Chenell v. Westbrook College
Decision Date | 16 August 1974 |
Citation | 324 A.2d 735 |
Parties | George R. CHENELL and Trudylynn Chenell (Young) v. WESTBROOK COLLEGE. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Pierce, Atwood, Scribner, Allen & McKusick, by Ralph I. Lancaster, Jr., Portland, for plaintiffs.
Mahoney, Robinson, Mahoney & Norman, by Lawrence P. Mahoney, Portland, Murray, Plumb & Murray, by Peter S. Plumb, Portland, for defendant.
Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD and DELAHANTY, JJ.
This case is before us on appeal by the defendant.
A trial resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
A motion for new trial was seasonably filed by the plaintiff. On order of a Justice of the Superior Court granting such motion, a new trial has been had.
That the new trial was error free was conceded by the defendant at oral argument.
We are concerned then only with the question as to the propriety of the action taken by the presiding Justice at the conclusion of the first trial by jury. 1
We deny the appeal.
At the time this cause of action arose Trudylynn Chenell Young 2 was a professional dancer.
In 1968 while a student at Westbrook Junior College in Portland she received serious injury to her leg when a large cabinet fell on her.
By complaint dated February 8, 1971, this action to recover damages for personal injuries received by her, and by her father for medical expenses incurred by him on her behalf, was commenced.
A trial of the case was by jury. The claim was premised upon our so-called 'comparative negligence' statute. (14 M.R.S.A. § 156)
The jury's finding was that the total damage sustained by plaintiff was $7,500.00.
It also found there was fault on the plaintiff's part causally contributing to the injury she received and the damage award was reduced to $5,000.00 because of her contributory fault.
Seasonably following the trial a motion for new trial was addressed to the presiding Justice. One of the grounds claimed for entitlement thereto was that 'the damages awarded to Plaintiff Trudilynn Chenell are grossly inadequate and reflect a compromise by the jury on the question of liability.'
The presiding Justice, after hearing, entered an order which provided that 'new trial granted on all issues for inadequate damages indicating a compromise on the issue of liability.'
A new trial was subsequently had. This trial resulted in a finding by the jury that the entire causal fault for the damages sustained was upon the defendant. Damages were assessed for the plaintiff in the sum of $53,000.00.
The defendant's appeal challenges the correctness of the action taken by the Justice presiding at the first trial in setting aside the verdict returned by the jury.
In deciding the correctness of the action taken by the presiding Justice we cannot substitute our judgment for his. His order may be reversed by us only 'in the event that a clear and manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge is shown.' MacLean v. Jack, 160 Me. 93, 198 A.2d 1 (1964).
We commence our evaluation of defendant's claim that the trial Court manifestly abused his discretion by briefly stating the responsibility of a trial Judge when presented with a motion for a new trial.
It is the duty of the Court in the case of excessive or inadequate damages to set aside the verdict if the jury disregards the evidence or acts from passion or prejudice. Chizmar v. Ellis, 150 Me. 125, 107 A.2d 538 (1954); Cosgrove v. Fogg, 152 Me. 464, 54 A.2d 538 (1947).
In determining whether the jury has disregarded the evidence or acted from passion or prejudice, the Court must view the evidence most favorable to the conclusion the jury's finding was correct. Chizmar v. Ellis, supra.
The trial court may not substitute his judgment as to the credibility of witnesses for the judgment of the jury. State v. Call, Me., 322 A.2d 64 (1974).
Cayford v. Wilbur, 86 Me. 414, 416, 29 A. 1117, 1118 (1894).
Summed up succinctly, it may be said the judgment of a jury as to the amount of damages should be disturbed by the trial Judge only if he is satisfied reasonable men will agree that the jury's finding is irrational on the basis of the evidence considered in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion to set aside the verdict is pressed.
The threshold question before us is: In determining that the amount of damages awarded by the jury was inadequate, did the trial Court in exercising its power to set aside the verdict do so for reasons which are clearly untenable or in a way that is clearly unreasonable or inexplicable?
As we earlier observed, plaintiff was trained to become a professional dancer. She did, in fact, at one point become a member of that remarkably precise dance team known as the 'Rockettes.'
The uncontroverted medical testimony compels the conclusion that her right to hope that she would one day become a second Isadora Duncan died when the 475 pound cabinet came crashing down and pinned her legs to the floor of the gymnasium at Westbrook College.
That prior to this accident plaintiff had 'definitely outstanding' ability as a dancer appears not to be in question.
That an arthrotomy performed in October, 1970, disclosed a tearing of the medial meniscus, a condyle fracture and resulting chondromalacia, is not denied. A permanent impairment of her leg resulted from the injury so received.
That she was caused to experience pain and suffering would be obvious even if she had not so testified.
On two occasions she was hospitalized, once for 3 days and on the occasion of surgery for a period of 1 week. Her leg was in a cast from October, 1970, through January of 1971, and locomotion was possible only through the use of crutches during that period.
That a finding that this damage would be translated into money terms in the sum of $7,500.00 is so clearly wrong that the conclusion cannot be left to stand.
The presiding Justice, who had the benefit of observing the witnesses as they testified, concluded the jury's finding was irrational and could not consonant with justice become the final adjustment of the rights of the parties, vis-a-vis, one the other....
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