Chicago And Eastern Illinois Railroad Company v. Vester
Decision Date | 15 February 1911 |
Docket Number | 6,875 |
Citation | 93 N.E. 1039,47 Ind.App. 141 |
Parties | CHICAGO AND EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD COMPANY v. VESTER, ADMINISTRATOR |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
From Mountain Circuit Court; Jere West, Special Judge.
Action by John C. Vester, as administrator of the estate of Bernard Polk, deceased, against the Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Company. From a judgment on a verdict for $ 4,000 for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Homer T. Dick, Lucas Nebeker and E. H. Seneff, for appellant.
Livengood & Bryant and Charles R. Milford, for appellee.
This is an action brought by John G. Vester, as administrator of the estate of Bernard Polk, deceased, against appellant to recover damages on account of the death of said Polk, caused by being struck by one of appellant's trains, at a point in the city of Attica, Indiana, where a street of said city crosses appellant's tracks.
This action was brought by said administrator for the benefit of and to recover for Rosa A. Polk, the mother of said decedent damages accruing to her by way of loss of support resulting from the death of her said son.
The complaint was in five paragraphs. A demurrer was filed to each of the paragraphs, and was sustained as to the first and third paragraphs and overruled as to the second, fourth and fifth, and exceptions given to the ruling on each paragraph. The case was then put at issue by a general denial. There was a trial by jury, answers to interrogatories, general verdict for appellee in the sum of $ 4,000, motion for new trial overruled, and exceptions and judgment on the verdict, from which this appeal is taken.
The substance of the facts as to the time, place and circumstances of the injury, as set out in the complaint, and each of the paragraphs thereof, may be summarized as follows: Decedent was injured at a crossing on appellant's railroad on Washington street in said city, which street runs east and west, and is about eighty-two and one-half feet wide. Union street, in said city, runs north and south. Appellant's road runs on Union street in said city, from where it enters the city at the south, to and beyond Washington street on a down grade toward the north. Three of appellant's tracks cross said Washington street. The center track is the main line, and there is a side-track on the east, thirteen and one-half feet from the center track, and another side-track on the west, about thirty feet from the center track. The freight-house is eighty-seven feet south of Washington street, and on the east side of all of said tracks.
We quote from appellant's brief as follows:
While the allegations of negligence and its causative connection with the injury are not identical in the three paragraphs of complaint, yet we think, for the purposes of this opinion, that it is necessary to set out those contained in the fifth paragraph only.
The allegations of the fifth paragraph, as to negligence and proximate cause, are as follows: Also, the following:
The first and only error argued is that "the court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial." The grounds for new trial are as follows: "(1) The damages assessed by the jury are excessive; (2) the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence; (3) the verdict of the jury is contrary to the evidence; (4) the verdict of the jury is contrary to law; (5) the assessment of the amount of recovery is erroneous, being too large."
Counsel first discuss the sufficiency of the evidence, and say that the evidence affirmatively shows contributory negligence on the part of decedent. It seems to us that the statement of facts, which is admitted to be correct, is all that is necessary to show that decedent acted as any prudent man, similarly situated, might act. In fact appellant's counsel concede that the conditions were such that decedent probably could not have seen in time to save his team; but that if he had been looking and had exercised proper care he could have escaped in time to prevent injury to himself. It is much easier, from a position of safety, to speculate upon what would have been prudent and considerate action, than to form the opinion and promptly act upon it when the danger is present and the peril imminent. Under such circumstances, eminently prudent men might act differently. There is no better tribunal to judge of the prudence of the acts and conduct of a man so situated than a jury of twelve men. Their judgment and conclusion should be final, unless the facts and circumstances are such as to compel a different opinion by the appellate tribunal. The facts in this case do not justify such a conclusion.
Counsel next discuss "Defendant's Negligence." Under this head, counsel concede that the complaint sufficiently charges negligence in the breaking of the train, in that it charges "(1) the use of defective appliances, with knowledge of such defects; (2) careless and negligent management of the train, and each part thereof; (3) that the train, and each part thereof, were negligently allowed to run past said crossing at a rate exceeding ten miles an hour, thereby violating the speed ordinance of the city."
But counsel insist that all these allegations have reference directly and exclusively to the cause of the break of the train, and must therefore be limited to conditions or acts at or before the time of such break. They insist, therefore, that it is not the theory of either paragraph of the complaint that there was careless and negligent management of the separated or lost division of the train after the break, but that the theory of each paragraph upon this subject of negligent management of each part of the train relates to the management prior to, and...
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