Chiaravallo v. Middletown Transit Dist.
| Decision Date | 22 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 3:18-cv-1360 (SRU) |
| Citation | 561 F.Supp.3d 257 |
| Parties | Andrew CHIARAVALLO, Plaintiff, v. MIDDLETOWN TRANSIT DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Jacques J. Parenteau, Magdalena B. Wiktor, Madsen, Prestley & Parenteau, LLC, New London, CT, Todd D. Steigman, Madsen, Prestley & Parenteau, LLC, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.
Andrew Brooks Farley Carnabuci, Michael J. Rose, Rose Kallor, LLP, Rauchell A. Beckford-Anderson, Shipman & Goodwin, LLP, Hartford, CT, for Defendants City of Middletown, Daniel Drew.
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Andrew Chiaravallo ("Chiaravallo"), former Administrator of the Middletown Transit District ("Middletown Area Transit" or "MAT"), filed this action in 2018 against the City of Middletown ("the City"), former City Mayor Daniel Drew ("Drew"), the MAT and certain members of the MAT Board of Directors ("the Board"), generally alleging that he was removed from his position without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and additionally raising numerous state-law claims. Following dismissal of the MAT defendants from the action, Drew and the City moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims.
For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
District of Connecticut Local Rule 56(a)(1) requires that a party moving for summary judgment:
file and serve with the motion and supporting memorandum a document entitled "Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts," which sets forth, in separately numbered paragraphs meeting the requirements of Local Rule 56(a)3, a concise statement of each material fact as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.
D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(1). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must respond by filing:
a document entitled Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement of Facts in Opposition to Summary Judgment, which shall include a reproduction of each numbered paragraph in the moving party's Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement followed by a response to each paragraph admitting or denying the fact and/or objecting to the fact ...
D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(2). Each statement of fact or denial in the Rule 56(a)(1) and (2) statement must cite to "(1) the affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the facts at trial, or (2) other evidence that would be admissible at trial." D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(3). Material facts included in the 56(a)(1) statement that are "supported by the evidence will be deemed admitted (solely for purposes of the motion) unless such fact is controverted by the Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement." D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(1).
This court has previously deemed facts admitted for purposes of summary judgment where a "plaintiff has objected to Defendant's facts but has failed to support [the] objection with any admissible evidence in the record, where the record itself does not support Plaintiff's denials, or where the Plaintiff has neither admitted nor denied a fact and where the record supports such fact." Johnson v. Connecticut Dept. of Administrative Services , 972 F. Supp. 2d 223, 229 (D. Conn. 2013) ; see also Barone v. Judicial Branch of Connecticut , 2019 WL 7283383, at *13, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221479, at *35 (D. Conn. Dec. 27, 2019) (); Buell v. Hughes , 568 F. Supp. 2d 235, 237 (D. Conn. 2008) (); Giglio v. Derman , 560 F. Supp. 2d 163, 166 (D. Conn. 2008) ().
In the case at bar, the defendants vehemently object to nearly all the denials included in Chiaravallo's Rule 56(a)(2) Statement of Facts. Defs.’ Rep. Doc. No. 103 at 2. Specifically, the defendants maintain that Chiaravallo's denials are improper because he: "1) denies facts other than the corresponding fact stated in Defendants’ 56(a)(1) Statement; and/or 2) denies facts on the sole basis of their phrasing, form, or other non-substantive grounds; and/or 3) denies facts where the denial is unsupported by admissible evidence." Id. Because those denials do not comport with the requirements of Rule 56(a)(2), the defendants argue, each of the corresponding facts in the Rule 56(a)(1) statement should be deemed admitted.
