiff's motion for final default judgment asks the Court to award her the following relief: (a) unpaid overtime wages in the amount of $5,801.25; (b) liquidated damages for unpaid overtime in the amount of $5,801.25; (c) lost wages for retaliatory discharge in the amount of $21,239.00; (d) liquidated damages for lost wages due to retaliatory discharge in the amount of $21,139.00; (e) punitive damages in the amount of $21,139.00; (f) attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $16,287.50; and (g) post-judgment interest thereon at the rate provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
In order to ensure that Defendant received proper notice of these court filings and an opportunity to cure its default prior to the issuance of a final default judgment, the Court orderedthe District Clerk to mail a copy of the Clerk's Entry of Default and Motion for Default Judgment by first class and certified mail, return receipt requested. The Order required Defendant to file a response to the motion for default judgment on or before July 13, 2020, to avoid final default [#35].
The certified mail receipt confirms that a copy of the Clerk's entry of default, Plaintiff's motion for final default judgment, and the Court's order for a response was mailed to Defendant at its last known address of record c/o Robert Gates on June 30, 2020. There is no indication that the mailing was returned as undeliverable; however, the certified mail receipt has not yet been returned confirming delivery. Nonetheless, the undersigned will grant Plaintiff's motion for default judgment. Defendant has had numerous opportunities to find substitute counsel to represent it in this action and has been notified as to the risks associated with failing to do so by its former counsel and this Court on multiple occasions. Defendant has not filed a response to Plaintiff's motion, filed an answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, or obtained substitute counsel to represent it in this action, and all of the Court's deadlines to do so have expired.
"When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Once default has been entered, the court may enter a default judgment against the defaulting defendant upon motion by the plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996). In considering a motion for default judgment, the court accepts as true the well-pleaded allegations of facts in the complaint (except regarding damages) but must determine whether those facts state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Matter of Dierschke, 975 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1992) (); United States ex rel. M-Co. Constr., Inc. v. Shipco Gen., Inc., 814 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1987). Thus, for a plaintiff to obtain a default judgment, "[t]here must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered." Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975); see Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001) () (quoting Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996)).
The record in this case establishes that Defendant failed to plead or otherwise defend against Plaintiff's claims since the withdrawal of its counsel, as an LLC cannot represent itself pro se in this action. See Memon v. Allied Domecq QSR, 385 F.3d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 2004) ( ); Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 2007) () (internal citations omitted). The undersigned therefore finds that the Clerk properly entered default, and Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment because the facts alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint alleges the following: Plaintiff was hired as a phlebotomist for Defendant, a medical testing laboratory providing mobile phlebotomy services, and also performed work assignment and scheduling duties for Defendant. (Am. Compl. [#22] at¶ 5.) According to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendant is an employer withing the meaning of the FLSA and is an enterprise engaged in commerce within the meaning of the FLSA by using equipment that has traveled in interstate commerce, such as medical specimens, laboratory testing equipment, and computers. (Id. at ¶ 4.)
Attached to Plaintiff's motion for default judgment is also the declaration of Plaintiff, which states that she was hired by Robert Gates, Defendant's CEO, as a phlebotomist on March 15, 2019, and worked for Defendant until June 18, 2019, a period of 13 weeks. (Decl. [#34-1] at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges she was paid on an hourly basis at the rate of $17.00 per hour plus $0.33 per mile. (Am. Compl. [#22] at ¶ 5.) Her duties were working as a mobile phlebotomist, inputting time records for other phlebotomists, compiling tracking sheets for phlebotomists, and compiling draw stats for the phlebotomists. (Decl. [#34-1] at ¶ 5.)
Plaintiff also acted as dispatch for the mobile phlebotomy division, receiving and dispatching requests for services. (Id.) Plaintiff claims she was required to be on-duty and on-call 24 hours a day and was frequently required to perform her work assignment and scheduling duties after normal business hours. (Am. Compl. [#22] at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges she was never paid overtime compensation for hours worked over 40 in a given workweek and was not paid for all of the time she spent assigning and scheduling work for Defendant. (Id.) Plaintiff estimates that she worked 15 to 20 extra hours over her normal 40 each week, work that she performed "off the clock" and was not recorded per instruction from management. (Decl. [#34-1] at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff claims that she complained to management—and to Robert Gates specifically—that she was not being compensated for all hours worked, including overtime hours, and that she was subsequently fired because of her complaints. (Am. Compl. [#22] at ¶ 5; Decl. [#34-1] at ¶ 8.)
Following her termination, Plaintiff looked for a new job and began work at Alpha Medical Labs on August 6, 2019. (Decl. [#34-1] at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff was therefore out of work for more than six weeks, during which she collected $2,688 in unemployment benefits. (Id.) Plaintiff's current position is at Alpha Medical Labs, where she averages wages of approximately $750 week, less than the wages she earned working for Defendant. (Id. at ¶ 10.)
The FLSA mandates minimum wage and overtime compensation for employees who are (1) "engaged...
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