Chi. Teachers Union v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.

• Decision Date: 03 January 2020
• Docket Number: No. 12 C 10338,12 C 10338
• Parties: CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 1, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Terri Fells, Lillian Edmonds, and Josephine Hamilton Perry, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

419 F.Supp.3d 1038

CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 1, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Terri Fells, Lillian Edmonds, and Josephine Hamilton Perry, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs,

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant.

No. 12 C 10338

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed January 3, 2020

Robin B. Potter Potter Bolanos LLC Randall D. Schmidt Mandel Legal Aid Clinic Patrick James Cowlin Potter Bolanos LLC Chicago, IL 60601 for Plaintiffs.

All Plaintiffs, pro se.

Cary E. Donham, John J. Hagerty, Allison Emma Czerniak, Daniel Reza Saeedi, John Francis Kennedy, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, J. Ernest Mincy, III, Board of Education, City of Chicago, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HON. JORGE ALONSO, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs, the Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO ("CTU"), Terri Fells, Lillian Edmonds, and Josephine Hamilton Perry, bring this class-action suit against defendant, the Board of Education of the City of Chicago ("the Board"), asserting claims of racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, as well as Daubert motions to exclude the other's expert testimony. For the following reasons, defendant's motion is granted, plaintiffs' motion is denied, and the Daubert motions are denied as moot.

BACKGROUND

Defendant, the Board of Education of the City of Chicago ("the Board"), is the employer of all teachers and paraprofessionals in the Chicago Public Schools ("CPS") system. (Pls.' LR 56.1 Resp. ¶ 8, ECF No. 249.) Plaintiff CTU is a labor organization and the exclusive bargaining representative of all CPS teachers and paraprofessionals. (Id. ¶ 3.) The individual plaintiffs, Terri Fells, Lillian Edmonds, and Josephine Hamilton Perry, are African-Americans who were working as teachers in CPS schools when they received layoff notices in the summer of 2011. (Id. ¶ 5-7.) Plaintiffs bring this suit on behalf of all African-American teachers and paraprofessionals who received similar layoff notices in 2011. (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 94-96, ECF No. 167-1; see Apr. 28, 2017 Mem. Op. & Order, ECF No. 165 (defining class).)

The Board, via CPS administrators, determines how many teachers to employ in its individual schools based essentially on enrollment projections. (Def.'s LR 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 258.) Each spring, a certain number of "quota positions" are allocated to each school based on the school's enrollment projections for the following school year. (Id. ¶ 4; Pls.' LR 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 20, 23.) Additionally, a certain number of "instructional and programmatic positions," such as, for example, special education or bilingual education positions, are allocated to each school based on formulas created by the Illinois State Board of Education, which depend on the number of students in each school needing special education, bilingual education, or other such additional support. (Def.'s LR 56.1 Resp. ¶ 4; Pls.' LR 56.1 Resp. ¶ 25.) Further, each school is allocated a certain amount of discretionary funding derived from federal programs, based on the number of students receiving free or reduced lunch in the school. (Def.'s LR 56.1 Resp. ¶ 4; Pls.' LR 56.1 Resp. ¶ 26.) The school's principal can use this funding to create additional positions, or for any other purpose, at his or her discretion. (Def.'s LR 56.1 Resp. ¶ 4; Pls.' LR 56.1 Resp. ¶ 34.)

Toward the end of each school year, each CPS principal receives a packet of information from the CPS budget office, including a letter providing the number of quota positions and amount of discretionary funding the school has been allocated for the coming school year. (Pls.' LR 56.1 Resp. ¶ 32.) If the school is allocated fewer positions and/or less discretionary funding than in prior years, the principal may be forced to close positions. Depending on factors such as past performance and applicable seniority rules, the principal makes an initial determination as to which individuals will be retained for the upcoming year and which will be bumped from their positions. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36.) The Board's Workforce Planning Department reviews the principal's initial decisions in order to ensure that they comply with the collective bargaining agreement between the Board and CTU. (Id. ¶ 37.)

In the spring of 2011, due to a range of factors, the Board was facing a budget deficit of $724 million, and the Board's senior administrators held several meetings to determine how to address it. (Id. ¶¶ 10-14.) Among the options presented was altering the formula for calculating quota positions so as to require schools to make do with fewer teachers, but chief executive officer Jean-Claude Brizard rejected this suggestion, which would have increased class sizes. (Id. ¶ 14.)¹ In 2011, CPS followed the same process it had followed the previous year for adjusting the number of positions and amount of funding allocated to particular schools. (Id. ¶ 31). As a result, in the summer of 2011, the Board sent 1,470 layoff notices to 1,077 teachers and 393 paraprofessionals. (Id. ¶ 38.)

Between 2001 and 2011, enrollment in CPS schools had declined by 7.6%. (Id. ¶ 17.) For African-American students, who were in large part clustered on Chicago's South and West Sides, the rate of decline was more than triple, 25.2%. (Id. ) Of the 1,470 individuals who received layoff notices in 2011, 630 were African-American. (Id. ¶ 38). Many of these 630 worked in predominantly African-American schools on the South and West Sides, where enrollment was declining most precipitously. (See Def.'s LR 56.1 Resp. ¶ 30.)

Laid-off individuals received full pay and benefits through August 31, 2011. (Pls.' LR 56.1 Resp. ¶ 39.) Some tenured teachers were transferred to the Reassigned Teachers Pool, where they received full salary and benefits for ten months while working as substitute teachers. (Id. ¶ 40.) Other tenured teachers were not transferred to the reassigned teachers' pool, but they were given the opportunity to continue their employment as day-to-day substitute teachers, albeit at lower pay, with no guarantee of steady work. (Id. ¶ 42; see Def.'s LR 56.1 Resp. ¶ 15.) Of the 630 laid-off individuals, 335 had found other full-time positions with the Board by September 1, 2011, sometimes in the same school where they had previously worked, and therefore suffered no loss of pay or benefits. (Pls.' LR 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 44-46.) Another thirty-four voluntarily retired prior to September 1, 2011. (Id. ¶ 46.)

ANALYSIS

"The Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Wackett v. City of Beaver Dam , 642 F.3d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 2011). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations, but the party opposing summary judgment must point to competent evidence that would be admissible at trial to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact. Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc. , 629 F.3d 697, 705 (7th Cir. 2011) ; Gunville v. Walker , 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009) ; see Modrowski v. Pigatto , 712 F.3d 1166, 1167 (7th Cir. 2013) (court must enter summary judgment against a party who " ‘does not come forward with evidence that would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in [its] favor on a material question’ ") (quoting Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp. , 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994) ). The Court construes all evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chaib v. Geo Grp., Inc. , 819 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 2016). The Court applies these "ordinary standards for summary judgment" in the same way whether one or both parties move for summary judgment; when the parties file cross-motions, the Court treats each motion individually, "constru[ing] all facts and inferences arising from them in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is made." Blow v. Bijora, Inc. , 855 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 2017) ; see Reeder v. Carter , 339 F. Supp. 3d 860, 869-70 (S.D. Ind. 2018).

Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to ... discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Unlawful employment practices under this section are of two types: (1) "intentional discrimination (known as ‘disparate treatment’)" and (2) "practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities (known as ‘disparate impact’)." Ricci v. DeStefano , 557 U.S. 557, 577, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009). Under a disparate treatment theory, " ‘the most easily understood type of discrimination,’ " id. (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States , 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) ), the plaintiff must prove "that an employer had a discriminatory motive for taking a job-related action." Ernst v. City of Chi. , 837 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 2016). Under a disparate impact theory, by contrast, an employer may be liable for ...