After carefully reviewing the Rule 56(a)(2) statement, I disagree that any of the statements of fact included in the Rule 56(a)(1) statement should be deemed admitted on the basis of purportedly improper denials. As an initial matter, many of the defendants’ statements of fact are actually legal propositions or conclusions not properly included in a Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement. For example, paragraph 34, describing a letter sent by Drew to Chiaravallo, provides, "Mayor Drew did not make any statements about Plaintiff's reputation, good name, or character." L. R. 56(a)(1) Stmt. at ¶ 34. That Drew's statements did not impugn Chiaravallo's reputation, however, is an argument about how record evidence should be characterized rather than a statement of fact. To the extent that the defendants have set forth legal conclusions and arguments in the Rule 56(a)(1) statement, those statements will not be deemed admitted whether or not Chiaravallo's denials comport with the requirements of Rule 56(a)(2). See, e.g., Giglio , 560 F. Supp. 2d at 167 (); Brown v. Tuttle , 2015 WL 3886466, at *2, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81597, at *4 (D. Conn. June 24, 2015) (same).
Further, some of the statements in the Local Rule 56(a)(1) statement are not supported by evidence in the record. For example, paragraphs 42-46 do not, in my view, accurately reflect Chiaravallo's deposition testimony.1 See Defs.’ Ex. A, Doc. No. 86-2. Accordingly, those statements will not be deemed admitted. See Johnson , 972 F. Supp. 2d at 229 () (emphasis added); Gibson v. Wood , 563 F. Supp. 2d 341, 343 n.2 (D. Conn. 2008) ().
Finally, despite the defendants’ objections, the majority of Chiaravallo's denials do properly deny the stated fact and provide a "specific citation to (1) the affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the facts at trial, or (2) other evidence that would be admissible at trial" in support of that denial. D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56 (a)(3). For example, paragraph 18 of the Rule 56(a)(1) statement provides: "Plaintiff cannot identify where in Mayor Drew's letter that the Mayor falsely accused him of implementing service cuts in a way that potentially violates Federal Law." L. R. 56(a)(1) Stmt. at ¶ 18. Chiaravallo's denial cites directly to the letter in question, which is addressed to Chiaravallo and reads: "a multitude of constituents brought to my attention that you had eliminated bus routes in Middletown." Defs.’ Ex. E, Doc. No. 86-6. It goes on to suggest that the disruption of those routes without hearing and notice could lead to potential violations of federal law. Id. Similarly, Paragraph 23 provides: "[a]lthough Plaintiff alleges that ‘Defendant Drew's statement was that what MAT administrators told us has been pretty inconsistent so far’ ... this is plaintiff's speculation." L. R. 56(a)(1) Stmt. at ¶ 23. In response, Chiaravallo denies that the allegation is "speculation" and cites to the minutes of the meeting where that statement was made. See id.; see also Pl.’s Ex. N, Doc. No. 98-15.
In sum, I disagree with the defendants that any of the statements of fact included in the Rule 56(a)(1) statement should be deemed admitted on the basis of Chiaravallo's purportedly improper denials. In reviewing the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and determining whether genuine disputes of material fact exist, I will rely on the parties’ 56(a) statements to the extent that those statements properly identify factual disputes and are supported by record evidence. I have also conducted a careful review of the evidence submitted by both parties. See Chalco v. Belair , 738 F. App'x 705, 709 (2d Cir. 2018) (). To the extent that either party has set forth legal arguments in the 56(a) statements, I will consider those arguments as part of my analysis.
The MAT was created pursuant to the provisions of Connecticut General Statutes section 7-273b, which authorizes a town, city, borough or the legislative body of a municipality to form a transit district to provide "modern, efficient and adequate systems of mass transportation." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-273b. A transit district is defined by statute as a "body corporate and politic, and may sue and be sued ... [and] borrow on the faith and credit of the district for its purposes under this chapter." Id. MAT receives funding from the State of Connecticut, the Federal Transit Administration and the City to finance the provision of various transportation services to residents of Middletown and surrounding communities. L. R. 56(a)(1) Stmt. at ¶ 9.
Connecticut General Statutes section 7-273c addresses procedures for the management of a transit district and provides that the "affairs ... shall be managed by a board of directors chosen from among the electors of the constituent municipalities" who "shall be...
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