Cherokee Farms, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., Inc.
Decision Date | 15 April 1988 |
Parties | CHEROKEE FARMS, INC., and Bill Adams v. FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. 86-979. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Robert H. Ford and Richard Chesnut of Brinkley & Ford, Huntsville, for appellants.
W. Stanley Rodgers and Robert E. Ledyard III of Ford, Caldwell, Ford & Payne, Huntsville, for appellee.
Plaintiffs appeal from the insurer's summary judgment in a suit based on the insurer's payment of insurance proceeds to the plaintiffs' mortgage holder, rather than to the plaintiffs directly.
A fire destroyed the poultry complex operated by Cherokee Farms, Inc. At the time of the fire there were two outstanding mortgages on the complex. The first mortgage was held by the Federal Land Bank of New Orleans and the second was held by the Farmer's Home Administration ("FmHA"). Cherokee Farms was insured by Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, Inc. ("FFI"). The insurance policy provided that in case of loss the payment would be the actual cash value of the property at the time of the loss, and it also contained an endorsement to provide that if the destroyed property was later replaced (under certain conditions) then the loss would be valued at the "replacement cost," resulting in an additional payment to the insured.
After the fire, FFI paid the insurance proceeds first to the Federal Land Bank of New Orleans and then to FmHA. The mortgage held by the Federal Land Bank of New Orleans was completely satisfied, but the FmHA loan was only partially satisfied. Thereafter, Bill Adams, Willie Joe Estes, and Jo Estes, the owners of Cherokee Farms, Inc., divided the corporate assets and debts and dissolved the corporation.
Adams then decided to rebuild the poultry operation and take advantage of the replacement cost provision of the insurance policy. It is undisputed that Adams talked with representatives of FFI on several occasions to determine exactly what rebuilding plan would qualify under the policy. It is also undisputed that the plan Adams adopted met the requirements of the replacement cost provision and qualified for the payment of additional proceeds of approximately $197,000. The problem in this case is how the additional payment was made.
When Adams finished the reconstruction (which also involved the purchase of another poultry complex) and had it approved by an FFI adjuster, he requested that his payment from FFI be made in three checks--one for $80,000 made payable jointly to Cherokee Farms and Chore-Time Equipment Company; one for approximately $55,000, made payable jointly to Cherokee Farms and the Bank of Ardmore; and one for approximately $62,000, made payable to Cherokee Farms. FFI made the check to Chore-Time as requested, but wrote the other two checks as jointly payable to the FmHA as well as to the parties Adams requested. Adams made several attempts to have the checks reissued as he had originally requested, but, on advice of counsel, FFI refused. Adams was able to get the check to the Bank of Ardmore endorsed by FmHA, but the other check, for $62,000, was retained by FmHA. Adams contends that because of the "loss" of this $62,000 he was unable to fulfill a contract he had with T & L Egg Farms and that that inability led to damages, for which he and Cherokee Farms, Inc., brought this action against FFI.
The plaintiffs' complaint stated three causes of action: first, that FFI had breached the insurance contract; second, that FFI was negligent and/or wanton in making the check for $62,000 jointly to them and the FmHA; and, third, that FFI had defrauded them. The trial judge granted FFI's motion for summary judgment on all the claims, and the plaintiffs brought this appeal.
Our rule of review on summary judgment is well settled. Summary judgment is proper only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Ala.R.Civ.P. If there is a scintilla of evidence supporting the position of the non-moving party, summary judgment should not be granted. Cole v. First National Bank of Tuskaloosa, 485 So.2d 717, 719 (Ala.1986). A scintilla has been defined as a "mere gleam, glimmer, spark, the least particle, the smallest trace." Howard v. Crowder, 496 So.2d 31, 32 (Ala.1986).
We first turn to the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. The plaintiffs argue that FFI breached its contract with them by making the two checks jointly payable to them and the FmHA. We disagree. The plaintiffs contend that the absence of any reference in the endorsement to the interest of the Federal Land Bank of New Orleans or FmHA as loss payees of the replacement cost proceeds, combined with the reference in the endorsement itself to the obligation of the insured alone to replace the damaged premises, created an ambiguity in the terms of the contract.
"Alabama law requires the trial court to determine whether a contract is ambiguous, and if it is not, to determine the force and effect of the terms of the contract as a matter of law." Wigington v. Hill-Soberg Co., 396 So.2d 97, 98 (Ala.1981). The threshold issue--whether the contract is ambiguous--is itself a question of law. Brown Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Centennial Insurance Co., 431 So.2d 932, 942 (Ala.1983).
The trial judge in this case must have determined, based on the evidence presented, that the contract was not ambiguous, as a matter of law.
We agree with his determination. The fact that the endorsement did not refer to the mortgagees by name is not persuasive. The first paragraph of the endorsement states:
This paragraph clearly states that the endorsement is subject to all of the provisions of the original policy. The policy, in turn, states that the insurance company's first obligation is to pay off any outstanding mortgages (a so-called "standard mortgage clause"):
We hold that the contract is not ambiguous and that the trial judge properly interpreted it as a matter of law, and decided that FFI did not breach its contract with the plaintiffs. We therefore hold that summary judgment was proper on this claim.
We next turn to the plaintiffs' claims of negligence and/or wantonness. The plaintiffs claimed that FFI acted either negligently or wantonly, or both, in the way it discharged its obligations under the insurance contract. The issue is whether the plaintiffs presented a scintilla of evidence that FFI acted either negligently or wantonly. The plaintiffs urge that the following statements from the deposition of plaintiff Bill Adams support their position on this point:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Foremost Ins. Co. v. Parham
...94 (Ala.1987); Traylor v. Bell, 518 So.2d 719 (Ala.1987); Pranzo v. ITEC, Inc., 521 So.2d 983 (Ala.1988); Cherokee Farms, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 526 So.2d 871 (Ala.1988); and Southern States Ford, Inc. v. Proctor, 541 So.2d 1081 On July 28, 1989, by a five-to-three vote of the Jus......
-
Southern States Ford, Inc. v. Proctor
...719 (Ala.1987); Boswell v. Coker, 519 So.2d 493 (Ala.1987); Pranzo v. ITEC, Inc., 521 So.2d 983 (Ala.1988); Cherokee Farms, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 526 So.2d 871 (Ala.1988), which all follow Torres on this point--"hypothetically be consented to today by the conscience and the feeli......
-
Government Street Lumber Co., Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, N.A.
...plaintiffs difficulties does not create a cause of action in either negligence or gross negligence. See Cherokee Farms v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 526 So.2d 871, 874 (Ala.1988). The trial court did not err in entering AmSouth's summary judgment as to this CASE NO. 88-566 This is an app......
-
In re Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. Sales
...representations, thereby putting him on notice as a matter of law that a fraud may have been committed. Cherokee Farms, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 526 So.2d 871, 877 (Ala.1988) (citations McGahan alleges that Lewis assured him i) that the policies would be paid up in eight and ten yea......