Chi. Teachers Union v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.

• Decision Date: 25 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. 15 C 8149,15 C 8149
• Parties: CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 1, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a body politic and corporate, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 1,AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO,a body politic and corporate, Defendant.

No. 15 C 8149

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

February 25, 2020

Judge Sara L. Ellis

OPINION AND ORDER

In preparation for summary judgment briefing, both the Defendant Board of Education of the City of Chicago (the "Board") and Plaintiffs the Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 ("CTU"), American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Donald L. Garrett Jr., Robert Green, and Vivonell Brown, Jr., individually and on behalf of the class, have filed motions to exclude the opposing party's proposed expert testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The Court assumes the reader's familiarity with the background facts of this case, which the Seventh Circuit's class certification opinion more fully recounts. See Doc. 164. The Court certified the following class in this case: "All African American persons employed by the Board of Education of the City of Chicago as a teacher or para-professional staff, as defined in the labor agreement between the Chicago Teachers Union and the Board of Education, in any school or attendance center subjected to reconstitution, or 'turnaround,' in the 2012 calendar year." Doc. 173. After considering the parties' arguments, the Court concludes the following. The Court allows Trujillo's opinions in full. The Court excludes Walker's opinions in part and permits them in part, as set forth in section II. Likewise, the Court excludes Blanchflower's opinions in part and permits them in part, explained more fully in section III. Finally, the Court allows Jacob's opinions in full.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), govern the admissibility of expert opinion testimony. See Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2011). Rule 702 provides that a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of opinion or otherwise provided that "(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case." Fed. R. Evid. 702. To admit expert testimony under this rule, the Court must determine that (1) the witness is qualified, (2) the witness' methodology is reliable, and (3) the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Myers v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 629 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2010). The Rule 702 inquiry "is a flexible one," however. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. "Determinations on admissibility should not supplant the adversarial process; 'shaky' expert testimony may be admissible, assailable by its opponents through cross-examination." Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 616 (7th Cir. 2010). The proponent of testimony bears the burden of proving that the proffered testimony meets these requirements, and the Seventh Circuit grants the district court "wide latitude in performing its gate-keeping function." Bielskis, 663 F.3d at 894.

ANALYSIS

I. The Board's Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs' Expert Tina Trujillo [254]

Plaintiffs intend to present the testimony of Tina Trujillo, a professor of educational policy at University of California, Berkeley, with a Ph.D. in education. Plaintiffs offer Trujillo's opinions to demonstrate that the Board could have implemented alternatives to turnarounds. Trujillo's work considers how educational reforms impact the educational environment in urban schools. In her report, Trujillo analyzes the practice of school turnarounds and opines on alternative reforms that are less discriminatory and more effective. Trujillo synthesizes empirical evidence regarding turnarounds and related reforms and identifies five alternatives that the Board could have selected.

The Board challenges Trujillo's opinions on relevance and reliability grounds. The Board does not take issue with Trujillo's qualifications to testify as an expert; thus, the Court will not address her qualifications. See United States v. Moore, 521 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2008) ("A judge is not obliged to look into the questions posed by Rule 702 when neither side either requests or assists."). The Board argues that the Court should exclude Trujillo's opinions for the following reasons. First, Trujillo's opinions are not based on sufficient facts or data because she did not evaluate Chicago Public Schools ("CPS") data. Second, Trujillo did not apply reliable principles and methods because she synthesized other experts' opinions without setting forth her own methodology. Third, Trujillo proposed alternatives without indicating how the Board could implement such alternatives. Lastly, the proposed alternatives are theoretical and will confuse the jury.

A. Reliability

The Court first addresses the reliability of Trujillo's opinions. Although "the district court's admissibility determination is not intended to supplant the adversarial process," proposedtestimony must be "based on sufficient facts or data," use "reliable principles and methods," and "reliably apply the principles and methods to the facts of the case." Fed. R. Evid. 702. Daubert provides a non-exhaustive list of factors for courts to use in this reliability analysis: "(1) whether the theory can be and has been verified by the scientific method through testing; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and (4) the general acceptance of the theory in the scientific community."¹ Chapman v. Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 368 (7th Cir. 1996)).

"To succeed on a disparate impact claim, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that a particular employment practice causes a disparate impact on the basis of race." Allen v. City of Chicago, 351 F.3d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 2003). Once Plaintiffs make this showing, the burden shifts to the Board to show the practice is "job related" and "consistent with business necessity." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)). If the Board makes this showing, the burden shifts back to Plaintiffs to demonstrate that there was an alternative "which was equally valid and less discriminatory that the [Board] refused to use." Adams v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). For Plaintiffs to succeed with this claim, the alternative "must be available, equally valid and less discriminatory." Id. (quoting Allen, 351 F.3d at 312). Plaintiffs seek to rely on Trujillo's opinions to establish this alternative.

The Board challenges Trujillo's report for synthesizing other researchers' opinions without setting forth her own methodology. Throughout her report, Trujillo relies on studies by other professionals in forming her opinions. Trujillo analyzes studies on the effectiveness ofturnarounds and potential alternatives before discussing whether the Board could have implemented those alternatives. The Seventh Circuit has explained that "review of experimental, statistical, or other scientific data generated by others in the field" may suffice as a reasonable methodology for an expert's opinion. Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 758 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Cummins, 93 F.3d at 369); See Walker v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 208 F.3d 581, 588 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[C]ourts frequently have pointed to an expert's reliance on the reports of others as an indication that their testimony is reliable."). Here, Trujillo analyzes research that explains the negative effects of turnaround schools, including research on Chicago's reforms. Doc. 255-1 at 8-9. In proposing alternatives, Trujillo discusses how other school districts have implemented her proposed alternatives. See, e.g., Doc. 255-1 at 18 (explaining how the Berkeley Unified School District designed an integration plan to maintain balanced school diversity). The Board argues that Trujillo includes data from school districts not comparable to CPS and criticizes Trujillo's reliance on case-study and opinion pieces by policy advocacy groups.

The Court will exclude expert testimony only if an expert's reliance on the opinions of others is "too speculative . . . or the underlying basis is faulty." Walker, 208 F.3d at 588 (citations omitted). Trujillo's reliance on other professionals' opinions is not too speculative. Indeed, Trujillo critically addresses turnaround policies, their impact on students, and more effective alternatives. Although the Court agrees that much of Trujillo's report relies on the opinions of others, that reason alone is insufficient for excluding her report under Daubert. See In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-CV-10012-DRH, 2011 WL 6740363, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2011) (explaining that the expert was "permitted to base his opinion in part on what other experts believe and [was] allowed rely on the reports and studies of other experts"); Sanders v. City of Chicago Heights, No. 13 C 0221,2016 WL 4398011, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2016) (permitting an expert's testimony where the expert relied on "a multitude of studies generated by scientific professionals" and "his own experimental work and professional studies"). Additionally, Trujillo's proposed alternatives are more than mere speculation, as she explains the basis for each and includes studies that support the feasibility of alternatives. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that although an expert's opinion may take the form of hypotheticals, hypotheticals "must themselves have...