Chesapeake Ohio Railway Company v. John De Atley
| Decision Date | 22 May 1916 |
| Docket Number | No. 274,274 |
| Citation | 60 L.Ed. 1016,241 U.S. 310,36 S.Ct. 564 |
| Parties | CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY, in Err., v. JOHN J. DE ATLEY |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. E. L. Worthington, W. D. Cochran, and Le Wright Browning for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Allan D. Cole and H. W. Cole for defendant in error.
In this action, which was brought in a state court under the Federal employers' liability act of April 22, 1908 (chap. 149, 35 Stat. at L. 65, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8657), the following facts appeared or might reasonably be inferred from the evidence most favorable to defendant in error (plaintiff below), in the light of which the initial question touching the validity of the judgment in his favor must be determined:
On January 22, 1911, plaintiff was in the employ of defendant and acting as head brakeman on train No. 95—a fast west-bound interstate freight train. When the train reached a station called Springdale, about 6 miles east of Maysville, in Kentucky, the train engineer directed plaintiff to go to a nearby railway telephone, call up the operator, and ascertain the whereabouts of train No. 1, which was a fast west-bound passenger train; the object being to determine whether it was safe for No. 95 to proceed to Maysville ahead of it. Plaintiff was unable to understand the operator and so reported to the engineer. He then got into the cab of the locomotive and the train proceeded to the coal docks, about 1 mile east of Maysville and about 460 yards east of a telegraph station in a signal tower known as the F. G. cabin, where it stopped for coal and water. Plaintiff was directed by the engineer to go forward to F. G. cabin and ascertain from the operator the whereabouts of train No. 1. Plaintiff went to the tower, and was there advised that his train had time to reach Maysville. He immediately descended to the platform in front of the tower and beside the track, and saw that his train was approaching. He waited for it, and when it reached the platform he attempted to board the engine. He could not accurately judge the speed of the train, but it appeared to him to be going slowly enough for him to get aboard it. He caught hold of the grab iron and put one foot on the step, and then the speed of the train, combined with his weight, caused his foot to slip and loosened his hold, so that he fell beneath the wheels of the tender and his arm was cut off. He had been employed as brakeman for about six weeks, and before that had made two round trips over the road for the purpose of becoming acquainted with his duties. During the time of his employment he had frequently been called upon, under orders of the train engineer, to leave the train and go forward to signal towers for orders or information, and then mount the train as it came moving by. On the occasion of the accident the train was running about 12 miles per hour.
The case went to the jury under instructions making defendant's liability dependent upon whether the engineer, with knowledge of plaintiff's presence at the telegraph tower upon business connected with the operation of the train, and with knowledge of his purpose to board the train, negligently operated the train at such a rate of speed as to make plaintiff's attempt to board it unusually hazardous. There was a verdict for plaintiff and the resulting judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals of Kentucky. 159 Ky. 687, 167 S. W. 933.
Upon the present writ of error, it is not disputed that there was sufficient evidence of the negligence of the engineer to require the submission of the case to the jury. It is argued that there was no substantial evidence to support the conclusion that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury; but this is so clearly untenable as to require no discussion. The remaining questions turn upon the application of the law respecting assumption of risk.
It is insisted that, even conceding the train was operated at a negligent rate of speed in view of plaintiff's purpose to board it, yet he assumed the risk of injury involved in the attempt. The act of Congress, by making the carrier liable for an employee's injury 'resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees' of the carrier, abrogated the common-law rule known as the fellow-servant doctrine by placing the negligence of a coemployee upon the same basis as the negligence of the employer. At the same time, in saving the defense of assumption of risk in cases other than those where the violation by the carrier of a statute enacted for the safety of employees may contribute to the injury or death of an employee (Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 502, 58 L. ed. 1062, 1069, L.R.A.1915C, 1, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 635, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 475, 8 N. C. C. A. 834), the act placed a coemployee's negligence, where it is the ground of the action, in the same relation as the employer's own negligence would stand to the question whether a plaintiff is to be deemed to have assumed the risk.
On the facts of the case before us, therefore, plaintiff having voluntarily entered into an employment that required him on proper occasion to board a moving train, he assumed the risk of injury normally incident to that operation, other than such as might arise from the failure of the locomotive engineer to operate the train with due care to maintain a moderate rate of speed in order to enable plaintiff to board it without undue peril to himself. But plaintiff had the right to presume that the engineer would exercise reasonable care for his safety, and cannot be held to have assumed the risk attributable to the operation of the train at an unusually high and dangerous rate of speed, until made aware of the danger, unless the speed and the consequent danger were so obvious that an ordinarily careful person in his situation would have observed the one and appreciated the other. Gila Valley, G. & N. R. Co. v. Hall, 232 U. S. 94, 101, 58 L. ed. 521, 534, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 504, 58 L. ed. 1062, 1070, L.R.A. 1915C, 1, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 635, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 475, 8 N. C. C. A. 834.
It is argued that, so far as the question of assumed risks is concerned, it makes no difference, in the case of a...
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