Cheley v. Burson

• Decision Date: 23 February 1971
• Docket Number: 13276.,Civ. A. No. 13093
• Citation: 324 F. Supp. 678
• Parties: Zobe and Carrie Mae CHELEY et al., Plaintiffs, for themselves and all others similarly situated, v. William BURSON, Director of the Georgia Department of Family and Children Services, Gilbert Dulaney, Director of the Fulton County Department of Family and Children Services, Vance Faircloth, Director of the Appling County Department of Family and Children Services, Mary Lou Hensley, Director of the Candler County Department of Family and Children Services, Christine G. Dorsett, Director of the Carrol County Department of Family and Children Services, Margaret Rhodes, Director of the Taliaferro County Department of Family and Children Services, Defendants, in their official capacities and personally. Mrs. Louella M. HELLER on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. William BURSON, Director of the Georgia Department of Family and Children Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

324 F. Supp. 678

Zobe and Carrie Mae CHELEY et al., Plaintiffs, for themselves and all others similarly situated, v. William BURSON, Director of the Georgia Department of Family and Children Services, Gilbert Dulaney, Director of the Fulton County Department of Family and Children Services, Vance Faircloth, Director of the Appling County Department of Family and Children Services, Mary Lou Hensley, Director of the Candler County Department of Family and Children Services, Christine G. Dorsett, Director of the Carrol County Department of Family and Children Services, Margaret Rhodes, Director of the Taliaferro County Department of Family and Children Services, Defendants, in their official capacities and personally.

Mrs. Louella M. HELLER on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. William BURSON, Director of the Georgia Department of Family and Children Services, Defendant.

Civ. A. Nos. 13093, 13276.

United States District Court, N. D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

February 23, 1971.

Frederic S. LeClerq, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs.

Arthur K. Bolton, State Atty. Gen., Robert J. Castellani & W. Wheeler Bryan, Asst. State Attys. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., for defendants.

Before BELL, Circuit Judge, and HOOPER and HENDERSON, District Judges.

OPINION AND ORDER

PER CURIAM:

These two cases were consolidated for hearing and decision. They involve the validity of certain eligibility factors in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC), as effectuated in Georgia. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The state, on behalf of defendants, moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Plaintiff Heller is a welfare recipient whose family includes three children who are about to be or have been removed from the family's AFDC grant, due to Georgia Code Ann. § 99-902 which limits eligibility for AFDC to children under 18 years of age.¹ The enabling federal statute defining eligibility, 42 U.S.C.A. § 606(a), gives the option to the states whether to cut off eligibility at 18 years, or at age 21 if the child is still in school.²

Plaintiffs Cheley, et al., are poor people who are ineligible for AFDC because they do not meet the additional criteria of Ga.Code Ann. § 99-902 (and 42 U.S. C.A. § 606(a)), which limit deprivation of parental support entitling persons to AFDC benefits to deprivations "by reason of death, continued absence from the home or physical or mental incapacity of a parent * * *" and which establishes the so-called degree of relationship requirement. These plaintiffs fall into two categories: underemployed persons whose homes are intact; and non-relatives supporting otherwise eligible children.

All plaintiffs seek injunctive relief enjoining defendants from enforcing Ga. Code Ann. § 99-902 and regulations pursuant thereto to the extent that they in the above manner exclude dependent children from AFDC eligibility. Jurisdiction of this court is premised on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Plaintiffs attack the above eligibility factors on the ground that they are inconsistent with 42 U.S.C.A. § 601, the general policy declaration that AFDC was established for "the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes * * *" and "to help maintain and strengthen family life * * *", and that they violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The United States Supreme Court in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491, dealt with the Maryland maximum grant regulation, which placed a ceiling on the amount an eligible AFDC family could receive. The court upheld the state regulation in the face of claimed statutory and equal protection violations. Fundamental to that decision is an implicit judgment as to the validity of the AFDC program's basic eligibility requirements. In doing so, the court referred to its earlier decision of King v. Smith, 1968, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118:

"In King v. Smith, supra, we stressed the States' `undisputed power' under these provisions of the Social Security Act, `to set the level of benefits and the standard of need.' * * * We described the AFDC enterprise as `a scheme of cooperative federalism,' * * * and noted carefully that, `there is no question that States have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each State is free to set its own standard of need and to determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the program.'" 397 U.S. at 478, 90 S.Ct. at 1158.

The court mentioned that "the starting point of the statutory analysis must be a recognition that the federal law gives each State great latitude in dispensing its available funds." 397 U.S. at 478, 90 S.Ct. at 1158.

The basic premise of King and Dandridge is that the eligibility requirements of § 606(a) are both consistent with the general policy statement of § 601 (to furnish assistance "as far as practicable under the conditions in such State"), and valid as a determination of Congressional policy. Dandridge tangentially approves that part of § 606(a) (and Ga.Code Ann. § 99-902), which limits eligibility to those dependent children living with relatives in the specified degree. Thus, the degree of relationship requirement of the Georgia statute as it is here in issue is also valid.

Plaintiffs Cheley and Thomas also attack that part of the statute which limits eligibility to those children who have been deprived of parental support by reason of death, continued absence or incapacity of the parent. These plaintiffs are members of that class known as the "working poor". Children in these parental intact families are deprived of AFDC benefits because the family has a breadwinner who supports the family although at a level below the state-defined...