Chavez v. State
| Decision Date | 08 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civ. 19-496 MV/JFR |
| Parties | JOE D. CHAVEZ JR., Petitioner, v. STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION [1]
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner Joe David Chavez Jr.'s Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C § 2254 For Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person In State Custody. Doc. 7. Respondents filed an Answer, after which Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend.[2] Docs. 19, 21. Petitioner did not file a reply. Having carefully reviewed the record,[3] the parties' submissions and the relevant law, and for the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that the Petition is not well-taken. The Court therefore recommends that the Petition be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and recommends against issuing a Certificate of Appealability (COA).
Petitioner and others were prosecuted in the Twelfth Judicial District Court, State of New Mexico, for engaging in racketeering and other crimes linked to their drug trafficking activities. The indictment alleged that Petitioner and others[4] formed a criminal enterprise that would purchase controlled substances primarily methamphetamine, in Arizona and then transport and sell those drugs in the Alamogordo, New Mexico area.[5] Petitioner's brother Robert Chavez was the leader of the organization, known as the AZ Boys, while Petitioner acted as Robert's intermediary and instructed other members to do what Robert directed. During the lengthy investigation, law enforcement noticed numerous cars outside Robert Chavez's residence, and that all of the cars had been purchased from the Richardson Motor Company, a local car dealership. They also learned that none of the cars had liens associated with them and all were paid for in cash. A confidential informant was able to provide detailed information about the workings of the organization to law enforcement, specifically about drug purchases in Arizona and subsequent purchases of automobiles in Alamogordo. Financial documents seized during the investigation helped prove that Petitioner and his brother used illegal proceeds to purchase numerous automobiles and pay the mortgage on his residence. See generally Doc. 19-1 at 251254 ().
Petitioner's case proceeded to trial in April, 2014, and after four days of trial proceedings, the jury convicted Petitioner of all counts except Count 3 (trafficking- methamphetamine) and Count 5 (trafficking-marijuana). Doc. 19-1 at 130-48 (“Original Verdicts”). Petitioner was sentenced in the Twelfth Judicial District Court, Otero County, State of New Mexico, to a total period of incarceration of forty-eight (48) years of imprisonment. Id. at 164-69. Petitioner appealed his convictions to the New Mexico County of Appeals, which affirmed. Id. at 251 et seq. The New Mexico Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari. Id. at 288-89. Thereafter, Petitioner filed in the State district court a petition for habeas corpus, which was summarily dismissed by the district judge. Id. at 429-34. The New Mexico Supreme Court denied a subsequent petition for writ of certiorari. Id. at 611. Petitioner then timely filed the instant federal Petition.
In the instant proceeding, Petitioner raises five claims. In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his right to not be placed in double jeopardy was violated when the federal government obtained a default judgment in federal forfeiture proceedings, prior to and apart from Petitioner's criminal prosecution and conviction in state court. In Ground Two, Petitioner argues there was insufficient evidence to support the racketeering conviction, because the jury acquitted on the drug trafficking charges which were the only charges that could support a racketeering conviction. In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that the state trial judge erroneously instructed the jury, as the racketeering instruction failed to provide the essential elements of the underlying offenses beyond the two possible predicate offenses with which Petitioner was charged: trafficking and conspiracy to commit trafficking. In Ground Four, Petitioner claims both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. Finally, in Ground Five Petitioner generally alleges that the arrest warrant and search warrants were based on defective and legally insufficient affidavits. The Court addresses each claim below.
After reviewing the motion and response, as well as the underlying files and records of the case, I can hold an evidentiary hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Townshend v. Sam 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963). To warrant such a hearing, the Petitioner must show that the hearing held in state court was not fair or adequate. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases Rule 8 Adv. Comm. Notes; § 2254(d). When reviewing the record in this case, including Petitioner's Motion and United States' response as well as all the documents in the underlying criminal case, I am mindful that I must liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings and hold them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by an attorney. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). I have done so here and have determined that no such evidentiary hearing is warranted, as the petition, files and records in this matter conclusively show that Petitioner received a fair and adequate hearing. I am comfortable ruling without taking additional testimony or evidence.
Petitioner states that Ground One has not been exhausted. Doc. 7 at 8. The claim was asserted in the state habeas case and summarily dismissed. See Doc. 19-1 at 291 (); 391-393; 429-434 (Procedural Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Summary Dismissal)); 438-445 (Motion to Dismiss based on Violation of Double Jeopardy). The undersigned finds Petitioner has adequately exhausted Ground One.
Petitioner states that his right to not be placed in double jeopardy was violated when, after the initiation of criminal and forfeiture proceedings in the Twelfth Judicial District Court, the state prosecutor dismissed the forfeiture proceedings and transferred all seized property to the federal government for federal forfeiture proceedings. Doc. 7 at 10; see Doc. 19-1 at 11-15 (), and 19-1 at 19-24 (“Complaint of Forfeiture of Real Property”). The United States filed a “Verified Complaint for Forfeiture in Rem” on February 15, 2013 in which the federal government alleged that the personal and real property and named monies constituted proceeds of illegal drug trafficking, or were subject to forfeiture because they were used to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, or possession of a controlled substance. See Civ. No. 13-cv-155 (D.N.M.), Doc. 1. Petitioner Joe Chavez filed an answer to the forfeiture complaint as an interested party, and claimed to be the “rightful and lawful owner” of the properties subject to forfeiture. Civ. No. 13-cv-155 (D.N.M.), Doc. 57. On December 5, 2013, the federal government obtained final judgment and order of forfeiture with respect to the property. Civ. No. 13-cv-155 (D.N.M.), Doc. 127 (“Final Judgment and Order of Forfeiture Except as to One Vehicle”).[6]
Now, Petitioner relies on State v. Nunez, 129 NM 63, 2 P.3d 264, 2000-NMSC-013, to claim that the subsequent criminal conviction violated his right to not be placed in double jeopardy in that the criminal charges and forfeiture proceedings did not proceed in a single bifurcated proceeding. See Doc. 7 at 58-66 (“Motion to Dismiss”). Petitioner states that jeopardy attached when the federal government obtained its default judgment in the civil forfeiture proceeding, and therefore the subsequent criminal convictions in state court were in violation of Petitioner's rights under Article II, Section 15 of the New Mexico Constitution and the New Mexico Forfeiture Act. Id. at 439. Petitioner claims that New Mexico's Forfeiture Act, which prohibits (under certain circumstances) the transferal of the seized property to the federal government for forfeiture proceedings, is retroactive to his case. Id.
The Forfeiture Act prohibits in some instances the transfer of seized property to the federal government for purposes of instituting federal forfeiture proceedings. Section 31-27-11 reads in relevant part:
N.M.S.A. 1978, § 31-27-11 (2015).
This section went into effect on July 1, 2015, or after Petitioner's trial and convictions. Thus, whether section 31-27-11 even applies to Petitioner's case is dubious, as Petitioner provides no authority to suggest that the New Mexico legislature, or a New Mexico court, has ever applied this statute retroactively. Moreover, the value...
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