Cheatham v. Pohle
| Decision Date | 28 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 40A01-0010-CV-329.,40A01-0010-CV-329. |
| Citation | 764 N.E.2d 272 |
| Parties | Doris CHEATHAM, Appellant, v. Michael POHLE, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Thomas J. Lantz, David W. Paugh, Montgomery, Elsner & Pardieck, Seymour, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Andrew M. Auersch, Timothy J. O'Connor, O'Connor & Auersch, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
David W. Stone IV, Anderson, IN, Attorney for Amicus Curiae.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, David L. Steiner, James B. Martin, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae.
In March 1998, Doris Cheatham filed a complaint against her former husband, Michael Pohle, alleging that he had invaded her privacy and intentionally caused her severe emotional distress when he posted several nude photographs of her in public places. In his amended answer, Pohle asserted the defense of waiver, and Cheatham moved for partial summary judgment on that issue. Following a hearing, the trial court entered partial summary judgment for Cheatham, ruling that, as a matter of law, Pohle could not assert waiver as a defense. At Pohle's request, the trial court certified its order for interlocutory appeal. In February 2000, we affirmed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Cheatham. See Pohle v. Cheatham, 724 N.E.2d 655 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). On remand, a jury found in favor of Cheatham and awarded her compensatory damages of $100,000 and punitive damages of $100,000. The trial court entered judgment on the verdicts. Cheatham appeals,1 but she does not attack the judgment. Rather, she raises the following issues concerning the allocation of her damage award:
1. Whether the State's appropriation of 75% of a punitive damage award violates the takings clauses of the United States and Indiana Constitutions.
2. Whether Indiana Code Section 34-51-3-6 violates Article 1, Section 21 of the Indiana Constitution because it makes an unconstitutional demand upon an attorney's particular services.2
We affirm the judgment and hold that Indiana Code Section 34-51-3-6 violates the particular services clause of the Indiana Constitution.3
In this court's opinion in Cheatham I we provided a lengthy recitation of the facts surrounding this case. They are, in part, as follows:
As a result of the publication of these photographs, Cheatham filed a complaint against Pohle on March 27, 1998, alleging intentional invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of severe emotional distress.
We note initially that Cheatham did not raise the constitutionality of Indiana Code Section 34-51-3-6 to the trial court. However, a party may raise the constitutionality of a statute at any stage of the proceeding, and this court may even raise the issue sua sponte. Morse v. State, 593 N.E.2d 194, 197 (Ind. 1992). Our usual standard of review for the interpretation of statutes is de novo. Parkview Hospital, Inc. v. Roese, 750 N.E.2d 384, 386 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). But when a statute is challenged as an alleged violation of the Indiana Constitution, it stands before us clothed with the presumption of constitutionality until clearly overcome by a contrary showing. Eukers v. State, 728 N.E.2d 219, 221 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000). The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute bears the burden of proof, and we resolve all doubts against that party. Id. If there are two reasonable interpretations of a statute, one of which is constitutional and the other not, we will choose that path which permits upholding the statute because we will not presume that the legislature violated the constitution unless such is required by the unambiguous language of the statute. Id.
The statute that permits the State to take 75% of Cheatham's punitive damage award, Indiana Code Section 34-51-3-6, provides, in pertinent part:
Cheatham contends that the State's enforcement of its right under Indiana Code Section 34-51-3-6 to collect 75% of her punitive damages award is an unconstitutional taking under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 21 of the Indiana Constitution. We cannot agree.
The United States Supreme Court, in McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24, 19 S.Ct. 134, 43 L.Ed. 382 (1898), stated that:
It is not within the power of the legislature to take away rights [that] have been once vested by a judgment. Legislation may act on subsequent proceedings, may abate actions pending, but when those actions have passed into judgment the power of the legislature to disturb the rights created thereby ceases.
That case, however, addressed the effect on an existing judgment when the State later repealed the statute under which the judgment had been obtained. We have no such scenario here, as Indiana Code Section 34-51-3-6 was originally enacted in 1995 (formerly I.C. § 34-4-34-6), and Cheatham did not file her complaint until 1998. Thus, the statute was in full force and effect from the inception of Cheatham's case, and she was charged with knowledge of its potential impact on her case.
In further support of her "takings" claim, Cheatham cites Kirk v. Denver Publ'g Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo.1991). There, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a state statute requiring judgment creditors to forfeit one-third of their punitive damages to the State's general fund was a "taking" of property without just compensation in violation of the United States and Colorado Constitutions. Id. at 272. The court concluded that the judgment creditor does have a property interest in a punitive damage award and noted that: "[t]he legislature may well abate or diminish a pending civil action, but when that claim ripens into judgment `the power of the legislature to disturb the rights created thereby ceases.'" Id. (quoting McCullough, 172 U.S. at 123-24, 19 S.Ct. 134). As we have already noted, we do not believe that McCullough holds that judgment creditors always have a property interest in punitive damage awards. And we do not agree with the Kirk court's interpretation on that point. We also note that, to our knowledge, Kirk is the only state supreme court decision to strike down a punitive damage allocation statute as an unconstitutional taking. See 32 Val. U.L.Rev. at 947. Subsequent courts in different states have found no vested property right in punitive damage awards. Id.; see State v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632, 634 (Ga.1993).
Moreover, it is well settled law in Indiana that there is no entitlement to punitive damages. Durham ex rel. Estate of Wade v. U-Haul Int'l, 745 N.E.2d 755, 764 (Ind.2001). The State could choose to eliminate punitive damages entirely. It is axiomatic that "individuals have `no vested or property right in any rule of common law,'" and that "the General Assembly can make substantial changes to the existing law without infringing on citizen rights." McIntosh v. Melroe Co., a Div. Of Clark Equip. Co., Inc., 729 N.E.2d 972, 978 (Ind. 2000). That being the case, we decline to hold that the State's appropriation of a portion of a judgment creditor's punitive damages is an unconstitutional "taking."
Cheatham next contends that, on its face, Indiana Code Section 34-51-3-6 violates Article 1, Section 21 of the Indiana Constitution. Specifically, she argues that the State's right to collect 75% of her punitive damage award, without a corresponding obligation to pay any attorney's fees, unconstitutionally demands the services of her attorney without just compensation.4 We agree.
Cheatham maintains that this statute conflicts with Article 1, Section 21 of...
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Cheatham v. Pohle
...of the Indiana Constitution by placing a demand on an attorney's "particular services" without just compensation. Cheatham v. Pohle, 764 N.E.2d 272, 277 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002). The Court of Appeals rejected Pohle's cross-appeal on the ground that the issues were first raised in a post-trial mot......
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Duncan v. Duncan, 15A04-0111-CV-489.
...be fundamentally unjust, such as where the issue did not become ripe for review until after judgment was entered. See Cheatham v. Pohle, 764 N.E.2d 272 (Ind. Ct.App. 2002) (determining that a civil appellant had not waived her constitutional challenge to a punitive damages statute because t......
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