Chew v. Eagan

• Decision Date: 08 December 1916
• Docket Number: No. 42/220.,42/220.
• Citation: 99 A. 611,87 N.J.Eq. 80
• Parties: CHEW v. EAGAN et al.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

99 A. 611

87 N.J.Eq. 80

CHEW

v. EAGAN et al.

No. 42/220.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Dec. 8, 1916.

Suit by Irene F. Chew against Lillie V. Eagan and William F. Chew. Motion to strike out paragraphs of the bill of complaint as scandalous and impertinent. Order overruling the motion advised.

Ott & Carr, of Camden, for complainant. Stackhouse & Kramer, of Camden, for defendants.

LEAMING, V. C. Pursuant to rule 213 a motion has been made in behalf of defendant Lillie V. Eagan to strike out paragraph 4 and 5 of complainant's bill of complaint upon the ground that the two paragraphs named are "scandalous and impertinent."

The bill has been filed by Irene P. Chew against her husband, William F. Chew, and his alleged illicit paramour, Lillie V. Eagan, for the purpose of establishing by decree of this court that certain real estate the legal title to which stands in the name of Lillie V. Eagan is in fact owned by complainant's husband. The object of the suit is to establish in complainant an inchoate right of dower as a charge against the land, and the bill is also in aid of a suit now pending in this court in which complainant seeks to compel her husband to contribute to her support, in which suit defendant Lillie V. Eagan is not a party.

The averments of the two paragraphs of the bill against which the motion is directed are to the effect that defendant Lillie V. Eagan and complainant's husband live together in open adultery and are known in the neighborhood where they live as husband and wife, and that Lillie V. Eagan holds herself out to the world as the wife of complainant's husband and at times assumes his name.

Exceptions and motions of this nature based on a claim of scandal and impertinence have become so infrequent in our equity practice that a brief review of the principles controlling the subject may be appropriate.

"Impertinence," in equity pleading, signifies that which is irrelevant and which does not, in consequence, belong to the pleading. The word does not include the idea of offending propriety. The full significance of the word is found in the expression "not pertinent." The element of offending the senses is found in the word "scandalous." But, as is pointed out in 1 Daniels, Ch. PL & Pr. 347, 348, matter in an equity pleading may be prima facie scandalous in the sense that standing alone it may be said to be an allegation which is "unbecoming the dignity of the court to hear," yet, if it is not stated in language unnecessarily offensive, it is not to be regarded by the court as scandalous if it can be said to be material to the primary issue of the suit. It follows that except as to language unnecessarily offensive the words "scandalous" and "impertinent," as used in equity pleading, may be alike said to mean "irrelevant." As the matter here objected to is not stated in an unnecessarily offensive manner, a consideration of its relevancy will fully exhaust the force of both branches of the motion.

In determining the relevancy of an averment in a bill in equity an element peculiar alone to equity pleading must be borne in mind. A bill in equity has a twofold purpose. The first is to "bring before the court and to put in issue the facts upon which the complainant's right to relief rests"; the second purpose, and the one peculiar to equity pleading, is "an examination of the defendant for the purpose of obtaining evidence to establish the complainant's case, or to...