Chesnut v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment (Ex parte Chesnut)

Decision Date22 January 2016
Docket Number1140731.
Citation208 So.3d 624
Parties Ex parte Richard E. CHESNUT and Betty B. Chesnut. (In re Richard E. Chesnut and Betty B. Chesnut v. Board Of Zoning Adjustment, City of Huntsville. Richard E. Chesnut and Betty B. Chesnut v. City of Huntsville, Denton–Niemitz Realty, LLC, and Guild Building and Remodeling, LLC)
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Richard E. Chesnut of Chesnut & Chesnut, Huntsville; and R. Patrick Chesnut of Ables, Baxter & Parker, P.C., Huntsville, for petitioners.

Allen L. Anderson and Allison B. Chandler of F&B Law Firm, P.C., Huntsville, for City of Huntsville and Board of Zoning Adjustment, City of Huntsville.

Jonathan D. Watson, Decatur, for Denton–Niemitz Realty, LLC, and Guild Building & Remodeling, LLC.

BOLIN, Justice.

Richard E. Chesnut and Betty B. Chesnut petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion affirming the Madison Circuit Court's summary judgments in favor of the City of Huntsville ("the City"), the Board of Zoning Adjustment of the City of Huntsville, Denton–Niemitz Realty, LLC, and Guild Building & Remodeling, LLC. See Chesnut v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 208 So.3d 609 (Ala.Civ.App.2015).

Facts and Procedural History

The Court of Civil Appeals set out the procedural history as follows:

"Richard E. Chesnut and Betty B. Chesnut appeal from two separate judgments of the Madison Circuit Court that were entered against them in connection with their challenge of building permits (‘the permits') issued for the construction of a house next door to the Chesnuts' house.
"On June 3, 2013, the Chesnuts filed a civil action, case no. CV–13–901203 (‘the civil action’), in the Madison Circuit Court against the City of Huntsville (‘the city’), Denton–Niemitz Realty, LLC, and Guild Building & Remodeling, LLC (the two latter entities are hereinafter referred to collectively as ‘the builders'); we hereinafter refer to the Madison Circuit Court, insofar as it presided over the civil action, as ‘the trial court.’ 1 On September 27, 2013, the builders filed a motion for a summary judgment, which the city joined on October 1, 2013. On December 23, 2013, the builders filed counterclaims against the Chesnuts, alleging slander of title and seeking sanctions against them pursuant to the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act. On February 2, 2014, the Chesnuts filed a motion to dismiss the builders' counterclaims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and (6), Ala. R. Civ. P. As discussed more fully below, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the city and the builders on the Chesnuts' claims on March 14, 2014. On April 16, 2014, the builders submitted a notice of dismissal to the trial court, in which they stated that they were voluntarily dismissing their counterclaims that were still pending against the Chesnuts. On May 16, 2014, the Chesnuts filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment. That motion was denied by operation of law, pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. The Chesnuts filed a timely notice of appeal to our supreme court, which transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to § 12–2–7(6), Ala.Code 1975. This court assigned appeal no. 2140043 to the appeal from the civil action.
"On July 8, 2013, while the civil action was pending, the city filed a motion to dismiss the civil action on the ground that the Chesnuts had not appealed the issuance of the permits to the Board of Zoning Adjustment of the City of Huntsville (‘the board’). Therefore, the city argued, the Chesnuts had not exhausted their administrative remedies before filing the civil action. On July 31, 2013, the Chesnuts filed an appeal of the issuance of the permits with the board. The board determined that the Chesnuts' appeal was untimely. On August 30, 2013, the Chesnuts appealed the board's decision (‘the administrative appeal’) to the Madison Circuit Court and the administrative appeal was assigned case no. CV–13–902031; we hereinafter refer to the Madison Circuit Court, insofar as it presided over the administrative appeal, as ‘the circuit court’.2 The board filed a motion to dismiss, which was converted to a motion for a summary judgment. On April 9, 2014, the circuit court entered a summary judgment upholding the board's determination that the Chesnuts' appeal of the issuance of the permits had been untimely. The Chesnuts filed a timely motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's judgment. The circuit court denied the postjudgment motion, and the Chesnuts filed a timely notice of appeal to our supreme court. Our supreme court transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to § 12–2–7(6). This court assigned appeal no. 2140042 to the appeal from the administrative appeal. On the Chesnuts' motion, this court consolidated the appeals from the civil action and from the administrative appeal.
__________
" 1 Richard Chesnut is an attorney who practices in Huntsville. When the civil action was filed, all the Madison circuit judges recused themselves. A retired judge from another circuit was appointed to preside over the civil action.
" 2 Once again, because Richard Chesnut practices law in Madison County, all the Madison circuit judges recused themselves. A judge from another circuit was appointed to preside over the administrative appeal."

Chesnut, 208 So.3d at 611–13.

