Chesebro v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist, 368

• Citation: 59 S.Ct. 622,83 L.Ed. 921,306 U.S. 459
• Decision Date: 27 March 1939
• Docket Number: No. 368,368
• Parties: CHESEBRO v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DIST. et al
• Court: United States Supreme Court

306 U.S. 459

59 S.Ct. 622

83 L.Ed. 921

CHESEBRO

v LOS ANGELES COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DIST. et al.

No. 368.

Argued Feb. 1, 2, 1939.

Decided March 27, 1939.

Messrs. Bourke Jones and Frederick von Schrader, both of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.

Mr. W. B. McKesson, of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellees.

Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant maintains that a California statute authorizing an administrative board to levy special assessments on his land within a flood control district created by the legislature to pay cost of local improvements and facilities and of their operation, maintenance, and betterment, without providing him an opportunity to be heard on the question of benefits, is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.C.A.Const.

Chapter 755, p. 1502, Statutes 1915, creates the Los Angeles flood control district. Section 2 declares that the purposes of the act are to provide for the control of the flood and storm waters of the district, to conserve them for beneficial uses, and to protect the property within the district from damage by flood or storm waters. Section 16 empowers the board of supervisors of the district to construct all improvements and to acquire all property that is necessary or useful for carrying out the purposes of the act.

Chapter 642, p. 1763, Statutes 1937, added § 13 1/2 to the flood control act. It provides: The board of supervisors of the district may accept on its behalf, a transfer and conveyance of 'all, but not less than all,' storm drain improvements, drainage improvements or drainage systems of defined classes lying within the district. Upon conveyance to the district of any such drainage works it shall become liable for principal and interest of bonds thereafter maturing which were issued by any drainage district to pay the cost of constructing the transferred property. For that purpose the board shall levy a special tax each year upon the taxable real estate in the district.

A map, that with appellant's consent is included in appellees' brief, shows that the flood control district is within and nearly as large as Los Angeles county which contains almost 4,000 square miles and that within it there are eleven drainage districts, two of which were organized under Chapter 258, p. 354, Statutes 1903, and amendatory acts, and nine of which were organized under Chapter 354, p. 731, Statutes 1919, and amendatory acts.^*

Appellant and the city of Los Angeles presented to the highest court of the State their petition for a peremptory writ of mandate. In substance it alleges: Petitioners own taxable real property within the flood control district and outside the drainage districts. December 1, 1937, the board of supervisors of the district accepted a transfer to the district of the improvements and systems of the eleven drainage districts. The board intends to levy annual special assessments against all real estate in that district sufficient to meet the outstanding obligations incurred on account of the works so transferred. The levy of these assessments will be illegal in that they will be levied against property situated in the flood control district to pay the debts and obligations of other special assessment districts without regard to the accrual of benefits to the lands assessed and will deprive petitioners of their property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The petition prays a peremptory writ of mandate to require appellees to levy assessments in accordance with Chapter 755, p. 1502, Statutes 1915, as it was prior to the addition of § 13 1/2 and to command them to refrain from levying any assessment under that section.

Appellees demurred on the ground that the petition failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The state court sustained that contention and denied the writ. It ruled: A finding by the legislature that lands within the flood control district would be benefited by that district's acquisition of the works of the drainage districts is conclusive unless shown to be without reasonable foundation. It must be presumed that, by designating in § 13 1/2 the improvements authorized to be transferred, the legislature found that the entire flood control district would be specially benefited by the acquisition. The particularity of the description implies such a finding. The finding thus implied is as fully effective as if declared in express terms in the act itself.

Petitioners appealed to this court; appellees moved, as to the city, to dismiss or affirm on the ground that no federal question was involved; and, as to both appellants, on the grounds that no substantial federal question was presented, and that the decision below rests upon adequate non-federal grounds. We dismissed the city's appeal for want of a substantial federal question and postponed to the hearing on the merits further consideration of the question of jurisdiction and of the motion to dismiss or affirm. City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 305 U.S. 564, 59 S.Ct. 104, 83 L.Ed. —-.

That motion is denied. The validity of the statute under the federal constitution was by the petition appropriately drawn in question and in substance the decision of the state supreme court is in favor of its validity. See People of State of New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 67—69, 49 S.Ct. 61, 63, 73 L.Ed. 184, 62 A.L.R. 785. Its judgment does not depend upon characterization of the statute or mere interpretation of the language employed. Its decision is to the effect that the legislature found that the real property within the flood control district would be specially benefited by the acquisition of the district drainage works and that therefore the appellant and other owners are not entitled to be heard on the question of benefits. Appellant contends there is no foundation for the ruling that the legislature made that determination and that, as put in operation and effect by the State, § 13 1/2 deprives him of his constitutional right to be heard. See St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 362, 35 S.Ct. 99, 102, 59 L.Ed. 265; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 237, 37 S.Ct. 260, 264, 61 L.Ed. 685, Ann.Cas.1917D, 642; Railroad Commission v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 264 U.S. 79, 86, 44 S.Ct. 247, 249, 68 L.Ed. 569; Mason Co. v. Tax Comm., 302 U.S. 186, 206, 207, 58 S.Ct. 233, 243, 82 L.Ed. 187. We are unable to say that the question is foreclosed by our decisions or that it is so clearly not debatable as to require dismissal for lack of substance. Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 258, 55 S.Ct. 197, 202, 79 L.Ed. 343; Alton Railroad Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 305 U.S. 548, 59 S.Ct. 340, 83 L.Ed. 344, decided January 16, 1939. Nor do we find any merit in the contention that the judgment rests upon an independent non-federal ground.

But we are of opinion that the judgment is right and must be affirmed.

In the absence of flagrant abuse or purely arbitrary action, the State, consistently with the federal constitution, may establish local districts to include real property that it finds will be specially benefited by drainage, flood control, or other improvements therein, and, to acquire,...