Chavez v. Cockrell

• Decision Date: 29 October 2002
• Docket Number: No. 02-10050.,02-10050.
• Parties: Juan Rodriguez CHAVEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Janie COCKRELL, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

310 F.3d 805

Juan Rodriguez CHAVEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Janie COCKRELL, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 02-10050.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

October 29, 2002.

Donel Lee Davidson, Bedford, TX, for Petitioner-Appellant.

James Richard Broughton, Austin, TX, for Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before JONES, SMITH and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner-Appellant Juan Rodriguez Chavez seeks a certificate of appealability ("COA") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), to appeal the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. Chavez argues that he was denied the presumption of innocence and the right to an impartial jury when the "stun belt" that he was forced to wear during trial inadvertently activated in the presence of the jury. Because we find that Chavez has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, we deny his request for a COA.

I

Chavez was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Jose Morales during the course of committing or attempting to commit a robbery in 1996. Prior to the commencement of his trial, the court held a hearing to determine whether Chavez should be required to wear a stun belt in the courtroom.¹ Based on testimony from multiple sources indicating that Chavez was planning to escape during his trial by disarming an officer and shooting his way out of the building, the trial judge approved the use of a stun belt on Chavez. At trial, the stun belt was hidden under Chavez's clothing and was not visible to the jury. However, during the first day of testimony, the stun belt inadvertently activated, causing Chavez to stand up, say "it's shocking me ...," and slump over the table. The jurors were immediately excused from the courtroom, and Chavez was examined by medical personnel. That same day, the judge held a hearing in which he heard testimony establishing that the stun belt had activated through no fault of Chavez or either of the two certified stun belt operators present in the courtroom. Chavez's counsel then moved for a mistrial. The following day, the trial court separately questioned each individual juror to determine what he or she had witnessed, and if the juror's impartiality had been impaired by the incident. Seven of the twelve jurors correctly assumed that Chavez had been affected by some type of restraining device, although not all of them could ascertain the specific cause.² Two other jurors believed he had been shocked but had no idea what caused the incident. The three remaining jurors noticed a commotion but did not know the cause. All of the jurors stated that they believed they could remain fair and impartial following the incident. The court then determined that Chavez's presumption of innocence had not been impaired, and denied defense counsel's motion for a mistrial. Specifically, the trial judge made the following finding:

I find that while varying degrees of perception was as [sic] indicated by the record showed that the jurors saw or heard something, I find that which they recall having happened in no way would impinge or infringe upon the presumption of innocence guaranteed to Mr. Chavez under the constitution and laws of the State of Texas and the United States.

At the conclusion of the trial, Chavez was found guilty and sentenced to death.

Chavez's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and his application for state habeas relief was denied. Chavez then filed a federal habeas application asserting twenty grounds for relief. The district court determined that nineteen of these claims were procedurally barred, but considered Chavez's claim relating to the inadvertent activation of the stun belt. In this claim, Chavez specifically argued that he was denied the presumption of innocence and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when the stun belt activated in the presence of the jury. The district court concluded that Chavez's presumption of innocence claim was barred as a new rule of constitutional law under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), but nonetheless addressed the entire claim on the merits.³ Chavez v. Cockrell, No. Civ. A. 3:00-CV-2202-D, 2001 WL 1609347 at *3 (N.D.Tex. Dec.12, 2001). The district court ultimately held that because the Texas state court's adjudication of Chavez's claim was not objectively unreasonable, habeas relief should not be granted. Id. at *7. Chavez now seeks a COA to appeal the district court's ruling.

II

Chavez's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition, filed in 2001, is subject to the limiting provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Under AEDPA, a petitioner must obtain a COA before he can appeal the district court's decision. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). A COA will be granted only if the petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In order to make a substantial showing, a petitioner must show that "reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). In assessing whether the petitioner has been denied a constitutional right, a reviewing court must defer to the state court's determination unless its decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495. An application of federal law is unreasonable if "the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

III

Chavez argues that the inadvertent activation of his stun belt in the presence of the jury denied him the presumption of innocence. "The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice." Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). The physical appearance of a defendant while in the presence of the jury may adversely affect the presumption of innocence. Id. at 504, 96 S.Ct. 1691 (noting that defendant's appearance before the jury may "affect a juror's judgment" because prison clothing serves as a "constant reminder of the accused's condition"). Courts do, however, have an obligation to "protect the court and its processes, and to attend to the safety and security of those in the courtroom." United States v. Nicholson, 846 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir.1988) (upholding use of plainclothes deputies sitting next to defendant at trial). Thus, the Supreme Court has held that binding and gagging an "obstreperous defendant" is permissible when necessary to maintain courtroom order. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). In addition, a defendant may be shackled "to preserve the dignity of the trial and to secure the safety of its participants." Marquez v. Collins, 11 F.3d 1241, 1244 (5th Cir.1994); see also Fountain v. United States, 211 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir.2000) (holding that a defendant may be shackled in the presence of the jury in cases of "extreme need," when "necessary to maintain the security of the courtroom"). Defendants thus may be handcuffed to prevent escape and to prevent injury to others in the courtroom. Wilkerson v. Whitley, 16 F.3d 64, 67 (5th Cir.1994); Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir.1971); see also United States v. Collins, 109 F.3d 1413, 1417-18 (9th Cir.1997) (upholding use of shackles in case where defendant poses legitimate flight risk). The use of such restraints, however, is subject to close judicial scrutiny. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986). In addition, the restraints must further a legitimate interest of the state. Id. at 571-72, 106 S.Ct. 1340 (upholding presence of four uniformed state troopers in courtroom during defendants' trial when deployment was "intimately related to the State's legitimate interest in maintaining custody during the proceedings"); Estelle, 425 U.S. at 505, 96 S.Ct. 1691 (concluding prison clothing is prejudicial when it furthers no "essential state policy").

In this case, the trial court specifically determined before trial that Chavez was a flight risk and that the use of the stun belt was necessary. Based on the evidence presented at the separate hearing establishing that Chavez posed a legitimate risk of flight, we believe that it was within the trial court's discretion to visibly restrain Chavez. Marquez, 11 F.3d at 1244 (noting state trial judge has discretion to order restraints when necessary). Therefore, because the trial court could have permitted the use of visible restraints at Chavez's trial, we do not believe that the jury's momentary glimpse of the effects of the stun belt denied Chavez the presumption of innocence.

Moreover, we note that the trial judge in this case took steps to mitigate any prejudicial influence on the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Pina, 844...