Chavez v. Cnty. of Bernalillo

• Decision Date: 31 January 2014
• Docket Number: No. CIV 13–0309 JB/LFG.,CIV 13–0309 JB/LFG.
• Citation: 3 F.Supp.3d 936
• Parties: Fred Dean CHAVEZ, Plaintiffs v. COUNTY OF BERNALILLO, and Ramon Rustin, Chief of Corrections of Metropolitan Detention Center, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

3 F.Supp.3d 936

Fred Dean CHAVEZ, Plaintiffs

v.COUNTY OF BERNALILLO, and Ramon Rustin, Chief of Corrections of Metropolitan Detention Center, Defendants.

No. CIV 13–0309 JB/LFG.

United States District Court,

D. New Mexico.

Filed Jan. 31, 2014.

Scott A. Pistone, Michael E. Lash, Law Offices of Scott Pistone, Ltd. Co., Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey L. Baker, Renni Zifferblatt, The Baker Law Firm, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 11, 2013 (Doc. 8). The Court held a hearing on July 2, 2013. The primary issues are: (i) whether the Defendants violated Plaintiff Fred Dean Chavez' constitutional rights by incarcerating him pursuant to a bench warrant that had been cancelled before Chavez was arrested; (ii) whether the Defendants violated Chavez' constitutional rights by continuing to detain Chavez after Chavez' attorney sent notice that the bench warrant had been cancelled; and (iii) whether Chavez has established facts sufficient to maintain his municipal liability claim against the Defendant County of Bernalillo.¹ The Court concludes that the Defendants did not violate Chavez' constitutional rights, because they initially detained him pursuant to a facially valid warrant, and because they acted reasonably in requiring a court order setting Chavez' conditions of release before releasing him. Even if there were a constitutional violation, the law was not clearly established. Without a constitutional violation, the Court concludes that Chavez cannot maintain a municipal liability claim. These conclusions dispose of all federal claims in this case. The Court will decline to exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and will, therefore, remand the case.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 5, 2011, Albuquerque Police Department (“APD”) arrested and booked Plaintiff Fred Dean Chavez into the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) on an outstanding warrant. See Complaint for False Arrest, False Imprisonment and Damages ¶ 3, at 1, filed in state court February 4, 2013, filed in federal court March 2, 2013 (Doc. 2) (“Complaint”); Affidavit of Alexis Iverson ¶ 6, at 3, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8–1) (“Iverson Aff.”); Bench Warrant, filed July 1, 2013 (Doc. 24–1 at 7); Pre–Booking Worksheet, filed July 1, 2013 (Doc. 24–1 at 8); Offender Booking Sheet, filed July 1, 2013 (Doc. 24–1 at 9); ² MSJ ¶ 1, at 2 (setting forth this fact). ³ The Docket Sheet for State of New Mexico vs. Chavez Fred Dean, filed June 29, 2013 (Doc. 23–1) (“State Docket”), indicates that, on January 20, 2011, a bench warrant was issued for Chavez for a failure to appear at a plea hearing; the entry on the State Docket for January 28, 2011, states: “ORD: QUASHING WARRANT/ISSUED/FILING STIPULATED ORDER TO CANCEL BENCH WARRANT ON CHAVEZ.” State Docket at 2. See Response at 4 (setting forth this fact). ⁴ Judge Flores cancelled the bench warrant on January 28, 2011. See Stipulated Order to Cancel Bench Warrant, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8–19 to –20) (“Stipulated Order”).

On February 8, 2011, Scott Pistone, Chavez' lawyer, sent a letter by facsimile transmission to Defendant Ramon Rustin, the MDC Director, requesting that he release Chavez from custody immediately, because a stipulated cancellation of Chavez' bench warrant had been entered in Chavez' pending criminal case on January 28, 2011. See Affidavit of Brandi Urrutia ¶ 4, at 2, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8–16) (“Urrutia Aff.”); Facsimile Transmission from Scott Pistone, the Law Offices of Scott Pistone, Ltd. Co., to Ramon Rustin, Chief of Corrections, sent February 8, 2011, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8–17 to –18) (“Pistone Fax”) (enclosing the “Stipulated Order”); Affidavit of Ramon Rustin ¶ 1, at 1 (filed March 11, 2013) (“Rustin Aff.”) (describing Rustin's role at MDC); MSJ ¶ 2, at 2 (setting forth this fact).⁵

Urrutia scanned the facsimile transmission, and sent it to the corrections tech supervisor and acting records supervisor Alexis Iverson on the morning of February 8, 2011 to investigate; Iverson supervised the technical units that handled bookings, releases, and monitoring of court paperwork at the MDC. See Urrutia Aff. ¶ 5, at 2; Electronic Mail Transmission from Brandi Brinkman–Urrutia to Alexis M. Iverson, sent February 8, 2011 at 10:10 a.m., filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8–21) (“First Urrutia E-mail”); MSJ ¶ 3, at 2 (setting forth this fact).⁶ Within thirty minutes of receiving the facsimile transmission,Iverson sent Urrutia an electronic mail transmission reply, indicating that she had spoken with the MDC's district court liaison Laura Christison. See Electronic Mail Transmission from Alexis M. Iverson to Brandi Brinkman–Urrutia, sent February 8, 2011 at 10:31 a.m., filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8–21) (“Iverson Email”); Urrutia Aff. ¶ 6, at 2; MSJ ¶ 4, at 2 (setting forth this fact). Christison advised that she had spoken with Mr. Pistone's office the previous day and advised that Mr. Pistone would have to submit an order setting conditions of release, and the court would have to approve it before the MDC could release Chavez from custody. See Urrutia Aff. ¶ 6, at 2; Iverson E-mail; Iverson Aff. ¶ 8, at 3; Affidavit of Laura Christison ¶¶ 4–5, at 2, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8–22) (“Christison Aff.”); MSJ ¶ 4, at 2 (setting forth this fact). After receiving this information, it would have been customary for Urrutia to put the facsimile transmission in Rustin's inbox; she sent an electronic mail transmission to Iverson indicating that she intended to do so. See Urrutia Aff. ¶ 7, at 2; Electronic Mail Transmission from Brandi Brinkman–Urrutia to Alexis M. Iverson, sent February 8, 2011 at 10:38 a.m., filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8–21) (“Second Urrutia E-mail”); MSJ ¶ 5, at 2 (setting forth this fact). The records department received a court order for conditions of release in Chavez's pending criminal case on February 10, 2011; the MDC processed Chavez' paperwork and released him later that day. See Iverson Aff. ¶ 9, at 3; Order Setting Conditions of Release, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8–14); Inmate Release Form, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8–15); MSJ ¶ 6, at 3 (setting forth this fact). ⁷

Rustin has no specific recollection of taking any action in response to Mr. Pistone's request, but MDC internal policy, which was consistent with the American Correctional Association guidelines for correctional facilities, would not permit him to release Chavez without a court order setting conditions of release.⁸See Rustin Aff. ¶¶ 3–7, at 1–3, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8–23); Releasing Procedures, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8–24); American Correctional Association in cooperation with the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, Performance–Based Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities at 90 (4th ed., June 2004), filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8–25) (“ACA Standards”); MSJ ¶ 7, at 3 (setting forth this fact). Rustin was familiar with MDC policy and was responsible for creating and instituting the policy. Rustin Aff. ¶ 2, at 1; id. ¶ 5, at 2; Response at 3. After the events, he determined that his staff “acted appropriately” in communicating with Mr. Pistone and in refusing to process Chavez' release from custody without a court order. Rustin Aff. ¶ 2, at 1; id. ¶ 5, at 2; Response at 3.⁹

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 4, 2013, Chavez filed his Complaint in state court against Rustin and Bernalillo County, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and illegal detention, and that the Defendants violated his right to be free from an unreasonable seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. See Complaint ¶¶ 8–11, at 2. The Defendants removed the case to federal court on March 2, 2013, asserting that the Court has original jurisdiction over Chavez' Fourth Amendment claims as claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. See Notice of Removal ¶ 4, at 2, filed March 2, 2013 (Doc. 1). The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, including the false imprisonment and false arrest claims. See Response at 9–10.

On March 11, 2013, the Defendants moved the Court for summary judgment, arguing that Rustin did not participate in the alleged conduct and is further entitled to qualified immunity, and that Chavez has failed to plead facts that invoke municipal liability. See MSJ at 1. The Defendants argue that Rustin is not responsible for Chavez' alleged false arrest, because the APD, not an MDC employee, arrested Chavez. See MSJ at 8. The Defendants argue that the “Plaintiff's arrest cannot be legally attributed to Defendant Rustin or any MDC employee, since jailers have no legal authority to arrest any person but rather are authorized solely to maintain custody of individuals who have been arrested by a law enforcement officer.” MSJ at 8 (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33–3–28(D)(1)). The Defendants explain that there are a limited number of situations in which jailers have “peace officer powers”—when arresting on the jail premises, while transporting a person to jail, while supervising a person committed to or under the supervision of a jail, or when engaged in an effort to pursue or apprehend such a person—and that none of those situations were present in this case, because an APD officer arrested Chavez “outside the detention facility, and his arrest was based on a warrant, rather than any conduct occurring while in MDC custody.” MSJ at 9 (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33–3–28(A)). The Defendants argue that Rustin is entitled to qualified immunity and is not liable for Chavez' false arrest. See MSJ at 9.

The Defendants argue that Rustin is also entitled to qualified immunity for Chavez' false imprisonment claim, which they describe as a supervisory liability claim. See MSJ at 9. The Defendants assert that “supervisors can be held liable only for their own...