Chenault v. Stynchcombe

Decision Date10 February 1977
Docket NumberNo. 76-1214,76-1214
Citation546 F.2d 1191
PartiesMarcus Wayne CHENAULT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Leroy N. STYNCHCOMBE, Sheriff of Fulton County, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Randy Bacote, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner-appellant.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Carter Goode, Asst. Dist. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before MORGAN and HILL, Circuit Judges, and NOEL, District Judge. *

LEWIS R. MORGAN, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Marcus Wayne Chenault appeals the denial of habeas corpus relief by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. On September 12, 1974, a state jury convicted petitioner of the murder of Mrs. Martin Luther King, Sr. and Deacon Edward Boykin and of the assault of Mrs. Jimmie Mitchell. Having exhausted his state remedies, petitioner brought an action for habeas relief 1 in federal district court. The district court denied relief on fourteen allegations of error and stayed proceedings on error numbers fifteen and sixteen. 2

Petitioner's primary contention of state error justifying federal relief focuses on the failure of the state trial court to empanel a special jury, pursuant to Ga.Code § 27-1502, to conduct a hearing on petitioner's competency to stand trial. Prior to indictment, petitioner's counsel moved that the court enjoin the grand jury from issuing a bill of indictment until the court conducted an inquiry into petitioner's competency to stand trial. Treating this motion to stay indictment as a special plea of insanity or of incompetency to stand trial, under Ga.Code § 27-1502, the trial court rejected it as premature. After the grand jury had issued an indictment, petitioner failed to enter a special plea of incompetency to stand trial, instead entering only a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The latter puts in issue one's sanity at the time of commission of the offense, not one's competency to stand trial. Orange v. State, 77 Ga.App. 36, 47 S.E.2d 756 (1948). Nevertheless, the trial court appointed two psychiatrists, one of whom was requested by petitioner, to conduct a mental examination. Upon examination of petitioner, 3 each psychiatrist found him competent to stand trial. The trial court, therefore, ordered no further examination or hearing on this issue.

Petitioner argues that the state trial court should have ordered a hearing pursuant to a statute that petitioner never even invoked at trial. Whether the state court violated a state law by not empaneling, sua sponte, a special jury, does not concern this panel. See Pennington v. Stynchcombe,428 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1970). Rather, we examine the trial court's failure to grant a hearing only to the extent that this failure violated federal constitution standards governing a determination of mental competency. The Supreme Court has recognized a defendant's constitutional right in an appropriate case to adequate procedures to determine his competence. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). See also Nathaniel v. Estelle, 493 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1974). In Pate, the Court held that if a defendant has presented evidence to the trial court, before or during trial, that raises a "bona fide doubt" of his competence to stand trial, that court's failure to make further inquiry into the matter denies the defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial. Pate, 383 U.S. at 385, 86 S.Ct. at 842, 15 L.Ed.2d at 822. While the Supreme Court has not articulated a general standard for the nature or quantum of evidence necessary to trigger a competency procedure, it has focused on three factors that should be considered: the existence of a history of irrational behavior, defendant's demeanor at trial, and prior medical opinion. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, at 180, 95 S.Ct. 896 at 908, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 at 118 (1975). Petitioner establishes no history of irrational behavior, other than the crime in question. In addition, he has presented no evidence to indicate that his demeanor at trial created any suspicion of mental incompetence. Finally, the two psychiatrists who examined petitioner found him to be competent to stand trial. We, therefore, conclude that petitioner raised no bona fide doubt of his competency and that the trial court did not violate Pate through its failure to hold a competency hearing. See McCune v. Estelle, 534 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1976) (assertion of incompetency must be backed up with substantial facts); Grissom v. Wainwright, 494 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1974) (extensive hearings and thorough psychiatric examinations on competency are not prerequisites for every trial); Jordan v. Wainwright, 457 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1972) (no hearing is mandated by a naked suggestion that defendant may be incompetent).

We have carefully examined petitioner's other assertions of error 4 and hold that whether any or all of them contravened state law, 5 none of them violated petitioner's federal constitutional rights. See Redd v. Decker, 447 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1971). Pennington v. Stynchcombe, 428 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1970).

AFFIRMED.

* District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

1 Petitioner incorrectly based federal jurisdiction for habeas relief on 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3), which provides for Supreme Court review, through a writ of certiorari, of a final judgment of the highest court of a state. The proper jurisdictional base for petitioner's action is 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides for habeas corpus relief for a person who is being held in state custody in violation of United States laws or the United States Constitution. The district court apparently assumed jurisdiction under and acted according...

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23 cases
  • Dix v. Newsome
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • 20 Marzo 1984
    ...Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 95 S.Ct. 896, 908, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Lokos v. Capps, supra, at 1261; Chenault v. Stynchcombe, 546 F.2d 1191, 1192-3 (5th Cir.1977). The first important factor the court will address is the existence of a history of irrational behavior on the part o......
  • Saldaño v. Director
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas
    • 18 Julio 2016
    ...if a petitioner fails to raise a bona fide doubt as to his competency and, thus, does not hold a competency hearing. Chenault v. Stynchcombe, 546 F.2d 1191, 1193 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977). In the present case, trial counsel raised the issue of Saldaño's competence out of......
  • People v. Gensler
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 6 Julio 1988
    ...adopt a specific standard for the nature or quantum of evidence necessary to mandate a competency procedure (see, Chenault v. Stynchombe, 5 Cir., 546 F.2d 1191, 1192). The Federal Courts of Appeals, however, while employing somewhat varied terminology, have consistently required only that t......
  • Lokos v. Capps
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • 18 Septiembre 1980
    ...the existence of a history of irrational behavior, defendant's demeanor at trial, and a prior medical opinion." Chenault v. Stynchombe, 546 F.2d 1191, 1192-93 (5th Cir. 1977), citing Drope, 420 U.S. at 180, 95 S.Ct. at 908. Even one of these factors, standing alone, may, in appropriate circ......
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