Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 97-1125

Decision Date30 December 1997
Docket NumberNo. 97-1125,97-1125
Citation132 F.3d 925
Parties, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,487 CHESTER RESIDENTS CONCERNED FOR QUALITY LIVING; Zulene Mayfield; Cathy Morse; Ossie Morse; King McDonald; Angela McDonald; Carlene P. Stevenson; Louis S. Morse; Rick Otten; Linda Morse Rothwell; Arthur H. Rothwell, III; Margarita Santiago; Ricardo Santiago * ; Daniel Murphy; Janet Weiss; Reagan Otten; Renee D. Dale; Frances Rothwell; Lisa Gilliam, v. James M. SEIF, in his capacity as Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection; Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection; Carol R. Collier, in her capacity as Director of the Southeastern Region of Department of Environmental Protection; Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection--Southeast Region Chester Residents Concerned for Quality, Zulene Mayfield, Cathy Morse, King McDonald, Angela McDonald, Carlene P. Stevenson*, Louis S. Morse, Rick Otten, Lisa Morse Rothwell, Arthur H. Rothwell, III, Margarita Santiago, Ricardo Santiago, Daniel Murphy, Janet Weiss, Renee D. Dale, Frances Rothwell, and Lisa Gilliam, Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Jerome Balter, Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA, Gilbert Paul Carrasco, (Argued), Villanova University, Villanova Law School, Villanova, PA, for Appellants Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, Zulene Mayfield; Cathy Morse; Ossie Morse; King McDonald; Angela McDonald; Carlene P. Stevenson; Louis S. Morse; Rick Otten; Linda Morse

Rothwell; Arthur H. Rothwell, III; Margarita Santiago; Daniel Murphy; Janet Weiss; Reagan Otten; Renee D. Dale; Frances Rothwell; Lisa Gilliam; Ricardo Santiago.

Mark L. Freed, (Argued), Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources, Conshohocken, PA, for Appellees James M. Seif, in his capacity as Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Carol R. Collier, in her capacity as Director of the Southeastern Region of Department of Environmental Protection, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Southeast Region.

Seth M. Galanter, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Washington, DC, for Amicus-Appellant, United States of America.

Arthur H. Bryant, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, Washington, DC, for Amicus-Appellant, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice Southern Poverty Law Center.

Before: COWEN, ROTH and LEWIS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

COWEN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal presents the purely legal question of whether a private right of action exists under discriminatory effect regulations promulgated by federal administrative agencies pursuant to section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. The district court determined that plaintiffs-appellants Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living ("CRCQL") could not maintain an action under a discriminatory effect regulation promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") pursuant to section 602 of Title VI. See 944 F.Supp. 413 (E.D.Pa.1996). In so doing, it relied largely on our decision in Chowdhury v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 677 F.2d 317 (3d Cir.1982).

We find that Chowdhury is not dispositive on this issue. Subsequent jurisprudence, namely Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983), and its progeny, provides support for the existence of a private right of action. Moreover, Chowdhury did not apply this court's test for determining when it is appropriate to imply a private right of action to enforce regulations. We agree with the overwhelming number of courts of appeals that have indicated, with varying degrees of analysis, that a private right of action exists under section 602 of Title VI and its implementing regulations. We will reverse.

I.

The non-profit corporation CRCQL brought suit against the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection ("PADEP") and James M. Seif, in his capacity as Secretary of PADEP, and other related defendants. CRCQL alleges that PADEP's issuance of a permit to Soil Remediation Services, Inc., to operate a facility in the City of Chester, a predominantly black community, violated the civil rights of CRCQL's members. 1 Specifically, the complaint asserts that PADEP's grant of the permit violated: (1) section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.; 2 (2) the EPA's civil rights regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 7.10 et seq., promulgated pursuant to section 602 of Title VI; 3 and (3) PADEP's assurance pursuant to the regulations that it would not violate the regulations. This appeal concerns only Count Two.

PADEP has authority to issue or deny applications for permits to operate waste processing facilities. See 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6018.101 et seq. (West 1993). PADEP receives federal funding from the EPA to operate Pennsylvania's waste programs pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and other federal sources.

Title VI and the EPA's civil rights regulations implementing Title VI condition PADEP's receipt of federal funding on its assurance that it will comply with Title VI and the regulations. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.80(a) (1997). 4 In part, these regulations prohibit recipients of federal funding from using "criteria or methods ... which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, or sex...." 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b).

The district court dismissed Count One of CRCQL's complaint without prejudice. It found that CRCQL failed to allege intentional discrimination on the part of PADEP, which is a required element for an action brought under section 601 of Title VI. 5 The court, however, granted leave to amend Count One, affording CRCQL the opportunity to allege intentional discrimination. CRCQL subsequently informed the district court that it would not amend the complaint, and the district court entered a final judgment on that count.

The district court dismissed Counts Two and Three with prejudice, finding that no private right of action exists under which CRCQL could enforce the EPA's civil rights regulations. 6 In reaching this determination, it relied on our statements in Chowdhury, which concerned whether a private plaintiff must first exhaust administrative remedies under section 602 of Title VI and its implementing regulations before bringing suit directly under section 601. In holding that a plaintiff need not do so, we reasoned in Chowdhury:

Congress explicitly provided for an administrative enforcement mechanism, contained in section 602, by which the funding agency attempts to secure voluntary compliance and, failing that, is empowered to terminate the violator's federal funding. Under the regulations promulgated pursuant to this section, an aggrieved individual may file a complaint with the funding agency but has no role in the investigation or adjudication, if any, of the complaint. The only remedies contemplated by the language of the Act and the Regulations are voluntary compliance and funding termination. There is no provision for a remedy for the victim of the discrimination, such as injunctive relief or damages.

677 F.2d at 319-20 (footnotes omitted). The district court took these statements to signify that no private right of action exists under the EPA's civil rights regulations. Although the district court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Guardians and the decisions of other courts of appeals provide support for implying a private right of action, it determined that Chowdhury required the opposite conclusion. See 944 F.Supp. at 417 n. 5 ("We find that the Supreme Court has never decided the question of whether there is an implied right of action under the regulations and that our Court of Appeals's Chowdhury decision is authoritative on us.").

II.

The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the district court's construction of Title VI and its conclusions of law. See In re Corestates Trust Fee Litig., 39 F.3d 61, 63 (3d Cir.1994); Unger v. Nat'l Residents Matching Program, 928 F.2d 1392, 1394 (3d Cir.1991).

III.

It is important to distinguish at the outset between section 601 of Title VI, which was the basis of Count One of CRCQL's complaint, and section 602, which was the basis of Count Two. A private right of action exists under section 601, but this right only reaches instances of intentional discrimination as opposed to instances of discriminatory effect or disparate impact. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293, 105 S.Ct. at 716 ("Title VI itself directly reache[s] only instances of intentional discrimination.").

In contrast, section 602 merely authorizes agencies that distribute federal funds to promulgate regulations implementing section 601. The EPA promulgated such implementing regulations, which provide in relevant part:

A recipient shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, or sex, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program with respect to individuals of a particular race, color, national origin, or sex.

40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b). This regulation clearly incorporates a discriminatory effect standard. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the promulgation of regulations incorporating this standard is a valid exercise of agency authority. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 292-94, 105 S.Ct. at 716. CRCQL seeks the right to proceed against PADEP under this standard, rather than the more stringent standard required under section 601.

A.

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