Chavez-Castillo v. Holder, 14–1486.
| Decision Date | 17 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–1486.,14–1486. |
| Citation | 771 F.3d 1081 |
| Parties | Jeho CHAVEZ–CASTILLO, also known as Iran Castillo–Gomez, Petitioner v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Murray David Hilts, argued, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner.
Nicole Thomas–Dorris, USDOJ, OIL, argued, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Before MURPHY, SMITH, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Jeho Chavez–Castillo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision which dismissed his appeal from an order by an Immigration Judge (IJ) removing him from the United States to Mexico. Chavez–Castillo argues that the evidence of his alienage should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. He also asserts that he was not afforded due process in his removal proceedings and that the IJ erred in drawing an adverse inference against him when he invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination. After due consideration, we deny the petition.
On August 21, 2011 a police officer of Belle Fourche, South Dakota stopped Chavez–Castillo for speeding. Chavez–Castillo failed to produce a valid driver license and claimed that he was a Mexican citizen named Iran Castillo–Gomez. The officer then arrested Chavez–Castillo and charged him with speeding and driving without a valid driver license in violation of South Dakota law. The next day, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) interviewed Chavez–Castillo. Chavez–Castillo admitted that his true name was Jeho Chavez–Castillo, he was a Mexican citizen and did not claim lawful status in the United States, and he had purchased two false identification cards with the name Iran Castillo–Gomez. He was turned over to ICE custody, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served him with a notice to appear charging him as an alien present without admission or parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). State law charges against him for speeding and driving without a valid driver license were dismissed at that time.
In the removal proceedings, Chavez–Castillo moved to suppress all evidence that was obtained as a result of the traffic stop. He submitted an affidavit stating there was no legitimate reason for the officer to stop him because he had been “driving the lawful speed limit.” He also argued that he was entitled to confront the immigration officer who prepared Form I–213 which detailed the facts of the traffic stop and stated that he had entered the United States without admission or parole. In response, DHS submitted additional evidence relating to the traffic stop including two traffic tickets, the arresting officer's “affidavit of probable cause for warrantless arrest,” and the record of arrest. All of these documents stated that Chavez–Castillo was stopped and ticketed for speeding and driving without a license.
On August 21, 2012 the parties appeared at a hearing before the IJ to resolve the charge of removability. When Chavez–Castillo was questioned about his place of birth, his attorney objected and advised him to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination. The IJ overruled the objection and stated that Chavez–Castillo, not his attorney, must invoke the right. Counsel then advised Chavez–Castillo “to invoke the Fifth Amendment on all questions.” When asked about his parent's place of birth, Chavez–Castillo refused to answer, and the IJ declared that it would “take a negative inference from the refusal to answer.” Nevertheless, Chavez–Castillo eventually testified that he was pulled over while driving, he provided the officer with false identification, and he had been charged with speeding.
At the close of the hearing, the IJ admitted the notice to appear and the Form I–213 into evidence, denied the motion to suppress, and ordered Chavez–Castillo removed from the country. The IJ found there was no basis to suppress the evidence and determined that Form I–213 provided sufficient evidence of removability. The BIA affirmed, concluding that Chavez–Castillo failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that he was stopped illegally or that the officer egregiously violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The BIA also concluded that the lack of opportunity to cross examine the immigration officer who prepared Form I213 did not deny Chavez–Castillo due process. Further, because Form I–213 independently established Chavez–Castillo's removability, the BIA did not reach his additional argument that the IJ violated his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination.
Chavez–Castillo now petitions for review of the BIA's decision dismissing his appeal. As before the BIA, he argues that the evidence against him should have been suppressed because the traffic stop preceding his detention violated the Fourth Amendment. He also argues that he was not afforded due process of law in the removal proceedings because hearsay evidence was admitted against him and he did not have an opportunity to cross examine the immigration officer who prepared Form I–213. He finally argues that the IJ improperly drew an adverse inference against him when he invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination.
The BIA's decision is reviewed “as the final agency action” but we also consider the findings and reasoning of the IJ if they have been adopted by the board. Diaz–Perez v. Holder, 750 F.3d 961, 963–64 (8th Cir.2014). We review conclusions of law de novo, according substantial deference to the agency's interpretation of immigration statutes and regulations. Sanchez–Velasco v. Holder, 593 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir.2010). The administrative findings of fact are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Chen v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 797, 800 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) ).
Chavez–Castillo asserts that the information contained within Form I–213 must be suppressed because the traffic stop preceding his arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Without Form I–213 he contends the government cannot meet its burden of proving his removability, and his removal proceedings should therefore be terminated. The exclusionary rule generally does not apply in deportation proceedings because the cost of excluding probative evidence outweighs the social benefits. INS v. Lopez–Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1040–50, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has indicated that “egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment ... that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained” may require use of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 1050–51, 104 S.Ct. 3479.
We have not had occasion to decide whether an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment would compel exclusion in a removal proceeding. Carcamo v. Holder, 713 F.3d 916, 922 (8th Cir.2013). Nor have we attempted to provide an exhaustive list of conduct that would be considered an egregious...
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