Chew v. City and County of San Francisco, 110317 FED9, 16-15437
|Party Name:||ARNOLD CHEW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO; LAGUNA HONDA HOSPITAL AND REHABILITATION CENTER, Defendants-Appellees.|
|Judge Panel:||Before: HAWKINS and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and KRONSTADT, District Judge.|
|Case Date:||November 03, 2017|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Argued and Submitted October 16, 2017 San Francisco, California
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Maria-Elena James, Magistrate Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 3:13-cv-05286-MEJ
Before: HAWKINS and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and KRONSTADT, [**] District Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Arnold Chew appeals the decision by the district court1granting the motion for summary judgment brought by Defendants-Appellees City and County of San Francisco (collectively, the "City") and Laguna Honda Hospital ("LHH"). Plaintiff also appeals from related evidentiary rulings and from the award of costs.2 The underlying claims arise from Plaintiff's employment with LHH, which is owned by the City. Plaintiff alleged discrimination and retaliation based on his association with an African-American colleague in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov't Code § 12940 ("FEHA"). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a decision granting summary judgment. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citing Weiner v. San Diego Cty., 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000)). We affirm.
Under Title VII and FEHA, a plaintiff must exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a civil action in which employment discrimination or retaliation claims are alleged. See, e.g., Paige v. California, 102 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1996); Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Yurick v. Superior Court, 257 Cal.Rptr. 665, 667 (Cal.Ct.App. 1989)). Consequently, the exhaustion requirement limits the scope of those claims that can be advanced in a judicial proceeding that is filed after the completion of the administrative process of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") or the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH"). See Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 707-09 (9th Cir. 2001). "The scope of the written administrative charge defines the permissible scope of the subsequent civil action . . . Allegations in the civil complaint that fall outside of the scope of the administrative charge are barred for failure to exhaust." Rodriguez, 265 F.3d at 897 (citations omitted). Therefore, a civil action may not include different alleged acts of discrimination or retaliation "unless the new claims are like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge." Green v. Los Angeles Cty. Superintendent of Schs., 883 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The complaint that was filed in this action alleged associational discrimination and retaliation based on Plaintiff's relationship with a colleague, Leonard Collins, who is an African-American. The district court correctly concluded that this alleged discrimination and retaliation was not "reasonably related" to the administrative charges that Plaintiff presented to the EEOC and the DFEH.
On January 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed a charge with the DFEH alleging that he experienced discrimination, harassment and retaliation. Plaintiff stated "Other" as the basis for these claims. The charge included detailed allegations, but made no mention of Collins or associational...
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