Chester Upland School Dist. v. McLaughlin
| Decision Date | 24 February 1995 |
| Parties | 148 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2690, 98 Ed. Law Rep. 280 CHESTER UPLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT v. MILDRED MCLAUGHLIN and Chester Upland Education Association, Appellants, CHESTER UPLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT v. PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Appellant, CHESTER UPLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT v. PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and Chester-Upland Education Association, Appellants, CHESTER UPLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, and Chester-Upland Education Association. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Leonard V. Tenaglia, for appellants Chester Upland Educ. Ass'n and Mildred McLaughlin.
James L. Crawford, for appellant/appellee Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd.
Leo A. Hackett, for appellee/appellant Chester Upland School Dist.
Before COLINS, President Judge, and DOYLE, McGINLEY, SMITH, PELLEGRINI, FRIEDMAN and NEWMAN, JJ.
The Chester-Upland Education Association (Association) appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County (trial court) denying in part the trial court's order dated July 16, 1993, and reversing the decision of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB) except as to its finding that the School District's refusal to arbitrate or seek a stay of arbitration constituted an unfair labor practice contrary to the Public Employe Relations Act (PERA). 1 The Chester Upland-School District (School District) has filed a cross appeal from this order as well.
These appeals arise as a result of the following procedural history. On April 2, 1992, Mildred McLaughlin (McLaughlin), a special education teacher employed by the School District, was advised in writing by the School District's Superintendent, Anthony Iacono, Ed.D. (Dr. Iacono), that she was being suspended without pay as a result of hearings that were held regarding allegations that she used corporal punishment on special education students. 2 The Association filed a grievance on McLaughlin's behalf seeking to restore her status as a tenured professional employee without loss of compensation or benefits. On May 15, 1992, the Association sent a letter to Dr. Iacono to discuss the selection of a mutually acceptable arbitrator pursuant to Article III C.6 of the collective bargaining agreement (Agreement) but received no response.
On June 4, 1992, the Association contacted the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, Bureau of Mediation, to request a list of arbitrators because the parties had not selected a mutually acceptable arbitrator within the requisite time set forth in the agreement. After receiving the list of arbitrators, the Association still could not get a response from the School District. The Association then filed with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB) an unfair labor practice charge, alleging that the School District had failed and/or refused to take any action regarding the selection of an arbitrator in violation of Section 903 of PERA. 3 The School District responded by filing a Stay of Arbitration with the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County (trial court) contending that the matter was not arbitrable because the grievance provision under the Agreement did not apply to circumstances where, as in this case, the teacher had a remedy under the provisions of Section 1151 of the Public School Code of 1949. 4 Although the matter was called for a hearing in the trial court, the trial court judge recused himself and indicated that the hearing would be rescheduled before another judge. No further action was taken by the trial court and no orders were entered regarding the Stay of Arbitration.
Addressing the unfair labor charge of refusing to arbitrate and relying on Section 903 of PERA, the PLRB found that an arbitrator, at least in the first instance, is to decide whether a grievance is arbitrable. Further, it found that under PERA, any refusal to arbitrate a dispute concerning a collective bargaining agreement is, per se, an unfair labor practice. It further stated that the School District's defense that the PLRB lacked jurisdiction pursuant to Section 501(a) of the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 7304(a), 5 also failed because its jurisdiction had not been preempted by the trial court.
Because the PLRB then found that the School District had violated Section 1201(a)(5) of PERA 6 by refusing to arbitrate the grievance, the School District filed a petition for review and a petition for injunction with the trial court seeking a reversal of the PLRB's order and a determination that the alleged demotion of a professional employee was not within the grievance arbitration provisions of the Agreement. It again alleged that the Agreement between the Association and the School District expressly excluded from arbitration that provision of the collective bargaining agreement having to do with discipline grievance matters where the teacher would otherwise have a remedy on the provisions of the Public School Code of 1949.
