Chi. Ins. Co. v. City of Council Bluffs
Decision Date | 30 April 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 12-1918,No. 12-1922,12-1918,12-1922 |
Parties | Chicago Insurance Company, an Illinois corporation Plaintiff v. City of Council Bluffs; Daniel C. Larsen, in his individual and official capacities; Lyle Brown, in his individual and official capacities Defendants Columbia Casualty Company Plaintiff - Appellee v. City of Council Bluffs; Daniel C. Larsen; Lyle Brown; David Dawson; Terry J. Harrington Defendants Curtis W. McGhee, Jr. Defendant - Appellant Chicago Insurance Company, an Illinois corporation Plaintiff - Appellee v. City of Council Bluffs; Daniel C. Larsen, in his individual and official capacities; Lyle Brown, in his individual and official capacities Defendants - Appellants Columbia Casualty Company Plaintiff - Appellee v. City of Council Bluffs; Daniel C. Larsen; Lyle Brown; David Dawson Defendants - Appellants Terry J. Harrington; Curtis W. McGhee, Jr. Defendants |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Council BluffsBefore WOLLMAN, BYE, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
The City of Council Bluffs, police officers Daniel Larsen, Lyle Brown, and David Dawson (collectively the City), and Curtis McGhee appeal from the district court's order granting summary judgment to Chicago Insurance Company (CIC) and Columbia Casualty Company (Columbia), on CIC's and Columbia's declaratory judgment claims concerning coverage under various insurance policies. We affirm as to those policies in effect after 1977, but reverse as to Columbia's 1977-78 policy.
Many of the background facts are set forth in Genesis Insurance Co. v. City of Council Bluffs, 677 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2012). We summarize them only briefly here. In 1977, McGhee and Terry Harrington were arrested for the murder of retired police officer John Schweer and were convicted on May 11, 1978, and August 4, 1978, respectively. McGhee and Harrington both received life sentences. In 2003, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that "Harrington's due process right to a fair trial was violated by the State's failure to produce . . . police reports documenting the[] investigation of an alternative suspect in Schweer's murder." Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 525 (Iowa 2003). McGhee and Harrington were released from prison later that year.
In 2005, McGhee and Harrington brought claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) against, among others, the City, alleging violations of civil rights sounding in malicious prosecution. See Genesis, 677 F.3d at 808. The City sought coverageunder the following insurance policies issued by CIC and Columbia: (1) two excess liability policies issued by CIC; (2) five special excess liability policies issued by Columbia; and (3) one commercial umbrella liability policy issued by Columbia.
CIC issued the City two excess liability policies, one in effect from July 1, 1983, to July 1, 1984; and the other in effect from July 1, 1984, to July 1, 1985. The policies contain Endorsement 6, which reads:
POLICE PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - FOLLOWING FORM
It is agreed that, except insofar as coverage is available to the Insured in the underlying insurance, this policy shall not apply to Personal Injury or Property Damage caused by Negligent Acts, Errors and/or Omissions of Police Officers including but not limited to[:] false arrest, erroneous service of civil papers, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault and battery, libel, slander, defamation of character, violation of property rights, or deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States.
Appellants' App. 579.1 The "underlying insurance" was issued by Admiral Insurance Company.2 The relevant portions of the policies read:
Appellants' App. 620. For purposes of Coverage D, the Admiral policies define an "occurrence" as "any injury or damage sustained during the policy term, by any person or organization and arising out of the personal injury as defined herein" and define "personal injury" as including "malicious prosecution[.]" Appellants' App. 625.
Columbia issued the City five special excess liability policies: one in effect from August 8, 1977, to August 8, 1978; one in effect from August 8, 1978, to August8, 1979; one in effect from August 8, 1979, to August 8, 1980; one in effect from August 8, 1980, to August 8, 1981; and one in effect from July 1, 1981, to July 1, 1982. These policies provide that Columbia "will indemnify the Insured for ultimate net loss in excess of the retained limit hereinafter stated which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of . . . personal injury . . . to which this policy applies, caused by an occurrence." Appellants' App. 762. These policies define "personal injury" as including "malicious prosecution" and define an "occurrence" as "an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in personal injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the Insured[.]" Appellants' App. 765.
Columbia also issued the City a commercial umbrella liability policy, in effect from July 1, 1982, to July 1, 1983, which reads:
Appellants' App. 828 (emphasis omitted). The policy defines "personal injury" as:
. . . .
Appellants' App. 844 (emphasis omitted). The policy defines an "occurrence" as:
. . . .
Appellants' App. 844 (emphasis omitted).
CIC and Columbia filed declaratory judgment actions on the issue of coverage. On summary judgment, the district court rejected the "multiple triggers" coverage theory; denied the use of extrinsic evidence for contract interpretation or contract construction purposes; and determined that only the 1977-78 Columbia special excess liability policy potentially provided coverage. As to that policy, the district court concluded that because the alleged malicious prosecution was not caused by an accident and did not result in unexpected or unintended personal injuries, that policy was inapplicable. The district court accordingly granted CIC and Columbia summary judgment on each of the policies.
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, "applying the same standards as the district court and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Zike v. Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs. of Mo., Inc., 646 F.3d 504, 509 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Cos., 465 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2006)). "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
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