Chest v. McKinney
Decision Date | 27 April 2017 |
Docket Number | No. C17-1002-LRR,C17-1002-LRR |
Parties | EDDIE CHEST, Petitioner, v. JIM MCKINNEY, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
This matter is before the court pursuant to the petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (docket no. 2). The petitioner submitted such application on February 16, 2017. The petitioner paid the $5.00 filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires the court to conduct an initial review of the application for a writ of habeas corpus and summarily dismiss it, order a response or "take such action as the judge deems appropriate." See Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The court may summarily dismiss an application for a writ of habeas corpus without ordering a response if it plainly appears from the face of such application and its exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2243; Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 1993). For the reasons set forth below, summary dismissal is appropriate in this case.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") strictly limits a federal court's power to review habeas corpus petitions brought by state-court prisoners. See White v. Kelley, 824 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 2016) ; Abernathy v. Hobbs, 748 F.3d 813, 816 (8th Cir. 2014) (); Taylor v. Roper, 561 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir. 2009) ( ); Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2003) ( ). The AEDPA prohibits the grant of habeas corpus relief unless the state adjudication:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). When considering § 2254(d) matters, the court is guided by well-established principles: (1) "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law," Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)) (emphasis in original), see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 411 ( ), Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (), Cole v. Roper, 623 F.3d 1183, 1187 (8th Cir. 2010) ( ); (2) "evena strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable," Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102; (3) the purpose of § 2254(d) is to "'guard against extreme malfunction in the state criminal justice systems,'" id. at 102-03 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)); and (4) the burden is on the petitioner to "show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement," id. at 103. Accord Moeller v. Weber, 649 F.3d 839, 843-44 (8th Cir. 2011). In addition, a "court is bound by the facts as found by the state courts, absent clear and convincing evidence those findings were incorrect." White, 824 F.3d at 757 (citing Buchheit v. Norris, 459 F.3d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 2006)); accord Forrest v. Steele, 764 F.3d 848, 854 (8th Cir. 2014).
In his application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the petitioner asserts one ground for relief. Namely, he contends that his "conviction or sentence [is] in violation of the Constitution of the United States [because] the State repeatedly violated [the] plea agreement by not being true—in spirit—to [its promise to make a] recommendation."
With respect to the history of the petitioner's case, the Iowa Court of Appeals stated:
In the first appeal, this court rejected Chest's claim the district court considered an impermissible sentencing factor when imposing sentence. See State v. Chest, 808 N.W.2d 449, 2011 Iowa App. LEXIS 1162, *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). In thesecond appeal, arising from postconviction-relief proceedings, Chest contended the State breached its agreement to recommend concurrent sentences. See Chest v. State, 847 N.W.2d 612, 2014 Iowa App. LEXIS 452, *13 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). We agreed, vacated the sentences, and remanded the matter for resentencing before a new judge. Following remand, the district court again imposed consecutive sentences. See State v. Chest, 872 N.W.2d 199, 2015 Iowa App. LEXIS 929, *2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015). Chest appealed again, contending the same prosecutor painted with the same brush and again failed to truly recommend concurrent sentences. See id. We agreed, vacated the sentences, and remanded for resentencing before a new judge. See [id. at] *4. For the second time, we "direct[ed] the State to make a meaningful recommendation consistent with both the terms of the plea agreement and the established standard of a recommendation." Id.
State v. Chest, 2016 Iowa App. LEXIS 936 *2 (parallel citations omitted). Concerning the third sentencing hearing, the Iowa Court of Appeals observed:
Id. at *2-4. The Iowa Court of Appeals also pointed out the defense's response:
Chest's counsel objected to the prosecutor's statements as a breach of the plea agreement. The prosecutor's statements were not a true recommendation for concurrent sentences, counsel argued. Chest's counsel also argued for specific performance of the parties' plea agreement, contending theprosecutor's breach of the plea agreement on two prior occasions irreparably tainted the proceedings—a legal pentimento revealing itself despite overpainting. The seventy-seven-year-old defendant did not present much of an argument for himself at the sentencing hearing; even if the district court had imposed concurrent sentences, the defendant would not be eligible for parole until he is more than ninety years old.
Id. at 5. Lastly, when addressing the merits of the fourth appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals stated:
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