Chi. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Weaver

• Decision Date: 10 October 1900
• Citation: 83 N.W. 795,112 Iowa 101
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: CHICAGO & N. W. RY. CO. v. WEAVER, JUDGE.

112 Iowa 101

83 N.W. 795

CHICAGO & N. W. RY. CO.

v.WEAVER, JUDGE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 10, 1900.

Certiorari to district court, Boone county.

Suit was brought against the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company before a justice of the peace for the recovery of $15, the alleged value of a horse it was claimed the company had killed. The company filed a counterclaim, in which it claimed $30 for removing the carcass of the dead horse from the right of way. A trial before the justice resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for the amount claimed, from which the railway company appealed to the district court. The case was there reached for trial, a jury was impaneled, and the evidence on both sides submitted and closed. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the counterclaim was a sham, and irrelevant, framed and filed for the purpose of deceiving the court and as a fraud thereon, for the purpose of taking an appeal, and that by reason thereof the real amount in controversy did not at any time exceed $15. This motion was sustained, and the appeal dismissed. The plaintiff herein sued out a writ of certiorari to determine the legality of the court's action. Dismissed.Hubbard, Dawley & Wheeler and E. A. Fordyce, for complainant.

Whitaker & Dale, for respondent.

SHERWIN, J.

The real point in controversy is whether the counterclaim pleaded in the justice's court required the district court to take jurisdiction of the case upon appeal, and to proceed to hear and determine the same. The counterclaim, after alleging negligence on the part of the plaintiff in permitting the horse to run at large, admits the killing, and further alleges that plaintiff refused to remove the carcass from the right of way, and that the company “was obliged to and did remove the same”; and adds, “for which service defendant claims of plaintiff the sum of thirty dollars.” The last clause of this pleading amounts to nothing more than a prayer for the sum therein stated, if, indeed, it may be held to amount to that. Nowhere is the amount of defendant's damage alleged. If it be conceded that sufficient is alleged to support a recovery, it could, under this pleading, be nominal only. That the amount in controversy is to be determined by the facts alleged in the pleading, and not by the prayer for judgment, is well settled. Cooper v. Dillon, 56 Iowa, 367, 9 N. W. 302;Nash v. Beckman, 86 Iowa, 249, 53 N. W. 228;Schultz v. Holbrook, 86 Iowa, 569, 53 N. W. 285. While nicety of pleading is not required before a justice of the peace, the pleadings are required to be substantially the same as in the district court. Glidden v. Higbee, 31 Iowa, 379. The respondent found as a matter of fact that the counterclaim was a sham, and “filed for the express purpose of avoiding the effect of the statute...