Chestang v. Alcorn State Univ.

• Decision Date: 15 April 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 5:12cv69–DPJ–FKB.
• Citation: 940 F.Supp.2d 424
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
• Parties: Rudy CHESTANG, III, Plaintiff v. ALCORN STATE UNIVERSITY, Alcorn State University Board of Trustees, and Dr. Alvin Simpson, in his official capacity, Defendants.

940 F.Supp.2d 424

Rudy CHESTANG, III, Plaintiff

v.ALCORN STATE UNIVERSITY, Alcorn State University Board of Trustees, and Dr. Alvin Simpson, in his official capacity, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 5:12cv69–DPJ–FKB.

United States District Court,

S.D. Mississippi,

Western Division.

April 15, 2013.

Terence L. High, The High Law Firm, PLLC, Jackson, MS, for Plaintiff.

Alan M. Purdie, Purdie & Metz, PLLC, Ridgeland, MS, Amanda Green Alexander, Alexander & Watson, PA, Jackson, MS, for Defendants.

ORDER

DANIEL P. JORDAN III, District Judge.

This Title IX sexual-harassment case is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment [14]. Because the Court concludes that most of Plaintiff's claims are time-barred, but there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether his quid pro quo sexual-harassment claim was timely filed, the motion will be granted in part but otherwise denied. The Court also finds that Plaintiff should show cause why his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should not be dismissed as the defendants appear to be arms of the State.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiff Rudy Chestang, III, was a basketball scholarship student at Defendant Alcorn State University from Fall 2005 through Spring 2008. Defendant Dr. Alvin Simpson was Chestang's professor and advisor. Chestang alleges that Simpson subjected him to unwanted sexual advances and harassment throughout Chestang's academic career at Alcorn State. Following the Spring 2008 semester, Chestang consulted with an attorney, who sent Simpson a letter accusing Simpson of sexually harassing Chestang and demanding that Simpson “submit a grade for him for the past semester (so he can maintain his eligibility to play basketball)....” Mot. to Dismiss [14] Ex. G, June 7, 2008 letter. In response, Chestang alleges that he “began to receive a myriad of threatening phone calls from Simpson suggesting that Chestangnot return to Alcorn.” Compl. [1] ¶ 47.

As a result of Simpson's alleged harassment, Chestang transferred to another university for the Fall 2008 semester. Chestang alleges that “[a]s a parting shot, Simpson gave Chestang a grade of ‘incomplete’ ” in Simpson's Spring 2008 class “despite Chestang completing the required work for the class.” Compl. [1] ¶ 49. Simpson ultimately changed Chestang's grade from an “Incomplete” to an “F” in January 2009. Id. ¶ 97. As a result of the failing grade, Chestang could not meet the GPA requirement to play basketball at his new school, and his college basketball career ended.

On June 10, 2009, Chestang sued Alcorn State, the Alcorn State University Board of Trustees,¹ and Simpson, individually and his official capacity, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (“ Chestang I ”). In that suit, Chestang alleged Title IX claims for sexual harassment and discrimination, § 1983 claims for substantive due process and equal protection violations, and state-law tort claims. Chestang I was transferred to this District on April 20, 2010.

Once in Mississippi, Simpson filed a motion to dismiss the claims against him in his individual capacity for failure to serve process within 120 days as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). The Court (Bramlette, J.) denied that motion on May 17, 2011, excusing Chestang's delinquent service on Simpson. Though the delinquent service was forgiven, that same order dismissed a number of other claims against Simpson. More precisely, the Court dismissed the individual capacity claims under Title IX, the state law claims, and the individual and official capacity due-process claims under § 1983, all apparently with prejudice. The Court denied dismissal of the § 1983 equal-protection claim, but later dismissed that claim in an order altering judgment. Thus, all claims against Simpson were dismissed in Chestang I.

After Simpson was dismissed, attention turned to Alcorn State and the Board of Trustees. On May 27, 2011, those Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process, asserting that Chestang never served the Mississippi Attorney General as required by Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(5). On December 12, 2011, the Court granted Alcorn State and the Board of Trustees' motion, dismissing Chestang's claims against Alcorn State and the Board of Trustees without prejudice for insufficient service of process.

Chestang did not appeal the disposition of Chestang I, but instead filed this lawsuit ( Chestang II ) on May 11, 2012—nearly five months after the dismissal of Chestang I. In his Complaint here, Chestang again raises Title IX claims for sexual harassment and discrimination and § 1983 claims for substantive due process and equal protection violations, and adds Title IX claims for retaliation and deliberate indifference. This time, Simpson was sued in only his official capacity. Defendants answered the Complaint on September 21, 2012, and filed their Motion to Dismiss, or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment on December 4, 2012, arguing primarily that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred. The Court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction and is prepared to rule.

II. Standard

Defendants have moved for dismissal alternatively under Rule 12 and Rule 56, potentially implicating two standards. Ordinarily,a court decides a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim looking only at the face of the complaint; if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d); see In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.2007). In this case, the parties have submitted and relied on matters outside the pleadings, and neither party objects to the Court's consideration of these documents. As such, the Court will consider all the evidence before it and treat Defendants' motion solely as one for summary judgment under Rules 12(d) and 56.

Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party must then “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citation omitted). Conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments are not an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir.2002); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir.1993). In reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, “but only when ... both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. When such contradictory facts exist, the court may “not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citations omitted).

III. Analysis

Defendants assert, and Chestang does not dispute, that all of Chestang's claims are subject to Mississippi's three-year general statute of limitations. Miss.Code Ann. § 15–1–49; see Defs.' Mem. [15] at 7, 8, 10; Pl.'s Mem. [19] at 4, 11, 14. Assuming Chestang is correct that the claims all accrued on or before January 2009 when Simpson finalized Chestang's failing grade, Chestang had until January 2012 to file his lawsuit, but he waited until May 11, 2012, to file Chestang II. While the accrual date is disputed, even under Chestang's theory his claim is stale absent some legal basis for tolling. Because the analysis varies for Chestang's different theories of recovery, the Court will consider each category in turn.²

A. Title IX Sexual Harassment and Discrimination Claims

At first blush, it might appear that the Title IX claim against Simpson would be barred by res judicata based on Judge Bramlette's dismissal with prejudice “because such claims cannot be asserted against individuals.” Chestang I, No. 5: 10cv67–DCB–RHW, May 17, 2011 Order [62] at 9. But Judge Bramlette's ruling on this point dealt only with claims against Simpson in his individual capacity. Id. at 10 (citing Alegria v. Texas, 2007 WL 3256586, at *6 (S.D.Tex.2007); Rowinsky v. Bryan Ind. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1012–13 (5th Cir.1996)). Here, Simpson is sued solely in his official capacity. Judge Bramlette's conclusion that Simpson may not be held individually liable under Title IX does not impact the official-capacity claim asserted here. See Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 973 (5th Cir.1986) (“ Res judicata does not apply to a situation such as the one here in which a party appears in one action in an individual capacity and in a subsequent action in a representative capacity.”) (citation omitted).

Turning then to the claim, Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial...