Chiafalo v. Inslee

• Citation: 224 F.Supp.3d 1140
• Decision Date: 15 December 2016
• Docket Number: CASE NO. C16–1886JLR
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington
• Parties: P. Bret CHIAFALO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jay INSLEE, et al., Defendants.

224 F.Supp.3d 1140

P. Bret CHIAFALO, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Jay INSLEE, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. C16–1886JLR

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, at Seattle.

Signed December 15, 2016

Jonah O. Harrison, Sumeer Singla, Impact Law Group, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiffs.

Callie A. Castillo, Rebecca Ripoli Glasgow, Washington State Attorney General's Office, Olympia, WA, for Defendants.

ORDER

JAMES L. ROBART, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court is Plaintiffs P. Bret Chiafalo and Levi Guerra's motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and preliminary injunction (collectively, "preliminary injunctive relief"). (TRO/PI Mot. (Dkt. # 2).) Defendants in this lawsuit are three Washington State officials: Jay Inslee, in his official capacity as Governor; Bob Ferguson, in his official capacity as Attorney General; and Kim Wyman, in her official capacity as Secretary of State (collectively, "the State"). (Compl. (Dkt. # 1) ¶¶ 1.3–1.5.) The State opposes Plaintiffs' motion. (State Resp. (Dkt. # 18).)

In addition, there are two motions to intervene before the court: the Washington State Republican Party's (the "Republican Party") motion to intervene (see Rep. Party MTI (Dkt. # 9)), and President-elect Donald J. Trump and Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.'s (collectively, "the Campaign") motion to intervene (Campaign MTI (Dkt. # 13)). Due to the rapid developments in this case, the Republican Party and the Campaign (collectively, "Putative Intervenors") filed an opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction, which they ask the court to consider if the court grants their motions to intervene. (Put. Intervenors Resp. (Dkt. # 16).)

The court has considered the parties' and Putative Intervenors' written submissions and oral arguments, the relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law. The court held a hearing on Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief on December 14, 2016. (12/14/16 Min. Entry (Dkt. # 27).) Following oral argument, the court DENIED Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief and indicated that this written order would follow to more thoroughly articulate the court's reasoning.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are two presidential electors for the State of Washington who attack the constitutionality of Washington's Presidential Electors Statute, RCW 29A.56.300 et seq. (Compl. ¶¶ 1.1–1.2, 2.2.) In Washington, "each major political party and each minor political party or independent candidate convention that nominates candidates for president and vice president" also nominates presidential electors. RCW 29A.56.320. In tallying votes during the general election, the State counts each vote for president and vice president as a concurrent vote for the presidential electors of that political party. Id. In other words, the electors nominated by the political party that wins Washington's general election become the electors for the State. Seeid. Because Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine, the Democratic candidates for president and vice-president, respectively, won the general election in Washington (see Augino Decl. (Dkt. # 19) ¶ 4, Ex. C at 2), Plaintiffs, as the Democratic Party's nominees for presidential electors, became presidential electors (see Augino Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. A at 1; see also Compl. ¶¶ 1.1–1.2, 3.2, 3.4; Chiafalo Decl. (Dkt. # 1–5) ¶ 6; Guerra Decl. (Dkt. # 1–6) ¶ 6).

Plaintiffs believe that President-elect Donald Trump and Vice President-elect Michael Pence are unfit for office (Compl. ¶¶ 3.7–3.8; Chiafalo Decl. ¶ 9; Guerra Decl. ¶ 8), and that it is therefore "in the best interests of Washington and the United States to prevent Trump/Pence from taking office." (Chiafalo Decl. ¶ 10; Guerra Decl. ¶ 9). To attain that end, Plaintiffs seek "the freedom to vote for any person whom [they] feel is the most viable, fit, and qualified." (Chiafalo Decl. ¶ 10; Guerra Decl. ¶ 9.) With this "freedom," Plaintiffs—in consultation with other presidential electors around the nation—intend to either vote for a president and vice-president who will obtain a majority of electoral votes or, at a minimum, block the current candidates from obtaining a majority of electoral votes. (Chiafalo Decl. ¶ 11, Guerra Decl. ¶ 10); see also U.S. Const. amend. XVII.

Plaintiffs challenge two provisions of the Presidential Electors Statute. (See generally Compl.) First, the Statute requires each presidential elector to "execute and file with the secretary of state a pledge that, as an elector, he or she will vote for the candidates nominated by that party." RCW 29A.56.320. Plaintiffs signed such a pledge, which reads, "I, [name of elector], do hereby pledge that I will vote for the candidates nominated by the Democratic Party for President of the United States and Vice President of the United States." (Augino Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B ("Elector Pledges") at 2, 4; see also Chiafalo Decl. ¶ 4, Guerra Decl. ¶ 4.) Second, the Statute authorizes the State to impose a "civil penalty of up to" $1,000.00 on "[a]ny elector who votes for a person or persons not nominated by the party of which he or she is an elector." RCW 29A.56.340. Ms. Guerra attests that neither she nor her family can afford to pay such a penalty. (Guerra Decl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiffs contend that these restrictions violate Article II and the First, Twelfth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (See Compl. ¶¶ 2.2, 3.17–3.18.)

Plaintiffs move for preliminary injunctive relief that precludes the State "from enforcing RCW 29A.56.340, removing or replacing any electors for any reason other than death or physical absence of the elector, or otherwise influencing or interfering with the electors [sic] votes on December 19, 2016, including threatening to or actually imposing any civil penalty against Plaintiffs based on the vote they cast or say they are going to cast." (Prop. Order (Dkt. # 2–1) at 5.) That motion is now before the court.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

A plaintiff seeking a TRO in federal court must meet the standards for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co. , 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. To obtain either form of preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiffs must establish that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits, (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). Preliminary injunctive relief is also "appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor," provided the plaintiff also demonstrates that irreparable harm is likely and that the injunction is in the public interest. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell , 632 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2011).

B. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs fail to show serious questions going to the merits of their claims or irreparable injury, both of which are necessary to warrant preliminary injunctive relief.

1. Merits

Plaintiffs have demonstrated neither a likelihood of success on the merits, Winter , 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, nor "serious questions going to the merits" of their claims, Cottrell , 632 F.3d at 1135. As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs' merits-based argument relies heavily on the false premise that Plaintiffs' electoral votes will be disallowed or not counted if Plaintiffs fail to vote for the Democratic nominees.¹ (See TRO/PI Mot. at 4–10.) For instance, Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Supreme Court has held that "requiring electors to sign a pledge to certain candidates was valid and constitutional" (id. at 4 (citing Ray v. Blair , 343 U.S. 214, 220–21, 72 S.Ct. 654, 96 L.Ed. 894 (1952) )), but they contend that Ray supports the conclusion that Washington's law exceeds constitutional bounds by violating " ‘an assumed constitutional freedom of the elector under the Constitution, Art. II, § 1, to vote as he may choose in the [E]lectoral [C]ollege’ " (id. at 5 (quoting Ray , 343 U.S. at 229, 72 S.Ct. 654 ); see also TRO/PI Mot. at 9 (arguing that "Washington's binding statute ... violate[s] the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because [it] unconstitutionally dilute[s] and debase[s] the weight of Washington's electors' votes")). Washington has no law precluding Plaintiffs from voting as they choose—and having those votes counted—in the Electoral College. See RCW 29A.56.320, . 340. The only potential State-imposed repercussion before the court is the discretionary civil penalty of up to $1,000.00. See RCW 29A.56.340 ; (see also TRO/PI Reply at 5 ("If Defendants are conceding they will not impose the civil penalty if Plaintiffs chose to vote for a candidate other than the Democratic Presidential Nominees, they are stipulating to the relief requested by Plaintiffs.").)

Having clarified Washington's law, the court finds their argument based on Article II and the Twelfth Amendment and their argument based on the Fourteenth Amendment to warrant minimal discussion. Although it does not squarely address the issue, Ray implies that the Supreme Court does not consider Article II and the Twelfth Amendment to "demand[ ] absolute freedom for the elector to vote his own choice." 343 U.S. at 228, 72 S.Ct. 654 ; see also id. at 226–29 nn.14–16, 72 S.Ct. 654 (discussing the history of electors serving merely to register the will of the voters of their state as expressed through the general election). Plaintiffs have made no showing that the coercive impact of a potential civil penalty is so coercive that it offends the electoral system. Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment argument is based exclusively on the impact of Washington's "binding" statute (TRO/PI Mot. at 8–10), but Washington's statu...