Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Group, Inc., a Div. of Leggett & Platt, Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 November 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-2987,96-2987
• Citation: 129 F.3d 391
• Parties: 76 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 251, 72 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,069 Nicholas A. CHIARAMONTE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FASHION BED GROUP, INC., A DIVISION OF LEGGETT & PLATT, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 391

129 F.3d 391

76 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 251,

72 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,069

Nicholas A. CHIARAMONTE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FASHION BED GROUP, INC., A DIVISION OF LEGGETT & PLATT INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 96-2987.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 24, 1997.

Decided Nov. 4, 1997.

Anthony Pinelli (argued), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Walter Jones, Jr., Carole A. Corns, Dennis P.W. Johnson (argued), Pugh, Jones & Johnson, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

Nicholas A. Chiaramonte sued his former employer, Fashion Bed Group, Inc. ("FBG"), alleging that FBG improperly terminated him because of his age. FBG argued that it discharged Chiaramonte for financial reasons. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of FBG. The issue on appeal is whether Chiaramonte has presented evidence sufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion by showing that FBG's rationale for the termination was a pretext for age discrimination. Because we find that Chiaramonte failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.

I. HISTORY

FBG, a manufacturer of brass beds, engaged in a series of personnel reductions in 1991 and early 1992 that resulted in the termination of more than a third of the total FBG workforce. Chiaramonte lost his job in early 1992 in the last wave of these reductions.

Prior to his employment with FBG, Chiaramonte worked as a manager of engineering for Dresher, Inc. In 1985, when Chiaramonte was 52 years old, he joined Berkshire Furniture Co., Inc., in an equivalent position. John Elting, Berkshire's President, and Dick Singer, Berkshire's CEO, made the decision to hire Chiaramonte.

In 1988, Leggett & Platt, Inc. ("L & P") acquired Berkshire. L & P then also acquired Dresher and a third bed manufacturer, J.B. Ross. While L & P originally operated Berkshire, Dresher, and Ross as separate entities, L & P merged the three companies into a single company, FBG, in early 1991. Elting became President of the newly formed FBG, and Singer became CEO of the new company.

Elting selected the salaried employees that he thought FBG needed from the merged companies; the remaining employees were terminated. Elting appointed Chiaramonte to the position of Vice President of Engineering at FBG. Elting declined to hire the employee who held Chiaramonte's position at Dresher. At that time Chiaramonte was 57 years old.

In late 1991, as a result of a change in manufacturing methods, Elting bifurcated the position of Vice President of Engineering. Elting appointed Chiaramonte to the position Vice President of Research and Development, while Rob Cummins, an employee originally hired by Chiaramonte while he was at Berkshire, was assigned to the Director of Engineering position. Chiaramonte's position enabled him to focus on questions of manufacturing method, while Cummins handled the mundane, day-to-day detail work.

FBG experienced financial difficulties after the merger. FBG suffered losses in all four quarters of 1991. By year-end, although FBG expected to earn a $3.6 million profit, FBG had lost $6.6 million. The losses, among other factors, precipitated a massive lay-off. In November and December 1991, FBG terminated nearly one-third of its total workforce. Most of these terminated employees were unionized hourly factory workers.

In the first two months of 1992, FBG lost another $900,000. Elting decided that further personnel reductions were in order. Because he felt FBG was "top-heavy" in management, Elting looked to the salaried employees for the next set of terminations, using the payroll register to determine who would be terminated. The register listed every employee at FBG, each employee's salary, and each employee's previous rate increases. It did not list age. Elting was the sole decision-maker regarding the salaried-employee terminations. He used three factors to determine which employee to terminate: salary, value to FBG, and performance. Based on the first two of these criteria, Elting decided to terminate Chiaramonte, who was earning $73,000 per year at the time.

Elting selected twelve employees for termination. The ages of the employees ranged from thirty-two to sixty-one. Elting submitted the list of names to L & P's Personnel Department to ensure the terminations complied with applicable law. Thereafter, Elting personally terminated all twelve employees. Elting terminated Chiaramonte effective March 13, 1992, explaining that the termination was a result of the need to "downsize." Chiaramonte was 59 years old at the time of his termination.

After meeting with Elting regarding the termination, Chiaramonte spoke with Singer. When Chiaramonte asked Singer why he was being terminated, Singer gave three reasons: Chiaramonte's time off for illness, the fact that Elting was on "an ego trip," and, "Well, there's age." Singer denies making any such statement. Chiaramonte also alleges that prior to his termination, he was told by Debbie Lunn, a cost manager, that FBG was "going to get rid of all you old people." Lunn denies making that statement.

Several people took over Chiaramonte's duties after his termination. Among them was Cummins. Elting retained Cummins, while terminating Chiaramonte, because he believed Cummins was the type of "detail" person needed for the day-to-day operations, and Cummins' salary was significantly lower than Chiaramonte's salary. FBG also hired two additional workers in February 1993, who assumed some of Chiaramonte's former responsibilities.

In October 1992, the Illinois Department of Human Rights held a fact finding hearing regarding charges filed by Chiaramonte and others against FBG. At the hearing, Elting testified regarding the reasons for each termination. In reference to Chiaramonte's termination, Elting testified that he chose to terminate Chiaramonte because he lacked "team synergy," due to "cultural differences," and because Chiaramonte would be unwilling to "crawl through the dirt" in rebuilding the new company.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing our own conclusions of law and fact from the record before us. See Thiele v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 68 F.3d 179, 181 (7th Cir.1995). Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, courts must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, neither "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. at 2509-10 (emphasis in original), nor the existence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

B. Chiaramonte's ADEA Claim

Chiaramonte alleges that his termination was motivated by age animus. The ADEA prohibits employers from engaging in discrimination "because of [an] individual's age," 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), though the prohibition is "limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age." 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to mean that the ADEA prohibits all discrimination based on age but limits the class of persons protected by the statute to those persons 40 years of age and older. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 878, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). To succeed in an ADEA claim, a plaintiff must establish that he would not have been terminated "but for" his employer's intentional age-based discrimination. See Konowitz v. Schnadig Corp., 965 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir.1992).

A plaintiff may prove age discrimination in two ways. "She may try to meet her burden head on by presenting direct or circumstantial evidence that age was the determining factor in her discharge. Or, as is more common, she may utilize the indirect, burden-shifting method of proof for Title VII cases originally set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), ... and later adapted to age discrimination claims under the ADEA." McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir.1992) (quoting Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir.1988)).

1. The Direct Method of Proving Age Discrimination

Establishing discrimination by the direct method requires the plaintiff to produce evidence that the trier of fact can interpret as an acknowledgment of the employer's discriminatory intent. See Hill v. Burrell Communications Group, Inc., 67 F.3d 665, 667 (7th Cir.1995). Such evidence, therefore, "must relate to the motivation of the decisionmaker responsible for the contested decision." Cheek v. Peabody Coal Co., 97 F.3d 200, 203 (7th Cir.1996).

The parties take conflicting approaches in establishing whether there was any discriminatory intent in the decision to terminate Chiaramonte. FBG asserts that Elting was the sole decision-maker regarding Chiaramonte's termination. Thus any direct evidence Chiaramonte presents must relate to Elting's motivation for the firing. Chiaramonte, on the other hand, asserts that Elting was not the sole decision-maker....