Chesson v. State
Decision Date | 03 May 1983 |
Docket Number | 3 Div. 556 |
Citation | 435 So.2d 177 |
Parties | Willie James CHESSON v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Benjamin E. Pool, Montgomery, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Jane LeCroy Brannan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for the offense of murder. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and the court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment. Appellant does not raise the sufficiency of the evidence as an issue on appeal.
The victim was a seven-month old baby girl who died as a result of blunt force trauma to her head. Her skull had been severely fractured, and her body evidenced numerous other puncture wounds, lacerations, blisters, and bruises, of both immediate and longer term infliction.
Appellant gave two statements in which he admitted whipping the baby with both his hands and a belt on the morning of October 15, 1981. She was admitted to the hospital that afternoon in an unconscious, rigid state with multiple facial and head injuries. Appellant admitted in his statement and in his testimony at trial that the child had been in his sole custody on the morning of the incident.
Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the chief investigating officer, a State's witness, from the rule which provides for sequestration of witnesses. Appellant asserts the State presented no valid reason at trial to justify excluding the officer from the rule. The appellant, in objecting to the officer's presence, based his objection on the fact that the officer was "not the victim," and that he was the main investigating officer. The prosecution also informed the court that this same officer had taken both of appellant's statements.
Our holding in Weatherford v. State, 369 So.2d 863, 865 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 369 So.2d 873 (Ala.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867, 100 S.Ct. 141, 62 L.Ed.2d 91 (1979), disposes of this issues as follows:
Appellant asserted no reason at trial or on appeal sufficient to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. We point out that in this case the victim was a deceased infant, unable to assist the prosecution at trial. Our review of the record and of the evidence in its entirety reveals no actual prejudice inured to appellant as a result of the officer's presence during the trial proceedings. Consequently, we find no error in this regard. Weatherford, supra.
We note also our recent statement in Young v. State, 416 So.2d 1109, 1111 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), holding as follows:
"Where the rule for the exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom is invoked, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to allow any one of the witnesses to remain in the courtroom during the examination of the others and the exercise of this discretion is not reviewable on appeal." (Citations omitted.)
Appellant asserts the trial court erred in the following ruling, made during the cross-examination of the victim's mother by defense counsel:
Appellant's counsel now asserts for the first time on appeal that the testimony was offered, not only to show that the witness was a violent person, but to show she had a motive to kill her child. The motive asserted by appellant is that, because the witness had found the appellant in a compromising situation with another woman (the occasion of the gun being used), the witness killed her baby in order to frame the appellant as revenge for his infidelity to her. Appellant also argues the testimony should have been allowed to show the witness's bias towards him.
When error is predicated upon an exception to the ruling of the trial court in sustaining an opposing party's objection to questions propounded to a witness, error cannot be incurred, unless the trial court was made aware of what testimony the question was expected to elicit, and unless it further appears that it was material to the issues in the case. Ex Parte Fields, 382 So.2d 598 (Ala.1980).
C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 425.01(13) (3d ed. 1977)
The record makes it clear that, when the trial court inquired of appellant's counsel as to why the evidence should be admitted, he was neither told that appellant was seeking to introduce this evidence to prove a motive on the part of the witness to kill her baby nor to indicate her bias towards appellant.
The motive of another to commit the crime for which the appellant is being prosecuted, without further evidence to indicate that such other committed the crime, is not admissible. Bowen v. State, 140 Ala. 65, 37 So. 233 (1904); McElroy's, supra § 48.01(7). There was no evidence whatsoever to indicate that the witness committed the murder.
As well, the evidence was clearly inadmissible for the purpose for which the defense counsel stated it was being offered. Appellant was attempting to show the witness's character for violence. An accused cannot prove the character of another for the purpose of showing that such other, rather than the appellant, committed the crime charged. McAdams v. State, 378 So.2d 1197 (Ala.Cr.App.1979).
Finally, any potential error which appellant might have incurred from the sustention of the State's objection was cured and eradicated when the court allowed appellant to later elicit the same evidence, in much greater detail, from a defense witness. Watson v. State, 398 So.2d 320 (Ala.Cr.App.1980), cert. denied, 398 So.2d 332 (Ala.1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941, 101 S.Ct. 3085, 69 L.Ed.2d 955 (1981).
Appellant argues the trial court erred in admitting an incriminating statement made by appellant when a proper voluntariness predicate had not been established. The record reflects the following:
The record reflects the appellant's statement was a spontaneous exclamation, made not in response to interrogation of appellant, but volunteered during investigatory questioning of the victim's mother. Appellant requested no hearing and offered no evidence to prove otherwise. Miranda warnings were not required, therefore. Laffitte v. State, 370 So.2d 1108 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1111 (Ala.1979). Carroll v. State, 370 So.2d 749 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 761 (Ala.1979); Garrison v. State, 372 So.2d 55 (Ala.Cr.App.1979).
As well, the record reflects that appellant had been read his rights prior to volunteering the statement.
Finally, the appellant allowed two confessions to be read into the record...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Centobie v. State
... ... State, 502 So.2d 858 (Ala.Crim.App.1986) ; Johnson v. State, 479 So.2d 1377 (Ala.Crim.App.1985) ; Chesson v. State, 435 So.2d 177 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983), and authorities cited in those cases ... Based on the aforestated legal authority, the trial court did not err in allowing the witnesses to remain in the courtroom. Moreover, the appellant has failed to show that the presence of the ... ...
-
Shanklin v. State
... ... State , 502 So. 2d 858 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Johnson v. State , 479 So. 2d 1377 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); Chesson v. State , 435 So. 2d 177 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), and authorities cited in those cases." Centobie , 861 So. 2d at 1130 (emphasis added). See also Living v. State , 796 So. 2d 1121, 1141-42 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). Although Shanklin correctly notes that Lori Crumpton, Chief Bobo, and ... ...
-
Henderson v. State
... ... State, 502 So.2d 858, 863 (Ala.Cr.App.1986); Hall v. State, 500 So.2d 1282, 1291 (Ala.Cr.App.1986); Chesson v. State, 435 So.2d 177, 179 (Ala.Cr.App.1983); Young v. State, 416 So.2d 1109, 1111 (Ala.Cr.App.1982). We would note, however, that Dr. Embry's exemption was not necessary, because he could have also based his opinion on facts that are assumed in hypothetical questions. Phillips v. Emmons, 514 ... ...
-
Tarver v. State
... ... See also Toliver v. State, 142 Ala. 3, 38 So. 801 (1905) ... Evidence of the bad character of another person cannot be used for the purpose of showing that this other person, and not the defendant, committed the crime charged. Chesson v. State, 435 So.2d 177 (Ala.Crim.App.1983); McAdams v. State, 378 So.2d 1197 (Ala.Crim.App.1979); McElroy's, supra, § 48.01(10) ... The fact that Richardson may have had a prior altercation with Parrish in no way relates to the capital offense for which the appellant was ... ...