Cheney v. State

• Decision Date: 17 December 1985
• Docket Number: No. 684S251,684S251
• Citation: 486 N.E.2d 508
• Parties: Andrew CHENEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 508

486 N.E.2d 508

Andrew CHENEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 684S251.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Dec. 17, 1985.

Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of Indiana, C.H. Gardner, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Lisa M. Paunicka, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

GIVAN, Chief Justice.

Appellant was convicted by a jury of Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter. The jury also found appellant to be an habitual offender. The court imposed a ten (10) year sentence for the felony which was enhanced by thirty (30) years based upon the habitual offender finding.

The facts are: Appellant, his wife, Bill Brooks and Mary Blake sought admission to the Eagles Club in Booneville, Indiana. Blake was denied admission because she was wearing shorts. Appellant and his wife entered the club while Brooks and Blake left to change clothes. When Brooks and Blake returned, they were denied admission to the club on the ground Brooks had been involved in an earlier incident at the club. Appellant left the club and attempted to intercede on Brooks' behalf. Appellant and Brooks began to argue with Polk, a trustee of the club. Appellant then threatened to shoot the next person to exit the club. Appellant and his friends then turned and began to walk to their vehicles.

Dennis Rust left the club at the time these events were transpiring. He heard the sound of a gun mechanism followed by a shot. Rust was struck on the right side by a bullet which exited his body. A club employee saw appellant place a "long gun" in his automobile. Another patron observed appellant's automobile flee the scene.

Appellant was apprehended a short time later at a nearby tavern. The police confiscated a .22 caliber rifle from his automobile. The police also recovered a spent .22 casing at the scene of the shooting. Laboratory work indicated the casing had been fired from the gun recovered in appellant's vehicle.

Appellant argues the trial court erred when it admitted State's Exhibit Number 3, a statement made by Harry Powell to the police on the night of the incident. Powell was collecting the admission fee at the door of the club that evening. He was a witness to the argument involving appellant, Brooks and Polk. In his statement, Powell indicated he heard appellant threaten to shoot the next person to step outside. Powell was called by the State during its case in chief. In his trial testimony Powell stated that appellant only said, "I just dare you to step outside." Powell was then asked if appellant said what he would do if he (referring to Polk) did step outside. Powell replied in the negative.

Later in Powell's testimony the State sought to refresh his memory by showing him the portion of the statement which referred to appellant's threat. The State was hampered in this attempt due to the witness' inability to read. Out of the presence of the jury, the State read the statement to the witness and offered it in evidence. It is apparent the reading of the statement to the witness did refresh his recollection. He verified the statement as being correct. The admission of the statement into evidence though error was harmless. See Kinnel v. State (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.2d 825.

Appellant maintains the trial court erred when it admitted several photographs which depicted the exterior and interior of the Eagles Club. These exhibits were admitted during the testimony of Polk. He testified the photographs fairly depicted the club on the night of the incident. However, he could not testify as to the time or manner in which the photographs were taken. Appellant contends this is necessary to establish a proper foundation.

The admission of photographic evidence must be preceded by the laying of a proper foundation which requires testimony that the photographs are a true and accurate representation of the things they intend to portray. Brim v. State (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 672. We find a proper foundation was established to admit the photographs.

Appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting a taped statement he gave the police on the morning following the incident. Appellant contends the tape was inadmissible as the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody. An officer testified that while the tape was in his custody a transcript of it was prepared. The tape was then given to the State Police and later to the local prosecutor. The officer testified he had, shortly before trial, compared the tape and the transcript and found them to be identical. We find the State did establish a proper chain of custody to support the admission of the tape. See Wagner v. State (1985), Ind., 474 N.E.2d 476.

Appellant argues the trial court erred when it twice denied his motion for mistrial based on allegedly improper comments made during final argument in the habitual offender phase. On the first occasion the prosecutor, after commenting on appellant's past criminal record, called appellant a "drain on society." The second remark was made in the context of argument on the question of whether the jury has discretion in determining if appellant is an habitual offender. The prosecutor made the following statement: "Now, he's a four (4) time loser, from your evidence. And how long do we have to, to countenance that before they become habitual offenders. Now, Mr. Scales has looked you flat in the eye and told you to disobey the law." Appellant argues these remarks constituted an attempt to imply the jury should convict appellant on matters other than the evidence produced at trial. He also argues the comments were attempts to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury. Additionally, he maintains these statements are analogous to those criticized in Johnson v. State (1983), Ind.App., 453 N.E.2d 365.

The State argues appellant has not demonstrated he was prejudiced by the comments. The State contends the statements were permissible comments by the prosecutor on the evidence before the trier of fact. In order to persuade an appellate court that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for mistrial, a defendant must demonstrate that he was placed in a position of grave peril. Morgan v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 666, 419 N.E.2d 964. During final argument, it is proper for counsel to argue both law and facts. Inman v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 491, 393 N.E.2d 767. Counsel may propound any conclusions based upon the attorney's analysis of the evidence. Flynn v. State (1978), 177 Ind.App. 360, 379 N.E.2d 548. While this Court does not approve comments of this nature, we are not convinced a reversal is required.

Appellant contends the trial court erred when it gave a final instruction on the subject of flight. He argues the evidence did not support the instruction. He contends he left the parking lot of the Eagles Club and drove a short distance to a nearby tavern where he was arrested without incident. However, testimony was also offered from an eyewitness who stated appellant's automobile hurriedly left the parking lot of the club immediately after the incident.

It is proper to give an instruction on flight when evidence of flight has been adduced at trial. Taylor v. State (1984), Ind., 469 N.E.2d 735. The evidence is sufficient to support the instruction. The trial court did not err.

Appellant argues the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the issue of transferred intent to commit murder. The instruction provides:

"You are hereby instructed that when one intends to kill a certain person with a deadly weapon and by mistake and inadvertence causes bodily injury to another person with such weapon, in the eyes of the law, his intent is transferred from the person to whom it was directed to the person suffering the injury; a person committing such an act may be found guilty of the crime he originally intended to commit, in effect, as if he had originally intended to kill the person who suffered bodily injury through mistake or inadvertence.

"Therefore, under the doctrine of transferred intent, if the defendant attempted to murder someone and his actions toward this end resulted in bodily injury to another, then you may find that the defendant intended to murder the person actually harmed as a result of the defendant's attempt to murder another."

Appellant concedes the instruction is a correct statement of the law but argues it is not supported by the evidence. Additionally, he maintains the instruction was confusing to the jury. He bases both contentions on the fact the jury returned a guilty verdict on the included charge of attempted voluntary manslaughter and not on the charge of attempted murder. He argues this verdict indicates that no evidence of an intent to commit murder existed. Thus he claims it was error to confuse the jury by instructing concerning the transfer of the nonexistent intent.

Appellant's argument is without merit on several grounds. Powell's statement to the police contained sufficient evidence to support the instruction as it contained appellant's statement of his intent to shoot someone. The fact the jury returned a verdict based on the lesser offense and not the greater does not require a finding that it was error to instruct on the greater offense. The instruction does not create an impermissible inference on the question of intent. The instruction properly instructs the jury as to transferred intent. The trial court did not err when it gave the instruction.

Appellant avers the trial court erred when it gave the following instruction:

"If a defendant is innocent, he should not be convicted erroneously; but if a defendant is guilty, he should not be acquitted erroneously. By acquittal of the guilty a contempt of the law is aroused among the criminal classes and the safeguards of society are weakened."

Appellant acknowledges this instruction has been approved by this Court in Murray v. State (198...