The Court of Civil Appeals first addressed the appeal in case no. 2140043, the civil action, and whether there was a final judgment in that the summary judgment did not address the counterclaims asserted by Denton–Niemitz Realty and Guild Builders (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the builders"). A month after the March 14, 2014, summary judgment was entered, the builders filed a notice of dismissal of their counterclaims pursuant to Rule 41, Ala. R. Civ. P. The Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the summary judgment was final, reasoning:

"The procedural posture of this case at the time the builders filed their notice of dismissal presents an unusual set of circumstances in relation to the filing of a notice of dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i) [, Ala. R. Civ. P.]. Although a summary judgment had already been entered on the builders' and the city's motion for a summary judgment, the builders did not even file their counterclaims against the Chesnuts until after they had filed their motion for a summary judgment. Rule 41(a)(1) makes clear that the ‘adverse party must have filed an answer or a motion for a summary judgment before the notice of dismissal is filed. At the time the builders filed their notice of dismissal, the Chesnuts, as the adverse parties to the counterclaims, had not filed an answer to the pending counterclaims or a motion for a summary judgment as to the counterclaims.
"Although we have found no Alabama law directly on point, we note that this court has stated that [a] bona fide motion is certainly not a pleading [including an answer] within the intendment of Rule 7 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.’ Kuhns v. Coussement, 412 So.2d 779, 782 (Ala.Civ.App.1981). Moreover, federal cases interpreting Rule 41(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., which is similar to Rule 41(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., have held that [a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief does not have the same preclusionary effect’ as the filing of an answer for purposes of Rule 41(a). Roddy v. Dendy, 141 F.R.D. 261, 262 (S.D.Miss.1992) (citing Carter v. United States, 547 F.2d 258 (5th Cir.1977) ); see also Nix v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 452 F.2d 794, 797–798 (5th Cir.1972) (same). As mentioned, [t]he committee comments to Rule 41 state that this rule is substantially the same as the federal rule, and we normally consider federal cases interpreting the federal rules of procedure as persuasive authority.’ Hammond v. Brooks, 516 So.2d 614, 616 (Ala.1987). Thus, based on the authority cited, we conclude that the Chesnuts' Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, which, we note, contained no affidavits or other materials that might have converted the motion to dismiss to a motion for a summary judgment, did not constitute an answer.
"We are cognizant that Rule 41 is designed to limit voluntary dismissals " ‘to an early stage of the proceedings before issue is joined.’ " Riverstone Dev. Co. [v. Nelson], 91 So.3d [678] at 681 [ (Ala.2012) ]. However, because of the builders' delay in filing their counterclaims, those issues had not been ‘joined’ at the time the March 2014 summary judgment was entered on the Chesnuts' claims against the city and the builders. Because the Chesnuts had not filed an answer to or a motion for a summary judgment regarding the builders' counterclaims, and because the merits of the counterclaims had not been reached or the ‘issues joined,’ we conclude that, under the rare circumstances of this case, the trial court was not required to enter an order ‘granting’ the builders' notice of dismissal of the counterclaims. Accordingly, the summary judgment entered in the civil action is a final judgment for purposes of appeal."

Chesnut, 208 So.2d at 615–16.

The Court of Civil Appeals then turned to the merits of case no. 2140043, the appeal from the civil action, setting out the following facts:

"The materials the parties submitted in favor of and in opposition to the motion for a summary judgment filed by the builders and joined by the city in the civil action indicate the following. In 1983, the Chesnuts purchased a house and the adjacent lot to the east of their house, which was in a Huntsville neighborhood that had been established in 1908. The neighborhood is zoned as a ‘Resident 1–B’ district. In October 2012, one of the builders, Denton–Niemitz Realty, LLC (‘Denton–Niemitz’), purchased the house on the west side of the Chesnuts' house. The house Denton–Niemitz purchased was a single-family house with the usual sewerage, water, and utility connections, a driveway, and a landscaped yard. In other words, it was a ‘developed lot.’ On October
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • Berry v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • January 17, 2020
    ...of a criminal offense, nor do those cases persuade this Court to read § 15-10-3(a)(6) in the same way Berry does.In Ex parte Chesnut, 208 So. 3d 624, 640 (Ala. 2016), the Alabama Supreme Court recognized the following fundamental principles of statutory construction:" ‘It is this Court's re......
  • Hubbard v. State (Ex parte Hubbard)
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • April 10, 2020
    ...help in construing an ambiguous statute, courts consider how the statute has been interpreted by government agencies. Ex parte Chesnut, 208 So. 3d 624, 640 (Ala. 2016). This principle is especially applicable when the relevant agency has been empowered to issue interpretive opinions providi......
  • Lead Educ. Found. v. Ala. Educ. Ass'n
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • March 8, 2019
    ...under § 16-6F-6(a)(1) to become an authorizer, it cannot consider applications deemed denied under § 16-6F-6(e).In Ex parte Chesnut, 208 So.3d 624, 640 (Ala. 2016), this Court held:"[A] reviewing court will accord an interpretation placed on a statute or an ordinance by an administrative ag......
  • Phillips v. Montoya
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • October 27, 2017
    ...McDonald, 985 So.2d 914, 919 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. Vinson, 723 So.2d 634, 636 (Ala. 1998) )." Ex parte Chesnut, 208 So.3d 624, 635 (Ala. 2016).Phillips specifically argues that the first element of the doctrine of res judicata was not met because, he says, a defaul......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT