Chavira v. U.S. Dep't of Educ.
| Decision Date | 11 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:19-cv-00538-DAD-SAB |
| Parties | MARIA CHAVIRA, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT IMMEDIATE CREDIT RECOVERY INC.'S APPLICATION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IN PART (DOC. NOS. 30, 32, 39)
Before the court are the following two motions for summary judgment and an application to supplement one of those motions with a declaration that was mistakenly filed late: (i) plaintiff Maria Chavira's motion for summary judgment against defendant U.S. Department of Education (“DOE”) filed on October 21, 2020, (Doc. No. 30); (ii) defendant Immediate Credit Recovery, Inc.'s (“ICR”) motion for summary judgment against plaintiff filed on October 26, 2020, (Doc. No. 32); and (iii) defendant ICR's application to correct and substitute its previously filed motion for summary judgment and declaration in support thereof filed on December 9, 2020, (Doc. No. 39). The pending motions and application were taken under submission on the papers. (Doc. Nos. 31, 33, 37.) For the reasons explained below, the court will deny plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as moot, grant defendant ICR's application to correct and substitute, and grant in part defendant ICR's motion for summary judgment. [1]
This action arises from ICR seeking to collect a student loan debt on behalf of defendant DOE from plaintiff, a 73-year-old woman who claims that she is the victim of identity theft and that the debt ICR seeks to collect is not hers.
On May 28, 2018, ICR sent an initial collection letter to plaintiff stating that her “defaulted student loan or grant overpayment has been placed with [ICR] for the purposes of securing payment of this debt.” (Doc. Nos. 39-1 at 52; 35-2 at ¶ 19.) Among other things, the letter informed plaintiff that it was “an attempt [to] collect a debt” and that the letter was “from a debt collector.” (Doc. No. 39-1 at 52.) It specified the debt's principal balance, interest, fees, costs, and the resulting total balance. (Id.) The letter also provided the following notice, in part:
If you notify this office in writing within 30 days from receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will: obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification.
(Id.) ICR received neither any written response from plaintiff to this initial collection letter nor any returned mail indicating plaintiff had not received it. (Doc. No. 35-2 at ¶¶ 22-23.) Some 70 days later, on August 6, 2018, plaintiff first contacted ICR by telephone and advised ICR that she had received the initial collection letter but did not believe the debt belonged to her. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.) ICR told plaintiff that it would locate the promissory note associated with the account and send it to plaintiff.[3] (Doc. No. 39-1 at 62.) On or about that same day, August 6, 2018, ICR mailed plaintiff a second collection letter with identical language as that appearing in the first letter. (Doc. No. 30-1 at ¶ 3.)
Less than 30 days later, on August 21, 2018, plaintiff's counsel sent a letter to ICR claiming that plaintiff did not owe the debt and that she had been the victim of identity theft. (Doc. Nos. 39-1 at 62; 30-1 at ¶ 5.) Three months later, on November 30, 2018, a paralegal from plaintiff's counsel's office called ICR and was informed that plaintiff's account was in “cease and desist status.” (Doc. No. 39-1 at 62.) That same day, ICR mailed a third collection notice, this time addressed to plaintiff's counsel, with identical language as that appearing in the first two letters. (Id.; Doc. No. 30-1 at 35.)
Throughout December 2018 and early January 2019, plaintiff's counsel and non-party LifeLock[4] communicated with ICR on plaintiff's behalf regarding forms plaintiff could submit to establish that she had been the victim of identity theft and that the debt at issue was not hers. (See Doc. No. 39-1 at 62-63.) ICR received an identity theft victim's complaint and affidavit in late 2018 and DOE's identity theft application in early 2019 from plaintiff's representatives seeking to establish her identity theft claim and to discharge the debt. (Doc. Nos. 39-1 at 63; 30-1 at 38-44, 52-60.) On January 15, 2019, ICR advised LifeLock that plaintiff's documentation had been uploaded for review by the DOE, but that it ultimately denied plaintiff's application approximately one month later because it determined that the documentation plaintiff had submitted was insufficient to verify that she was not the individual who owed the disputed debt. (Doc. No. 39-1 at 63; 35-2 at ¶ 32.)
