Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co v. Beasley

• Decision Date: 18 January 1906
• Citation: 104 Va. 788,52 S.E. 566
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: CHESAPEAKE & O. RY. CO. v. BEASLEY, COUCH & CO.

52 S.E. 566

104 Va. 788

CHESAPEAKE & O. RY. CO.

v.BEASLEY, COUCH & CO.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Jan. 18, 1906.

1. Carriers — Liability as Insurer of Goods Carried for Hire.

A common carrier is an insurer of the goods it undertakes to carry for hire, and is bound to deliver the same safely, and from this duty it can only be exonerated by the act of God or of a public enemy.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 9, Cent. Dig. Carriers, § 481.]

2. Same—Passenger's Effects—Liability During and After Transportation.

A carrier's liability, as such, for a passenger's baggage, continues during transportation and for such a time thereafter as affords the passenger a reasonable opportunity to remove it,

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 9, Cent. Dig. Carriers, §§ 1541, 1542.]

3. Same—Diligence of Passenger in Removing Baggage.

A passenger reached his destination at 7:25 o'clock in the evening of a severe winter day, and his baggage was removed to the station to be weighed. The station was locked an hour later, and the agent left for the night. There was no reasonable way in which the baggage could have been removed at night, except by breaking the seal of a loaded freight car and making passageway through it, and it did not appear that such passenger knew that that was possible. Held, that the carrier was liable, as such, where the goods were destroyed during the night by fire.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 9, Cent. Dig. Carriers, §§ 1541, 1542.]

4. Same—Limitation of Liability.

Code 1887, § 1296 (Va. Code 1904, § 1294c, subsec. 25), providing that no agreement by a carrier for "exemption" from liability for injury or loss occasioned by its own neglect shall be valid, prohibits not only contracts exempting the carrier from liability, but also from making contracts limiting liability.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 9, Cent. Dig. Carriers, §§ 654, 659, 667, 937, 1554.]

Buchanan and Harrison, JJ., dissenting.

Error from Circuit Court, Botetourt County.

Action by Beasley, Couch & Co. against the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error. Affirmed.

R. L. Parish, for plaintiff in error.

Benj. Haden, for defendant in error.

KEITH, P. On March 1, 1903, H. A. Dudley, a traveling salesman representing the defendant in error, purchased of plaintiff in error a 1000-mile ticket, upon which he was entitled to travel in the passenger trains of plaintiff in error and to carry with him free of charge 150 pounds of baggage. The price of this ticket was one-half a cent per mile less than the regular fare, and in consideration of this reduced charge, Dudley signed a contract on the back of the ticket, which provides, in part, as follows: "That in the event of loss or damage to baggage, no claim shall be made therefor in excess of $100.00."

On February 1, 1904, Dudley had three trunks, weighing 600 pounds, checked on this ticket at Buena Vista, in Rockbridge county, to Eagle Mountain Station, in Botetourt county, paying 90 cents for the baggage in excess of 150 pounds. The train reached Eagle Mountain Station about twenty-five minutes after seven in the evening. Dudley went to a hotel, and his baggage was taken by the agents of the railroad company to its baggage room to be weighed. About an hour after the arrival of the train, the agent closed the station, locked up the baggage, and went home. Shortly after midnight the station was consumed by fire, and the baggage destroyed.

This suit was brought by the defendant in error, as assignee of H. A. Dudley, to recover damages for the destruction of the three trunks, which contained sample goods. Upon a demurrer to the evidence by the defendant company, judgment was given by the circuit court in favor of the plaintiff for $605.42, the amount ascertained by the verdict of the jury to be the value of the plaintiff's goods.

The first contention of plaintiff in error is that the fire resulted from no negligence on its part, and that its liability was not that of a common carrier but a warehouseman.

