Cherry v. Cherry

Decision Date15 December 1972
Docket NumberNo. 43317,43317
Citation295 Minn. 93,203 N.W.2d 352
PartiesDanele E. CHERRY, a minor, by John R. Wylde, Jr., her guardian ad litem, Appellant, v. Ernest E. CHERRY, et al., Respondents.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

In an action brought by an infant against her parents for injuries received when the infant placed an electrical extension cord in her mouth, the parents were immune from liability because their use of the extension cord was an act of ordinary parental discretion with respect to housing and other care.

Douglass, Bell, Donlin, Shultz & Petersen and Thomas J. Lyons, St. Paul, for appellant.

Rider, Bennett, Egan, Johnson & Arundel and David J. Byron, Minneapolis, for respondents.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and OTIS, KELLY, and GUNN, JJ.

KELLY, Justice.

Plaintiff is an infant who has brought suit against her parents for personal injuries received when she was 8 1/2 months old. The trial court directed a verdict for defendants because the alleged negligent act involved an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of housing and other care. Plaintiff appeals from the district court's denial of her motion for a new trial. We affirm.

The facts are well stated in an excellent memorandum by the trial court as follows:

'The testimony, which was uncontradicted, revealed that the accident happened in the home of the father and mother of the minor child who was 8 1/2 months old at the time of the accident. The sequence of events is as follows: The mother went upstairs to get the child from its bed, came downstairs and placed the child on the living room floor while the mother went into the kitchen and prepared breakfast. In the living room was a table lamp with a cord that went across the floor to an extension cord which was connected to a floor socket. There was nothing defective about the lamp, cords, nor the socket. The mother knew that the child had started to play with the cord on occasion just as it had played with other objects which it was able to reach and the mother had tried by talking to the child and slapping the child's hands (to teach it) to stay away from these objects it might pull off a table or might play with on the floor. After the breakfast was prepared, the mother returned to the living room and picked up the child and fed the child in the kitchen. After feeding the child, the mother returned the child to the living room floor and returned to the kitchen to get a cup of coffee and to clean up the kitchen a little before taking the child back upstairs for its morning bath. While in the kitchen...

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9 cases
  • Foldi v. Jeffries
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • July 13, 1983
    ...child about dangers of construction site ruled within the domain of parental authority and thereby non-actionable); Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 203 N.W.2d 352 (1972) (mother's conduct in leaving infant unattended, enabling infant to bite extension cord, held within Goller exception for ......
  • Sorensen v. Sorensen
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • December 29, 1975
    ...v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968). See Ourada v. Knahmuhs, Minn., 221 N.W.2d 659, 660 (1974); Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 95, 203 N.W.2d 352 (1972); Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis.2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972). In Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181......
  • Dubay v. Irish
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • May 17, 1988
    ...of family affairs...." Paige v. Bing Construction Co., 61 Mich.App. 480, 485, 233 N.W.2d 46 (1975); see also Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 95, 203 N.W.2d 352 (1972). Accordingly, we decline to abrogate the doctrine of parental immunity in cases, such as this, involving allegations of the ......
  • Black v. Solmitz
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • December 18, 1979
    ...although the rules laid down for achieving that objective vary considerably from state to state. Compare, e. g., Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 203 N.W.2d 352 (1972), Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 324 N.E.2d 338 (1974), And Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914, 92 Cal.Rptr......
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