Checkley v. Boyd

• Decision Date: 08 November 2000
• Citation: 170 Or. App. 721,14 P.3d 81
• Parties: Ronald H. CHECKLEY, individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for Shad Alan Wagner, an incapacitated person, on behalf of Shad Alan Wagner and Lon N. Bryant, Guardian Ad Litem for Shad Alan Wagner, Appellants, v. Charles BOYD and Bimla Boyd, husband and wife, and Keizer Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Salem, Oregon, an Oregon non-profit corporation, Respondents.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

14 P.3d 81

170 Or. App. 721

Ronald H. CHECKLEY, individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for Shad Alan Wagner, an incapacitated person, on behalf of Shad Alan Wagner and Lon N. Bryant, Guardian Ad Litem for Shad Alan Wagner, Appellants, v. Charles BOYD and Bimla Boyd, husband and wife, and Keizer Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Salem, Oregon, an Oregon non-profit corporation, Respondents.

(95C-12511; CA A96887)

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted December 7, 1998.

Decided November 8, 2000.

Kelly Clark argued the cause and filed the briefs, for appellants.

Richard L. King, Portland, argued the cause for respondents Charles Boyd and Bimla Boyd. With him on the brief was Warren Allen King O'Hara Bennett & Jepsen, LLP.

John E. Pollino, Salem, argued the cause for respondent Keizer Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Salem, Oregon. With him on the brief were Chess Trethewy and Garrett, Hemann, Robertson, Paulus, Jennings & Comstock, P.C.

Before LANDAU, Presiding Judge, and HASELTON and LINDER, Judges.

Argued and Submitted December 7, 1998, Wilsonville.

LINDER, J.

Plaintiff Ronald Checkley, as guardian and on behalf of his disabled brother, Shad Wagner, brought intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims alleging that defendants Charles and Bimla Boyd (the Boyds) engaged in a pattern of brainwashing, influencing, manipulating, and coercing Wagner. Plaintiff also brought actions on his own behalf for IIED and for wrongful use of civil proceedings. On all counts, plaintiff alleged that the Keizer Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses (the Congregation) is vicariously liable for the Boyds' conduct because the Boyds were acting under the Congregation's direction and control.¹ The trial court dismissed plaintiff's actions on his own behalf for failure to state a claim. ORCP 21 A(8). The claims brought on Wagner's behalf proceeded to a jury trial, and the trial court directed verdict in defendants' favor at the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief. On appeal, plaintiff raises numerous assignments of error relating to the dismissals, the directed verdict, and various evidentiary rulings. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

We begin by reviewing the trial court's dismissal of the IIED and wrongful use of civil proceedings claims that plaintiff brought on his own behalf. For purposes of reviewing a trial court's order of dismissal pursuant to ORCP 21 A(8), we accept all of the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and we give plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts alleged. Glubka v. Long, 115 Or.App. 236, 238, 837 P.2d 553 (1992).

In support of the IIED claims brought on his own behalf, plaintiff alleged that his brother, Wagner, suffers from mental disabilities due to physical injuries resulting from an automobile accident, and he has lived under plaintiff's care since 1981. As a result of his mental disabilities, Wagner is highly vulnerable to suggestion, influence, and coercion. According to plaintiff,

"[The] Boyds engaged in a deliberate pattern of brainwashing Wagner, and influenced, manipulated and coerced Wagner into thinking that:

"A. [Plaintiff] had stolen money from Wagner over the years and had dealt dishonestly with Wagner in financial matters;

"B. Wagner was being emotionally, spiritually and physically abused by [plaintiff];

"C. Wagner's physical needs were being neglected and that [plaintiff's] care of Wagner was inadequate;

"D. [Plaintiff's] lifestyle and religious beliefs were at odds with Wagner's;

"E. [Plaintiff] was holding Wagner prisoner and persecuting Wagner for his religious beliefs;

"F. [Plaintiff], not being a Jehovah's Witness, and opposing the involvement of Jehovah's Witnesses in Wagner's life, was an instrument of Satan, was under the influence of Satan, or was Satan, and that Wagner's salvation, and spiritual and emotional health was at risk if he continued to live with [plaintiff];

"G. Wagner had a religious and moral duty to attempt to remove [plaintiff] as guardian and conservator."

The complaint further alleged that, at the Boyds' urging, Wagner initiated proceedings to remove plaintiff as his guardian and conservator and that the allegations in support of removal were adjudicated to be without merit. According to the complaint, the Boyds' conduct in that regard was "deliberate and intentional and designed to cause [plaintiff] extreme turmoil and distress," and plaintiff did, in fact, suffer from "extreme and lasting emotional turmoil [and] distress" as a result.

In dismissing plaintiff's own claims for IIED against the Boyds and the Congregation, the trial court concluded that plaintiff had failed to state a claim but did not explain in what particular way or ways the court found the complaint to be deficient.² To properly plead a claim of IIED, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant: (1) intentionally—i.e., that the defendant intended to cause or knew with substantial certainty that his or her conduct would cause severe emotional distress; (2) engaged in outrageous conduct— i.e., conduct that was an extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable behavior; and (3) caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress-i.e., the defendant did in fact cause the plaintiff emotional distress that was severe. McGanty v. Staudenraus, 321 Or. 532, 543, 550-51, 901 P.2d 841 (1995). In this case, we have no difficulty determining that the allegations of plaintiff's complaint, as we have just quoted them, sufficiently pleaded the elements of intent and causation for an IIED claim. The allegations as to the remaining element of "outrageousness," however, warrant discussion.

As detailed above, the complaint alleges that the Boyds knew that plaintiff's brother, Wagner, was susceptible to suggestion and influence; that the Boyds nonetheless engaged in a pattern of "brainwashing" the brother and "influenced, manipulated and coerced" him to believe that plaintiff was abusing him and was pilfering funds from him; that those accusations were "adjudicated to be without merit"; that the Boyds' conduct was "designed" to cause plaintiff extreme distress; and that the Boyds' motive for that conduct was to remove plaintiff as his brother's guardian. Viewing those allegations and all reasonable inferences they might support in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the complaint can be understood to allege both that the Boyds' conduct toward plaintiff was defamatory and that the Boyds knew that their defamatory accusations were unsubstantiated.

We agree with plaintiff that those allegations satisfy the outrageousness element of the tort of IIED. Decisions of both this court and the Oregon Supreme Court consistently have held that a defendant's publication of a defamatory or otherwise significantly stigmatizing statement, knowing the statement to be false, unfounded, or unsubstantiated, is conduct that, if found to be true by a factfinder, constitutes an extraordinary transgression of what is socially tolerable. The earliest of those cases is Hall v. The May Dept. Stores, 292 Or. 131, 637 P.2d 126 (1981). There, the court held that outrageousness was adequately pleaded where the allegations permitted an inference that the defendant-employer knew that it lacked proof that an employee stole store funds and that it nevertheless accused the employee of theft and threatened to have the employee arrested and charged, all as part of a design to coerce the employee into confessing.³ Since Hall, our court consistently has reached the same conclusion on similar allegations or evidence, often emphasizing, as adding to the socially outrageous quality of the conduct, the fact that the defamation allegedly was to serve an ulterior purpose or to take advantage of an unusually vulnerable individual.⁴

The allegations of the complaint in this case fit well within those precedents. Plaintiff alleged that the Boyds accused him of pilfering funds from and abusing his brother, Wagner, a mentally disabled person who was especially vulnerable to influence and to whom plaintiff, as Wagner's guardian, owed special fiduciary duties. Such accusations are serious ones that potentially could have led to a formal investigation of plaintiff, OAR 411-020-0040, and ultimately to plaintiff's removal as guardian and conservator, ORS 125.225, in addition to civil liability, ORS 125.485. Indeed, at least in part due to those accusations, Wagner allegedly sought to have plaintiff removed as his guardian. Plaintiff's complaint, read in the light most favorable to plaintiff, permits an inference that the Boyds made those serious accusations against plaintiff either with knowledge that they were false or at least without substantiation. Plaintiff's complaint further alleges that the conduct was designed to prey on the particular vulnerabilities of plaintiff's brother, who suffered from significant mental disabilities due to physical injuries, in order to have the brother seek to remove plaintiff as his guardian. Such an inference falls within the bounds of what we and the Supreme Court consistently have concluded satisfies the "outrageousness" element of IIED.

Defendants assert three alternative grounds for affirming the trial court's dismissal. First, defendants argue, as they did below, that plaintiff's claims impinge on their constitutionally protected rights to free exercise of religion.⁵ Specifically, according to defendants, all of the conduct and statements that are the focus of plaintiff's allegations were religiously motivated and "inextricably tied to religious beliefs." Thus, defendants contend that plaintiff's claims, if tried, would require an improper inquiry into the validity of their religious beliefs. In renewing their free exercise defense on appeal, defendants place primary reliance on Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or.App. 203, 644 P.2d 577, rev. den....