Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Quaintance

• Decision Date: 31 January 1871
• Citation: 1871 WL 7939,58 Ill. 389
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD CO.v.GEORGE W. QUAINTANCE.

58 Ill. 389

1871 WL 7939 (Ill.)

CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD CO.

v.GEORGE W. QUAINTANCE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1871.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Menard county; the Hon. CHARLES TURNER, Judge, presiding.

This was an action on the case, brought by Quaintance against the railroad company, to recover damages for the burning of his house, the fire alleged to have been communicated from an engine of defendant, on its road between the cities of Bloomington and Jacksonville. A trial by jury resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff, upon which the court rendered judgment. The defendant appeals. Upon the trial, the defendant offered to prove by John A. Jackman, the master mechanic of the company, in charge of its shops at Bloomington, and to which place the engine was running, what was the usage and routine as to the management of the engines when they arrived at Bloomington, it being the custom of the person whose duty it was to inspect all engines on their arrival at that place, to report their condition to the witness, for the purpose of showing, as no such report was made of any defect in the engine on its arrival at the shops on the day of the fire, that the engine, at the time, was in good repair. The exclusion of this evidence by the court, the defendant assigns as error. The other questions arising on the record are fully presented in the opinion of the court.

Mr. A. W. CHURCH, for the appellant.

Messrs. LACEY & WALLACE, and Mr. T. W. MCNEELEY, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

The sovereignty of the State, by the act of granting charters, has invested railway companies with the right to use locomotive engines as a propelling power in the exercise of the franchises conferred, upon the implied understanding, only, that the law will compel such corporations to use every possible precaution, by the use of all the best and most approved mechanical inventions for that purpose, to prevent injuries by fire and other causes, to the property of the citizens on the lines of their respective roads. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Mills, 42 Ill. 408; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Shanefelt, 47 Ill. 497.

The necessity for the grant of such a privilege was found to exist in the exigencies of commerce, and the right thus conferred to use this kind of motive power, however dangerous it may be in its natural tendencies, is as lawful in the parties using it, as is the use of any other known propelling power. The maxim of the law, sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas, may have as just an application to corporations created by legislative authority, as to private persons in the use and control of their property.

When the legislature conferred this right on railway companies to use locomotive engines, it is supposed they had in view their dangerous character, that if recklessly used, would spread destruction through all our towns and cities, and into every farming community through which they passed, and they certainly did not intend to confer this extraordinary privilege upon any other condition than that the parties using such engines should be held to the highest degree of care and diligence to prevent injury to the property of the citizen. The use of such engines in populous districts through which they pass, is known to be dangerous in their most careful use, and this fact itself imposes a high degree of responsibility upon the companies using them as a motive power. In the absence of such a degree of care and diligence on the part of railway companies, the courts in this country and in England have always held them to the strictest accountability for injuries to property in the vicinity of their roads.

Experience has demonstrated, that railway companies, by the use of certain mechanical inventions and contrivances, can prevent the emission of fire sparks from locomotive engines, in such quantities, at least, as would not be at all dangerous to property in the immediate proximity. They must, therefore, in every instance, be held to a strict performance of their duties in that regard, otherwise there would be no safety for the property of the citizen on the lines of these great thoroughfares which traverse the country in every direction, and on which their engines run night and day. If, however, such companies use all proper and reasonable precaution to prevent the escape of fire from their engines, by the application of the best and most approved mechanical appliances for that purpose, and keep the same constantly in good repair while in use, and carefully and skillfully managed by competent and prudent engineers, the law is, that they will not be responsible for injuries that may occur from fire; and in the event that a loss does occur under such circumstances, it will be damnum absque injuria.

The effect of the statute of 1869, (Gross Comp. 554, § 103,) is, if the fact be established that an injury has been occasioned from fire sparks emitted from the engine while passing along the road, to make that fact, itself, full prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the company, and of its agents and servants in charge at the time. If the party injured establishes, in the first instance, the fact that the fire, which occasioned the injury complained of, was communicated from the engine, such proof would entitle the party to a recovery, and the burden of proof to rebut the prima facie case thus made, is on the company, to show by affirmative evidence that the engine at the time was equipped with the necessary and most effective appliances to prevent the escape of fire, and that the engine was in good repair, and was properly, carefully and skillfully handled by a competent engineer.

The first inquiry, then, that presents itself in the consideration of the case, is, whether the fire that caused the destruction of the property of the appellee, was communicated from the engine of the appellant on its track. Of this fact there can be no serious question in this court. The evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the fire was so occasioned, and the jury having found that issue for the appellee, we can not say, in view of the evidence, that it does not sustain their finding, or that the verdict is even against the weight of the evidence.

The proof shows, that the house stood north of the track, distant about 150 feet. At the time the fire occurred, every-thing was very dry, and a strong wind prevailed from the south to the north, which would carry the sparks that escaped from the engine in the direction of the house of the appellee. The fire was not discovered until the lapse of about half an hour after the passage of the train, which, it is alleged, occasioned the injury. It was first seen on the roof, on the south side, facing the track, and when first discovered, it was a very small fire. The fire originated on the roof of the main part of the house, and some of the witnesses who went to assist the family, testified there was no fire in any of the stoves in that part of the house. In fact, there was no fire in any of the stoves about the house, except the one in the kitchen, and that was in the L that projected north, and it is hardly possible, or probable, that sparks of fire from that chimney could have gone south over the main building, against a strong wind...