Chelan County Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Chelan County
| Decision Date | 05 November 1987 |
| Docket Number | 53495-1,Nos. 53202-8,s. 53202-8 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 28 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 599, 117 Lab.Cas. P 56,507 CHELAN COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS' ASSOCIATION, Steven A. Worden, Richard A. Peterson, Brian A. Harris, William D. Robinson, Conrad T. Winn, Jr., Patrick J. Haster, Daryl D. Mathena, William K. DePew, Steven R. McCormick, Donald R. King, Mitch Thompson, Harry Hansen, Ronald K. Martin, Herb Whaley, Katherine B. Breda, Ragina Lea Bruggman, Shirley Nichols, Michael Lyons, Michael L. Brickert, Eugene E. Daniels, Thomas Schell, Jerry W. Yonaka, Don O. Danner, Richard Haynes, Jack M. Lyon, Mike Harum, Jerry Monroe, Wanda Hively, D.A. "Pat" Allen, Michael G. Mathena, Jim Brown, Dennis R. Hanks, Leon E. Milligan, C.M. Mikelson, Joe Larkin, Dick Winn, Scott Edie, Mike Hartnett, Bud Fritz, and John Does 1 through 50, Respondents, v. The COUNTY OF CHELAN, Petitioners. Gibson GOFF, III, Petitioner, v. CITY OF AIRWAY HEIGHTS, Respondent. |
Gary A. Riesen, Chelan County Prosecutor, E.R. Whitmore, Sp. Deputy, Wenatchee, for petitioner Chelan County.
Powell & Morris, Brian C. Balch, Spokane, for petitioner Goff.
Clem, Nelson & Zanol, P.S., Craig A. Nelson, Wenatchee, for respondent Chelan County Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n, et al.
Miller & Wainwright, Steven C. Miller, Cheney, for respondent, City of Airway Heights.
James C. Sloan, Spokane City Atty., Pat Dalton, Asst. City Atty., Spokane, amicus curiae for Ass'n of Washington Cities and City of Spokane.
C.C. Bridgewater, Cowlitz County Prosecutor, David R. Koss, Chief Civil Deputy, Kelso, amicus curiae for Washington State Ass'n of Counties & Washington Ass'n of Pro. Attys.
In these two consolidated cases, plaintiffs brought actions seeking compensation for time spent "on call" as law enforcement officers. The principal issue before us is the applicability of the Washington Minimum Wage Act (MWA), RCW Chapter 49.46, to their claims.
The Chelan County Sheriffs' Association and approximately 40 individual Chelan County deputy sheriffs brought this action against their employer, Chelan County, seeking compensation for time spent "on call". Historically, Chelan County deputies received a monthly salary and no extra compensation for overtime. Beginning in 1976, the County made certain allowances, within maximum limits, to pay deputies who actually worked overtime. Since 1979, Chelan County and the Association have had a collective bargaining agreement. Under this agreement, deputies are normally scheduled for a 40-hour work week, for which they receive a monthly salary. They also receive compensation for hours actually worked overtime, within certain maximum limitations. In addition, when the deputies are not serving their normal shifts, they may be required to be "on call" to come to work if needed. The agreement contains no provisions for paying deputies for the time when they are on call, unless they are actually called out, when they receive overtime compensation.
On-call time normally occurs in the following three situations:
(1) On holiday weekends, including the Apple Blossom Festival, Memorial Day, Independence Day and Labor Day, when the County needs extra law enforcement protection;
(2) During periods between regular shifts. The sheriff's office operates two shifts per day with some deputies going off their shifts at 3, 4 and 5 a.m. The next shift begins at 7 a.m. During the interval before the 7 a.m. shift begins, deputies who have just gone off or who are about to come on their regular shifts may be on call;
(3) Deputies in the detective division, in rotation, are on call at any time during the 24-hour day for a 7-day period once a month.
While deputies are on call, their conduct is restricted. They may not leave the vicinity of Chelan County. They must remain at a location where they may be reached by telephone or radio. They may not engage in any personal or recreational activities which would interfere with their availability to respond to a call. The deputies cannot obtain regular outside employment which would conflict with their ability to respond to calls. They may not consume any alcoholic beverages while on call.
