Chenault v. State

• Decision Date: 02 October 1972
• Docket Number: No. 5749,5749
• Citation: Chenault v. State, 484 S.W.2d 887, 253 Ark. 144 (Ark. 1972)
• Parties: Katherine CHENAULT, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 887

484 S.W.2d 887

253 Ark. 144

Katherine CHENAULT, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. 5749.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Oct. 2, 1972.

W. J. Walker and Harold L. Hall, Little Rock, for appellant.

Ray Thornton, Atty. Gen. by Milton Lueken, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

BYRD, Justice.

The appellant, Katherine Chenault, was tried and convicted of the first degree murder of her ex-husband for which the jury fixed her punishment at life imprisonment. For reversal of the conviction appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing statements made by the appellant at the scene of the crime to be introduced into evidence thus violating her constitutional rights as established under the Miranda decision; and further that the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce evidence as to the good character of the deceased.

Katherine Chenault, the appellant married William C. Chenault, the deceased, in 1968, and was divorced on June 24, 1971. This marriage was the appellant's eighth marriage and the deceased's second. On August 18, 1971, at 4:42 p.m., the Little Rock Police Department received a call to 2005 South Harrison, Little Rock, Arkansas. Patrolman Bobby Reynolds and Sergeant Leslie Gachot arrived at approximately 4:45 p.m. Sergeant Gachot testified that:

'When I got there a uniform officer had been dispatched and he was there at the house. Went inside the door and found the defendant standing by the wall of the kitchen, the body laying in Southwest corner of the front room. The defendant had a gun and I asked her to give me the gun and she told me that she shot him and I said, 'who is he?' She said, 'my husband,' and I went over to the body to see if he was still living or dead, and the man that, I couldn't feel any pulse on him. I went back to her and asked her what happened and she said, 'I shot him. I killed him.' I said, 'Don't say any more to me. Anything you tell me now will be used in Court against you,' and she said, 'Well, I know I killed him.''

The testimony was corroborated by the uniformed officer Bobby Reynolds. Another officer, Larry Dill arrested the appellant and took her to police headquarters where the appellant was advised of her Miranda rights and she gave a statement. The appellant objected to the above testimony by the officers after the trial court had held a Denno hearing and ruled it admissible as being a spontaneous utterance.

On this point we agree with the trial court. The cases are legion on this point. The appellant has argued that the officers failed to warn the appellant of her constitutional right to remain silent as provided by the standard established in Miranda. In the present case the patrolman received a call at 4:42 p.m. and arrived at approximately 4:45 p.m. along with Sergeant Gachot, some three minutes later. The appellant made the statements immediately upon arrival of the officers. A case directly in point recently before this court is Stout v. State, 244 Ark. 676, 426 S.W.2d 800 (1968). In that case similar statements of the accused were made at the scene of the murder to investigating officers and were admitted as being spontaneous utterances.

Further evidence of the spontaneousness of the utterances is readily demonstrated by the fact that while the police officers were investigating, the appellant answered her own phone and advised the party at the other end of the line that she had just killed her husband.

The appellant further contends that the trial court erred in permitting testimony to be introduced by the state as to the good character of the deceased.

In the opening statement to the jury the appellant's counsel, after telling the jury that appellant was pleading self-defense, made the following remarks in part:

'. . . She is going to testify briefly as to the mistreatment, physical abuse that she received during the marriage. That she required medical attention due to this abuse. . . . The evidence of Mrs. Chenaults, of the treatment that Mrs. Chenault received at the hand of Mr. Chenault during the marriage will be sustained by witnesses, or friends of hers, or relatives that saw them together during the marriage. . . . However, I think that you will find from...