After a hearing, the trial court issued two orders. 7 The first order granted the School District's Application for Stay of Arbitration. The second order vacated its July 16, 1993 order and then granted in part and denied in part the School District's petition for review by reversing the decision of the PLRB except insofar as the PLRB found that the School District's refusal to arbitrate or contemporaneously seek a stay of arbitration constituted an unfair labor practice contrary to PERA. The trial court did so in light of the School District's pending petition for injunction which it found, at least technically, to be an unfair labor practice under the authority of Chester Upland I. 8 The Association and the PLRB filed individual appeals and the School District filed cross-appeals with this court from both of the trial court's orders. 9
At the core of this appeal is the effect Section 7302(b) of the UAA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(b), has on Section 903 of PERA. Since the enactment of the UAA, parties on both sides of collective bargaining agreements have repeatedly raised questions as to whether PERA or the UAA controls when determining which entity, the arbitrator or the trial court, has jurisdiction, in the first instance, to determine if a matter is arbitrable. The Association and the PLRB argue that PERA is controlling because Section 903 of PERA mandates arbitration before an arbitrator, and the UAA only applies when it is consistent with any statute regulating labor and management relations. If PERA controls, then matters relating to disputes over whether an issue is arbitrable must first go before an arbitrator. If the UAA applies, then the trial court first decides to either compel or stay arbitration. In order to resolve this debate, we first must examine the history of the two Acts as well as the case law that has emerged in this area.
PERA was enacted in 1970 to provide a comprehensive legislative scheme for the resolution of employment disputes in the public sector. Its primary public policy objective was to establish a harmonious and fair working relationship for the benefit of the citizens and also for the protection of the employee. Kapil v. Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties, 504 Pa. 92, 470 A.2d 482 (1983).
Under Sections 401 and 701 of PERA, 10 public employees were given the right to "organize, form, join or assist in employe organizations or to engage in lawful concerted activities" for the purpose of bargaining with their employers over terms of employment. Consequently, pursuant to Section 901 of PERA, 11 the collective bargaining agreement, which embodied the terms of employment, was representative of a mutual acceptance of the terms by both the employer and the employee when reduced to writing and signed by the parties. Under Section 903 of PERA, the legislature determined that arbitration of disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of provisions of a collective bargaining agreement was mandatory, and that the procedure to be adopted was a proper subject of bargaining with the proviso that the final step had to provide for a binding decision by an arbitrator or a tripartite board of arbitrators as the parties may agree. 12
In Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Bald Eagle Area School District, 499 Pa. 62, 67-68, 451 A.2d 671, 674 (1982), the Supreme Court held that Section 903 of PERA required matters relative to collective bargaining agreements to first go to an arbitrator rather than the courts, stating:
[T]oday's decision only returns the issue to the forum where it should have been decided at the outset; it obviously leaves open the possibility of additional review. However, were we to decide otherwise we would only encourage potential parties to such disputes to continue to follow the practice of preliminary litigating through one forum the power of another to decide the substantive issue. We condemn that practice and hold that hereafter issues involving conflicts between a public sector collective bargaining agreement and fundamental statutory policies of this Commonwealth must be presented first to arbitration for determination, subject to appropriate court review of any award in conflict with such policies.
See also East Pennsboro Area School District v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 78 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 301, 467 A.2d 1356 (1983); Neshaminy Federation of Teachers v. Neshaminy School District, 501 Pa. 534, 462 A.2d 629 (1983); Appeal of Woodland Hills School District, 81 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 199, 473 A.2d 257 (1984); Alliston v. City of Allentown, 71 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 321, 455 A.2d 239 (1983). 13
The Uniform Arbitration Act was first adopted in Pennsylvania in 1927 by the Act of April 25, 1927, P.L. 381. That Act provided for the arbitration of contract-related matters by an arbitrator. In 1980, Pennsylvania repealed the 1927 Act by adopting and modifying in part the model...
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