The Association and individual deputy sheriffs brought this action in 1980. Both parties brought motions for summary judgment. In February 1984, the trial court entered an order on these motions, ruling inter alia, that plaintiffs were "employees" within the meaning of the MWA; that the time plaintiffs spent on call and on lunch breaks was "work" within the meaning of the MWA; that the plaintiffs were entitled to overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 240 hours during a 28-day period; and that sleeping and eating time would not be excluded in calculating the number of hours worked if the deputy was on call during that time. The trial court unnecessarily entered findings of fact and conclusions of law accompanying the order on summary judgment. The trial court then entered an order bifurcating the trial, so that the issues governing liability would first be adjudicated, and then the amount of monetary recovery and attorney fees, if any, would be determined.
In November 1984, a bench trial was held on the County's affirmative defenses, including accord and satisfaction, a statutory bar under RCW 36.40.130, and laches. In March 1985, the trial court entered a judgment in plaintiffs' favor. Its conclusions of law conformed with its rulings in the previous summary judgment order. The trial court held that plaintiffs were entitled to recover overtime compensation for hours worked, including time spent on call or on lunch breaks, in excess of 240 hours during any 28-day period after May 28, 1980, the date when they first asserted a claim for compensation. It ruled that the amounts of such compensation would be determined in a separate trial.
The County appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's judgment, 45 Wash.App. 812, 725 P.2d 1001. This court granted the County's petition for review.
Gibson Goff, III brought this action against his former employer, the City of Airway Heights, seeking compensation for time spent on call as a police officer in 1982 and 1983. Goff was hired by the City as a deputy police officer on February 9, 1982. The City's police force consisted of two officers. Goff was told that he would be required to put in 8 hours of work per day for a 40-hour week.
It was the City's policy to have police coverage 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, so that an officer would always be able to respond to police calls. When Goff first began working for the City, he and Police Chief Wayne Odum each took alternating 12-hour shifts. Later, the officers changed to alternating 48-hour shifts to alleviate the physical demands. The officers were supposed to perform regular assigned duties no more than 8 hours per day. The remainder of each shift was to be spent on call. Goff testified that he actually spent an average of about 30 hours during each 48-hour shift performing police duties, including patrol time, preparing reports, and responding to calls.
While on call, the officers were required to remain within city limits, so Goff could not return to his home in Medical Lake during these periods. He could sleep either at the police station or at a friend's house as long as he could be reached by telephone or radio. Goff testified that he could go where he wanted "[w]ithin reason" as long as he stayed within city limits and could immediately respond to calls. Goff also testified that during shifts, he was required to wear a uniform while out of the station and to present a proper police image.
Goff was paid $960 per month in 1982 and $1,056 per month in 1983, calculated on the basis of a 40-hour work week and a wage of $5.54 per hour in 1982 and $6.60 per hour in 1983. On a number of occasions, Goff had discussions with the mayor and with Chief Odum about the number of hours he was working, and stated his belief that it was impossible to do his duties in 8 hours per day. Goff inquired about receiving compensation for overtime. He was not paid any overtime compensation.
On February 23, 1983, Goff was dismissed by the City. Subsequently, he brought an action against the City claiming, inter alia, that under the MWA, he was entitled to be paid overtime compensation for several hundred hours. A jury trial was held. During trial, the City brought a motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that Goff was not covered by the MWA, citing an exclusion in RCW 49.46.010(5)(j). The court denied the motion. The City later proposed an instruction that would have informed the jury:
A statute provides that any individual whose duties require that he reside or sleep at the place of his employment or who otherwise spends a substantial portion of his work time subject to call, and not engaged in the performance of active duties, is not an employee covered by the provisions of the Washington Minimum Wage Act.
This instruction was a statement of the exclusion in RCW 49.46.010(5)(j). The trial court declined to give this instruction, ruling as a matter of law that Goff was covered by the MWA. The City took proper exception, citing RCW 49.46.010(5)(j).
Under the trial court's instructions, Goff had to prove that he "worked" the hours for which he claimed overtime wages and that he was not paid for such additional time. The court also instructed the jury that "hours worked" do not include periods when an employee is "completely relieved from duty." The court further instructed the jury on how to determine if sleeping periods constituted "hours worked". The jury was also provided with instructions on deciding "[w]hether on-call time or waiting time is time worked for which compensation is due under the Washington Minimum Wage Act ..."
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