Chavis v. State

• Decision Date: 23 June 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2617,2617
• Parties: JAMES ARTHUR CHAVIS v. STATE OF MARYLAND
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

JAMES ARTHUR CHAVIS v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 2617

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2018

June 23, 2020

Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 117045002

UNREPORTED

Beachley, Gould, Adkins, Sally D. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Gould, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

One of the hallmarks of a fair trial is the defendant's right to conduct a complete investigation and discover relevant evidence, both good and bad for the defense. One investigatory tool is interviewing the State's witnesses. Appellant James Arthur Chavis—convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for voluntary manslaughter—contends that the State violated his constitutional rights by insisting on being present during his counsel's interview of a State witness. Mr. Chavis also contends that the court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to impeach his credibility with evidence of two prior convictions.

Because the record does not reveal any indication that the State's presence during the interview interfered with defense counsel's ability to obtain relevant information from the witness, we find that the State did not violate Mr. Chavis's constitutional right to either a fair trial or to the effective assistance of counsel. We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to impeach Mr. Chavis with his prior convictions.

Accordingly, for the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

On January 22, 2017, Mr. Chavis engaged in heated conversations with Oscar Acevedo at a Royal Farms convenience store in southeast Baltimore City. Mr. Chavis briefly left the store, and then returned, had an altercation with, and ultimately fatally stabbed, Mr. Acevedo. Mr. Chavis was indicted by a grand jury on charges including first-degree murder and openly wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure.

A few days prior to trial, Mr. Chavis moved to exclude the testimony of four of the State's witnesses, including an individual named Jason Bupp. Mr. Chavis contended that the State had disclosed that Mr. Bupp would be testifying in the State's case-in-chief only days before, and that this late disclosure violated Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(3).¹ According to Mr. Chavis, in its initial disclosures, the State merely listed Mr. Bupp, without an address or telephone number, as one of the 21 people with whom it had made contact but had not yet interviewed. Mr. Chavis contended that the State violated its discovery obligations under Rule 4-263(d)(3), and that the proper remedy was the exclusion of Mr. Bupp as a witness.

The court denied Mr. Chavis's motion. The court observed that the State had provided notice of Mr. Bupp's potential role as a witness in its initial and supplemental disclosures about one year earlier. The court further noted that in its disclosures, the State had requested that identifying information be "withheld pursuant to Rule 4-263(d)(3), Rule 16-1009(b), and Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 11-205."² As such, the court concluded that the State had complied with Rule 4-263(d)(3) and CP § 11-205.

Also prior to trial, Mr. Chavis moved to preclude the admission of his two prior convictions—a 13-year-old conviction for robbery and a 14-year-old conviction for possession of narcotics with intent to distribute—that the State intended to use for impeachment purposes pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-609. The court denied this motion as well.

Mr. Bupp did not make himself available to be interviewed by either the prosecutor or defense counsel before trial. On the third day of trial, Mr. Bupp unexpectedly appeared. The prosecutor interviewed him that morning, advised defense counsel of his presence, and provided defense counsel with the opportunity to interview him as well.

Defense counsel asked the prosecutor to let him interview Mr. Bupp in private.³ The prosecutor declined, stating that she had the right to hear what Mr. Bupp had to say and challenged defense counsel to "cite a rule or a case that provides the right to a defense counsel to question a witness without the presence of the State's attorney." Defense counsel proceeded with the interview of Mr. Bupp in the prosecutor's presence.

Defense counsel informed the court about the circumstances surrounding his interview of Mr. Bupp and asked the court to allow a second interview outside of the presence of the prosecutor. The prosecutor opposed the request. She argued that the defendant did not have "any right to interview a witness without the presence of the State." She further maintained that during defense counsel's interview, she had "avoided eye contact with both the witness and [defense counsel and] was only a standing ear so that [she] could hear anything that possibly may be an issue at trial." Defense counsel did not dispute the prosecutor's account of the interview. The court denied the motion.

Mr. Chavis was tried before a jury and found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Chavis presents the following two questions for review:

1. Whether the State deprived appellant of his constitutional rights to a fair trial and to the effective assistance of counsel when the prosecutor insisted on being present during defense counsel's interview of a witness for the State; and

2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the age of appellant's 13- and 14-year-old prior convictions weighed in favor of their admissibility for impeachment purposes under Rule 5-609.

MR. BUPP'S INTERVIEW

Mr. Chavis makes a two-pronged argument regarding the prosecutor's refusal to absent herself from defense counsel's interview of Mr. Bupp. First, he argues that the State violated his constitutional rights by refusing to allow his counsel to privately interview Mr. Bupp. Second, he argues that this violation was compounded by the trial court's refusal toallow a second interview outside of the State's presence. He contends that both errors were not harmless because, if his counsel had been given the opportunity to interview Mr. Bupp alone, he may have discovered facts that would have supported a perfect self-defense claim. For the reasons that follow, we reject these arguments.

Mr. Chavis's Constitutional Claims

A criminal defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel is secured by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 355, 362 (2017) (citations omitted). "[E]ffective representation means representation in which the attorney is unhindered in the lawful pursuit for knowledge which might benefit the client." Clark v. State, 306 Md. 483, 489 (1986). One means of acquiring such knowledge is by interviewing witnesses, including those anticipated to testify on behalf of the State. See Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 461 n.3 (1982) (dissenting opinion) (citing Ex Parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Cr. App. 1980) ("failure to interview witnesses works a denial of effective assistance of counsel where the consequence is that only viable defense alternative to the accused is not advanced"); Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 436 (1990) (quotation omitted) (citing cases evidencing ineffective assistance of counsel, including where counsel "failed to interview witnesses before trial, did no legal research, and failed to consult experts").

In support of his contention that the State violated his constitutional rights to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel, Mr. Chavis urges us to "adopt the prevailing view in other jurisdictions and hold that the State violates a criminal defendant's constitutional rights by insisting on being present during defense counsel's interview of a witness, absenta request by the witness for the prosecutor's presence." In support of his argument, Mr. Chavis cites to:

• Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1966) - the prosecutor advised witnesses to a robbery not to speak to defense counsel outside of his presence or without his authorization.

• State v. Simmons, 203 N.W.2d 887, 891-92 (Wis. 1973) - the prosecutor denied defense counsel access to a 17-year-old victim and the victim's mother prior to trial. The victim said she was ordered not to speak to anyone without her mother being present, and that the mother stated that the prosecutor "instructed her not to talk to anyone about the case except in [the prosecutor's] presence." Id.

• State v. Hofstetter, 878 P.2d 474, 477 (Wash. 1994) - the prosecutor misleadingly informed the witness that it would be a breach of his plea agreement if he was interviewed by defense counsel without the prosecutor present.

• State v. Mussehl, 408 N.W.2d 844, 845 (Minn. 1987) - the prosecutor discouraged the State's witnesses from speaking to a defense investigator by sending them a letter with a warning that defense attorneys are:

ethically obligated to do everything within [their] power to defend the person charged with the crime. In practice this means that he will be trying to get his client acquitted. You should bear in mind when you are making your decision as to whether or not you wish to talk with someone from the defense. If you wish to talk to the defendant's investigator or to his attorney I would request that you advise me and request that I be present . . .

• State v. Blazas, 74 A.3d 991, (N.J. Super 2013) - defense counsel alleged that a detective told an investigator for the defense that he was not permitted to contact a State's witness and also instructed the witness not to speak to the investigator. Defense counsel further alleged that the detective stated that any

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