Chelentis v. Luckenbach Co

Decision Date03 June 1918
Docket NumberNo. 657,657
Citation62 L.Ed. 1171,247 U.S. 372,38 S.Ct. 501
PartiesCHELENTIS v. LUCKENBACH S. S. CO., Inc
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

[Syllabus from pages 372-373 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Silas B. Axtell and Arthur L. Burchell, both of New York City (Fayette B. Dow, of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for petitioner.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 373-377 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Peter S. Carter and William H. Carter, both of New York City, for respondent.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 377-378 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In December, 1915, petitioner was employed by respondent, a Delaware corporation as fireman on board the steamship J. L. Luckenbach, which it then operated and controlled. While at sea, twenty-four hours out from New York, the port of destination, petitioner undertook to perform certain duties on deck during a heavy wind; a wave came aboard, knocked him down and broke his leg. He received due care immediately; when the vessel arrived at destination he was taken to the marine hospital, where he remained for three months; during that time it became necessary to amputate his leg. After discharge from the hospital, claiming that his injuries resulted from the negligence and an improvident order of a superior officer, he instituted a common-law action in Supreme Court, New York county, demanding full indemnity for damage sustained. The cause was removed to the United States District Court because of diverse citizenship. Counsel did not question seaworthiness of ship or her appliances, and announced that no claim was made for maintenance, cure, or wages. At conclusion of plaintiff's evidence the court directed verdict for respondent, and judgment thereon was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 243 Fed. 536, 156 C. C. A. 234. The latter court said:

'The contract of a seaman is maritime, and has written into it those peculiar features of the maritime law that were considered in the case of The Osceola [189 U. S. 158, 23 Sup. Ct. 83, 47 L. Ed. 760]; and although, because of these peculiarities, such contracts are almost invariably litigated in admiralty courts, still the contract must be the same in every court, maritime or common law. The only difference between a proceeding in one court or the other would be that the remedy would be regulated by the lex fori. If a seaman, who had been locked up or put in irons for disobedience of orders, were to sue the master for damages in a court of common law, he could not recover like a shore servant, such as a cook or chauffeur, who had received the same treatment. So a seaman, bringing suit in a common-law court for personal injuries, could recover, even if guilty of contributory negligence, although a shore servant suing in the same court could not; and a seaman suing in a common-law court for personal injuries could recover (except in the case of unseaworthiness of the vessel or failure to give proper care and medical attention) only wages to the end of the voyage and the expenses for maintenance and cure for a reasonable time thereafter, whereas in a similar case a shore servant would be entitled to recover full indemnity. Therefore, by virtue of the inherent nature of the seaman's contract, the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence were totally immaterial considerations in this case; the sole question for the jury to determine being whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover because he had not received from the defendant his wages to the end of the voyage and the expense for his maintenance and cure for a reasonable time thereafter.

'Has Congress changed the situation by section 20 of the Seamen's Act [chapter 153, 38 Stat. 1164, 1185, Comp. St. 1916, § 8337a], as the plaintiff contends? He argues that the act makes the master a fellow servant of the seaman, and therefore that Congress intended to make the relation between the seaman and all the officers throughout the same as at common law. But the Supreme Court, in the case of The Osceola, supra, while reserving the question whether the master and seaman were fellow servants, held that it made no difference whatever in respect to the liability of the shipowners for an improvident order of the master which resulted in personal injuries to the seaman. * * *

'It follows that whether the master and seaman are fellow servants or not is quite immaterial in the case of a suit for injuries resulting from an improvident order of the master. For this reason the court was right in directing a verdict for the defendant, and the judgment is affirmed.'

In The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 175, 23 Sup. Ct. 483, 487 (47 L. Ed. 760), a libel in rem to recover damages for personal injuries to a seaman while on board and alleged to have resulted from the master's negligence, speaking through Mr. Justice Brown, we held:

'1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least so long as the voyage is continued.

'2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship. Scarff v. Metcalf, 107 N. Y. 211 [13 N. E. 796, 1 Am. St. Rep. 807].

'3. That all the members of the crew, except perhaps the master, are, as between themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot recover for injuries sustained through the negligence of another member of the crew beyond the expense of their maintenance and cure.

'4. That the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence of the master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and cure, whether the injuries were received by negligence or accident.'

After reference to article 1, § 8, and article 3, § 2, of the Constitution, we declared in Souther Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 215, 216, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 528 (61 L. Ed. 1086, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900):

'Considering our former opinions, it must now be accepted as settled doctrine that, in consequence of these provisions, Congress has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country. * * * And further, that in the absence of some controlling statute, the general maritime law, as accepted by the federal courts, constitutes part of our national law, applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.'

Concerning extent to which the general maritime law may be changed, modified or affected by state legislation, this was said:

'No such legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of...

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    ...S.Ct. 298; Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 1924, 264 U.S. 109, 44 S.Ct. 274, 68 L.Ed. 582; Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 1918, 247 U.S. 372, 383-384, 38 S.Ct. 501, 62 L.Ed. 1171; Atlantic Transp. Co. of West Virginia v. Imbrovek, supra, 234 U.S. at pages 62-63, 34 S.Ct. at page 7......
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    ...Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086, L.R.A.1918C, 451, Ann.Cas.1917E, 900; Chelentis v. Luckenbach, 247 U.S. 372, 38 S.Ct. 501, 62 L.Ed. 1171; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 159, 40 S.Ct. 438, 439, 64 L.Ed. 834, 11 A.L.R. 1145; Carlisle Pa......
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