A common carrier is an insurer of the goods it undertakes to carry for hire, and is bound to deliver the same safely, and from this duty can only be exonerated by the act of God or of a public enemy. A carrier's liability, as such, for a passenger's baggage, continues during transportation, and for such a time thereafter as affords the passenger a reasonable opportunity to remove it. In determining what is a reasonable time for removing the baggage after reaching its destination, the peculiar circumstances surrounding each case must be looked to, such as the character of the station, the opportunities afforded by the common carrier for delivering baggage when called for, etc. Penn. Co. v. Liveright (Ind. App.) 41 N. E. 350; Wald v. L. E. & St L. R. Co., 92 Ky. 645, 18 S. W. 650; Mote v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 27 Iowa, 22, 1 Am. Rep. 212; Roth v. Railroad Co., 34 N. Y. 548, 90 Am. Dec. 736; Burnell v. Railway Co., 45 N. Y. 184, 6 Am. Rep. 61.

The record shows that the weather on the night in question was unusually severe. The station was so situated and blocked with freight cars as to make it practically impossible to deliver the trunks that night. The agent testifies that after the train left he first put away his express; that then he would weigh the trunks before allowing them to be removed; that he left the station in about an hour after the train arrived, locking the trunks up in the baggage room, and went to his home; and that he would not have returned that night for any cause less than fire. He says that, if the trunks had been demanded before he left the station, they would have been delivered, but further says that there were only two waysin which the trunks could have been removed, one by taking them out on the railroad track and wheeling them down, which he says a reasonable man would hardly have attempted, and the other was to break the seal of a loaded freight car and make a passageway through it; that this last was the only practicable way in which the trunks could have been gotten from the depot and delivered that night; that the station hands had gone away some little time before he left; and that the trunks could not then be removed. He further says that Dudley was not informed that the trunks could be removed by opening the sealed and loaded freight car and taking them through it; and that appearances were such as to justify him in believing that they could not have been gotten out of the depot in that way.

We are of opinion, upon the whole evidence, that Dudley was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to remove his baggage on the night of his arrival at Eagle Mountain. Indeed, it is quite clear that the railroad company did not contemplate the removal of the baggage that night.

The second assignment of error is to the action of the circuit court in giving judgment in favor of the defendant in error for $605.42, with interest, the amount ascertained by the jury to be the value of the three trunks and their contents, instead of $100, the amount agreed upon, as shown by the contract, in the event of loss or damage to the baggage; the language of the fourth clause of the contract being, in part, as already seen, as follows: "That in the event of loss or damage to baggage, no claim shall be made therefor in excess of $100.00."

The decision of this question involves the construction of our statute upon the subject.

When the mileage ticket which contains this contract was purchased, section 1296 of the Code of Virginia of 1887 was in force. It declared that, "No agreement made by a common carrier for exemption from liability for injury or loss occasioned by his own neglect or misconduct, shall be valid." The law in force on February 1, 1904, when Dudley took passage upon this ticket, was passed on January 18, 1904, and is found in Va. Code 1904, § 1294c, subsec. 25, which reads as follows: "No agreement made by a transportation company for exemption from liability for injury or loss occasioned by its own neglect or misconduct as a common carrier shall be valid"—language which is similar to, but not wholly indentical with, section 1296 of the Code of 1887, in place of which it stands.

In Richmond & Danville R. Co. v. Payne, 86 Va. 481, 10 S. E. 749, 6 L. R. A. 849, this subject was under consideration, and it was said:

"There is no doubt that a common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from liability for the consequences of his own negligence or that of his servants. This was decided in an elaborate opinion by the Supreme Court of the United States, in Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 21 L. Ed. 627, and by this court in Railroad Co. v. Sayers, 26 Grat. 328; and the principle is now brought into the Code, section 1296 of which declares that 'no agreement made by a common carrier for exemption from liability for injury or loss occasioned by his own neglect or misconduct shall be valid.'

"But that is not the question before us. The question here is whether, when the shipper signs a bill of lading, not exempting the carrier from liability for the negligence of himself or his servants, but limiting the amount in which the carrier shall be liable, in consideration of the goods being carried at reduced rates, such a contract, fairly entered into, is valid and binding; and we see no reason why, when its terms are just and reasonable, it should not be. The test to be applied in all such cases is, was the contract fairly entered into, and are its terms just and reasonable?

"At common law, it is true, the carrier is chargeable as an insurer, unless loss or damage occur by the act of God or the public enemy. But, as the law now is, he may, by special contract, restrict his liability for losses otherwise occurring. Indeed, he may by such agreement exempt himself absolutely from any liability for damage not caused by the negligence or default of himself or his servants. And the owner and shipper,...