On February 21, 2019, ICR advised a paralegal in plaintiff's counsel's office by telephone conversation that the DOE had rejected plaintiff's identity theft application. (Doc. No. 35-2 at ¶ 33.) The paralegal reiterated to ICR the claim that plaintiff was the victim of identity theft, that the debt was not plaintiff's, and inquired as to what else could be done. (Doc. No. 39-1 at 45 ().) On March 15, 2019, LifeLock also called ICR seeking assistance in appealing DOE's decision in this regard, and ICR advised that plaintiff could attempt to submit as much additional documentation to DOE as possible. (Doc. No. 35-2 at ¶¶ 34-35.) That same day, ICR mailed a fourth collection letter directly to plaintiff with identical language as that contained in the first three collection letters. (Doc. No. 30-1 at 46.) After ICR received this lawsuit on May 3, 2019, there were no subsequent communications between the parties. (Doc. No. 39-1 at 63.)
On April 25, 2019, plaintiff filed her complaint in this action asserting a claim for declaratory relief against defendant DOE and a claim brought under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq., against defendant ICR for three asserted violations under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g, 1692e, and 1692f. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 40-42.) This case now proceeds only on plaintiff's FDCPA claim brought against defendant ICR.[5]
On October 26, 2020, defendant ICR filed its pending motion for summary judgment arguing that it: (1) complied with the all the requirements of the FDCPA, and (2) that it properly relied on its creditor, the DOE, regarding the validity of the underlying debt obligation. (Doc. No. 32.) Plaintiff filed her opposition to the motion on November 23, 2020. (Doc. No. 35.) On December 8, 2020, ICR filed its reply. (Doc. No. 38.) When ICR filed its reply brief, it realized that it had not filed a supporting declaration by Lawrence Rathbun and exhibits thereto, which it had intended to file concurrently with its motion for summary judgment on October 26, 2020. (See Doc. Nos. 36, 37.) Accordingly, on December 9, 2020, defendant ICR filed an application to correct and substitute its previously filed motion for summary judgment with a motion that includes the Rathbun declaration and exhibits. (Doc. No. 39.) Plaintiff opposed that application on December 11, 2020. (Doc. No. 41.)
In ICR's application, it seeks permission to substitute its originally filed motion for summary judgment, (Doc. No. 32), with a version that includes the Rathbun declaration and supporting exhibits because its failure to include them with the original filing was due to “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” (Doc. No. 39 at 1) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1)).[6]
“To determine whether a party's failure to meet a deadline constitutes ‘excusable neglect,' courts must apply a four-factor equitable test, examining: (1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith.” Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395).
ICR claims in its application that the only difference between the two versions of its motion for summary judgment is that the original (filed) version of the motion inadvertently omitted the declaration and exhibits. (Doc. No. 39 at 1.) ICR asserts that because it nevertheless served a copy of the Rathbun declaration and exhibits on plaintiff by email on October 26, 2020, plaintiff was not prejudiced by its filing error in this regard. (Id. at 2-3; Doc. No. 39-2 at 2.) In fact, ICR points out that plaintiff referenced the Rathbun declaration in her own opposition brief and did not oppose ICR's motion based on its failure to actually file the Rathbun declaration. (Doc. Nos. 39 at 3; 35 at 6.) Finally, ICR contends the omission was “entirely unintentional” and the clerical error should not prevent its motion from being decided on the merits. (Doc. No. 39 at 3.)
In opposition, plaintiff argues that “[w]e never received the filed Declaration of Lawrence Rathbun, and had to work off a draft.” (Doc. No. 41 at 2.) Nonetheless, plaintiff does not claim that the “draft” her counsel received was different in any way from the late-filed copy, nor does plaintiff claim prejudice from the late filing of the Rathbun declaration. Instead, her short opposition to the application focuses on the merits of ICR's motion for summary judgment. (Id. at 4.)
Here there does not appear to be any danger of prejudice to plaintiff because ICR emailed plaintiff's counsel the Rathbun declaration with exhibits on October 26, 2020, the date ICR filed its motion for summary judgment with the court. (Doc. No. 39-2 at 2.) Plaintiff does not contend-nor does it appear from the court's...
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