Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Oil & Gas Comm'n, No. 2012–1207.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: 985 N.E.2d 480,135 Ohio St.3d 204
• Parties: CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, L.L.C. v. OIL & GAS COMMISSION et al.
• Docket Number: No. 2012–1207.
• Decision Date: 30 January 2013

135 Ohio St.3d 204
985 N.E.2d 480

CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, L.L.C.
v.
OIL & GAS COMMISSION et al.

No. 2012–1207.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Jan. 9, 2013.
Decided Jan. 30, 2013.

[985 N.E.2d 481]

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., John K. Keller, Robert J. Krummen, and Daniel E. Shuey, Columbus, for relator.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and William J. Cole and Brandon C. Duck, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

[Ohio St.3d 204]{¶ 1} This is an action for a writ of prohibition to prevent respondents, the Ohio Oil and Gas Commission and three of its five members, from exercising jurisdiction in an appeal from the issuance by the chief of the Ohio Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management of a permit to relator, Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. (“Chesapeake”), to drill an oil and gas well, and to vacate the commission's actions in the appeal. Because the commission patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the appeal from the chief's issuance of the permit, we grant the writ.

Facts

{¶ 2} In 2004, Summitcrest, Inc. entered into an oil and gas lease with Mason Dixon, who assigned the lease to Burlington Resources. A portion of Burlington's lease interests was ultimately assigned to Chesapeake, which is an Oklahoma limited-liability company that is registered to do business in Ohio.

{¶ 3} Chesapeake applied to the Ohio Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management for a permit under R.C. 1509.06 to drill an oil and gas well on the lease property. In March 2012, the chief of the division issued a permit to Chesapeake to drill the wells. Summitcrest appealed the chief's issuance of the permit to the Oil and Gas Commission.

[Ohio St.3d 205]{¶ 4} Under R.C. 1509.36, the chief of the division is the appellee in appeals from orders of the chief. The division filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based on its claim that the issuance of permits to drill oil and gas wells did not constitute an order that was appealable to the commission. Chesapeake intervened and joined in the division's motion to dismiss.

{¶ 5} On July 10, 2012, the commission denied the motion to dismiss, relying on former R.C. 1509.03(B) and its determination that “the statutory and regulatory provisions directly addressing the jurisdiction of the Oil & Gas Commission did not specifically preclude an appeal of the Chief's issuance of a drilling permit to the Oil & Gas Commission.” The three members who voted to deny the motion constituted a quorum of the commission, with the two remaining members recusing themselves.

[985 N.E.2d 482]

{¶ 6} On July 19, 2012, Chesapeake filed this action for a writ of prohibition to prevent respondents, the Oil and Gas Commission and the three commission members who denied the motion to dismiss the appeal, from exercising further jurisdiction in the appeal and to vacate any actions taken by them. On July 23, the commission heard the appeal, and on August 8, the commission decided the merits of the appeal by affirming the issuance of the drilling permit to Chesapeake. No party appealed the commission's August 8 order.

{¶ 7} On August 31, respondents filed a motion to dismiss this prohibition case based on mootness, and on September 10, Chesapeake filed a memorandum in opposition. Summitcrest filed a motion to intervene as an additional respondent, but it later withdrew the motion after the commission decided the merits of its appeal on August 8. We denied respondents' motion to dismiss, granted an alternative writ, and issued a schedule for the presentation of evidence and briefs. 133 Ohio St.3d 1408, 2012-Ohio-4650, 975 N.E.2d 1027. We later denied respondents' motion for leave to argue lack of standing in their merit brief. 133 Ohio St.3d 1480, 2012-Ohio-5246, 978 N.E.2d 205.¹

{¶ 8} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the merits.

Analysis

{¶ 9} To be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, Chesapeake must establish that (1) the commission and its members are about to or have exercised quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) [Ohio St.3d 206]denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 18 and 23;State ex rel. Miller v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 130 Ohio St.3d 24, 2011-Ohio-4623, 955 N.E.2d 379, ¶ 12.

{¶ 10} The commission and its named members exercised quasi-judicial power by accepting jurisdiction over Summitcrest's appeal from the division chief's issuance of an oil and gas permit to Chesapeake. The appeal provided in R.C. 1509.36 requires a hearing resembling a judicial trial. See Miller at ¶ 13.

{¶ 11} For the remaining requirements, “[i]f an inferior tribunal patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, prohibition will lie to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.” State ex rel. Baker v. State Personnel Bd. of Review, 85 Ohio St.3d 640, 642, 710 N.E.2d 706 (1999). “Where jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking, relators need not establish the lack of an adequate remedy at law because the availability of alternate remedies like appeal would be immaterial.” State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15.

{¶ 12} The dispositive issue is thus whether the Oil and Gas Commission patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over Summitcrest's appeal.

Patent and Unambiguous Lack of Jurisdiction

{¶ 13} The General Assembly created the Oil and Gas Commission. See

[985 N.E.2d 483]

R.C. 1509.35(A) (“There is hereby created an oil and gas commission consisting of five members appointed by the governor”). Because the commission is a creation of state law, “its powers and duties extend only so far as the statutes grant authority, while being constrained by whatever limits the statutes impose.” Delaney v. Testa, 128 Ohio St.3d 248, 2011-Ohio-550, 943 N.E.2d 546, ¶ 20 (office of county auditor); see also Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 87 Ohio St.3d 363, 367, 721 N.E.2d 40...