Chavez v. City of Petaluma
| Decision Date | 16 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-cv-05038-MEJ |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | OMAR CHAVEZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PETALUMA, et al., Defendants. |
Re: Dkt. Nos. 25, 28
Plaintiff Omar Chavez brings this civil rights action against the City of Petaluma, Chief Patrick Williams, and Officers Michael Page and Paul Accornero (the "City Defendants"), as well as the County of Sonoma and Sheriff Steve Freitas (the "County Defendants") (collectively "Defendants"), concerning alleged violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights arising out of his November 14, 2012 arrest and subsequent confinement. See Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Pending before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6): one by the County Defendants ), and the other by the City Defendants ). Plaintiff filed an Opposition (Dkt. No. 33) and Defendants filed Replies ). The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and VACATES the June 25, 2015 hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civil L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the parties' positions, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motions for the reasons set forth below.
On November 14, 2012, Petaluma Police Department Officers Michael Page and PaulAccornero entered Plaintiff's residence at 103 Dana Street, Petaluma, and arrested Plaintiff. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 15, 17. Plaintiff alleges that Page and Accornero had previously entered onto the porch of his residence without a warrant and, while standing outside the front door, eavesdropped on and "surreptitiously recorded" conversations between Plaintiff and other persons within the residence. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges that Page and Accornero entered the residence without a warrant and unlawfully detained him and others at gunpoint. Id. ¶ 15. Page, Accornero, and other Petaluma Police Department officers searched the residence and seized various items. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff alleges that Page reported in the Petaluma Police Department report that the officers acted without a warrant because Plaintiff was on active state parole on November 14, 2012. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff asserts that he had not been on parole since September 2012. Id. ¶ 19.
Page, Accornero, and other Petaluma Police Department officers transported Plaintiff to the Sonoma County Jail after his arrest. Id. ¶ 17. Criminal charges were also filed against Plaintiff in the Sonoma County Superior Court. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that he was unable to post bail and obtain release from custody because a "parole hold" was placed on him based on his November 14, 2012 arrest. Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff alleges that while in custody, he repeatedly requested access to forms and legal materials necessary to challenge and appeal his incarceration, but he was denied access to these materials. Id.
Additionally, based on the conversations that Page and Accornero overheard while outside Plaintiff's residence, as well as the evidence they obtained inside the residence, Page obtained seizure warrants to seize all bank accounts in which Plaintiff had an interest. Id. ¶ 21. A forfeiture case was also filed in the Sonoma County Superior Court seeking to forfeit Plaintiff's interest in all property seized. Id. The criminal charges were eventually dismissed, as well as the forfeiture case. Id. ¶ 24. The parole hold was lifted around January 16, 2013, at which time Plaintiff posted bail and was released from custody. Id. ¶ 22.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on November 11, 2014, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as state law claims. Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that the violations of his civil rights were the result of Defendants City of Petaluma, Petaluma Police Chief Williams, and Sonoma County Sheriff Freitas' negligent supervision of the officers involved in investigating,detaining, arresting, and holding Plaintiff in custody. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff further alleges that the violations of his civil rights described above were the result of customs, policies and/or practices of the Petaluma Police Department and the Sonoma County Sheriff's Department, including but not limited to, negligent hiring, training, supervising, and disciplining members of the Petaluma Police Department and the Sonoma County Sheriff's Department. Id. ¶ 26.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a complaint as failing to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facial plausibility standard is not a "probability requirement" but mandates "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court "accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). "[D]ismissal may be based on either a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) ().
Even under the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2), under which a party is only required to make "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," a "pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (). The court must be able to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679.
If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the "court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, the Court may deny leave to amend for a number of reasons, including "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment." Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
Plaintiff asserts four causes of action: (1) a § 1983 claim against all Defendants; (2) a § 1983 claim against the City and the County, as well as Police Chief Williams and Sheriff Freitas; (3) a negligence claim against all Defendants; and (4) a false imprisonment claim against all Defendants. Compl. ¶¶ 28-46. As an initial matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims for negligence and false imprisonment are barred by the statute of limitations under California Government Code section 945.6.1 Cnty. Defs.' Mot. at 13-14; City Defs.' Mot. at 11. Plaintiffconcedes that these claims are untimely. Opp'n at 5, 8. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed with prejudice. The Court now considers Plaintiff's § 1983 claims.
Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations by persons acting under the color of state law. It provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quotation and internal marks omitted). To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution; (2) by a person acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To state a claim against a municipal entity for a constitutional violation, a plaintiff must show than an official's action that caused the plaintiff's injury was pursuant "to official municipal policy of some nature." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To prevail, a plaintiff must go beyond the respondeat superior theory of liability and demonstrate that the alleged...
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