Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Oglesby

• Decision Date: 20 July 1912
• Docket Number: 3,884.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri
• Parties: CHICAGO, B. & Q.R. CO. v. OGLESBY et al.

198 F. 153

CHICAGO, B. & Q.R. CO. v. OGLESBY et al.

No. 3,884.

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division.

July 20, 1912

O. M Spencer and M. G. Roberts, both of St. Joseph, Mo., for complainant.

Elliott W. Majors, Atty. Gen., and Campbell Cummings, Asst. Atty Gen., for defendants.

VAN VALKENBURGH, District Judge.

The defendants in the case are, respectively, the members of the Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners of the state of Missouri, the Attorney General of the state, and the prosecuting attorneys of Linn, Sullivan, and Putnam counties. The case arises because of an order of said Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners requiring the complainant on and after the 1st day of May, 1912, 'to operate each way daily a passenger train in addition to the trains now in operation between the Iowa-Missouri state line near Mendota Missouri, and Brookfield, Missouri,' and through it complainant seeks to restrain the defendants from enforcing said order. The grounds for the relief sought are thus stated in the bill:

'(1) That the enforcement of said order requiring an additional passenger train daily each way on said local branch line thus sought to be enforced, would give greater facilities on the said local branch line than is customarily given under similar conditions by other railroads either in Missouri or in other states of the Union.

'(2) That the passenger facilities thus sought to be enforced on the said local branch railway are not justifiable or demanded by the reasonable necessities and conditions of the traffic affected thereby, and that the existing facilities for passenger traffic on the said local branch railroad within the state of Missouri are adequate, fair, and reasonable.

'(3) That without any justifiable necessity the enforcement of the said order will inflict and impose on the complainant a loss on said local branch railway within the state of Missouri and from Laclede to the state line in revenue amounting to over $30,000 per year (which the complainant is entitled to have and needs), in addition to the present annual deficit of $65,000 on all passenger traffic carried on said branch line within the state of Missouri as aforesaid, and that there has been no change in the volume of traffic on the said branch railroad that would in any sense warrant said order of said Commissioners for any additional train in each or either direction.

'(4) That, if your orator were compelled to comply with said order of the Railroad Commissioners, it would result in great loss and irreparable injury to your orator, for which it has no remedy at law, and would be in effect the taking of the property of your orator to an extent greatly in excess of $30,000 per annum without due process of law, and without adequate compensation, contrary to and in violation of section 1 of article 14 of the amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and will deprive your complainant of equal protection under the laws as guaranteed to it by the Constitution of the United States.

'(5) That the enforcement of the said order of the Railroad Commissioners is a violation of those clauses of the Constitution of the United States in relation to commerce among the states, and that it is an attempt to place a substantial and direct burden upon transportation on the said branch line of railroad between the states of Missouri and Iowa, and compel your orator to run said proposed passenger train to the terminal facilities at Centerville, Iowa, or to expend large sums of money, to wit, over $100,000 in unnecessarily building, erecting and maintaining terminal facilities at the state line between Missouri and Iowa.'

A temporary restraining order was issued April 20, 1912, and at the hearing on May 11, 1912, complainant's application for a temporary injunction was opposed upon the following grounds:

(1) That the nature of the case presented requires the sitting of three judges to determine the application.

(2) The interstate commerce clause is not violated by the order.

(3) The cost of the proposed improvement ordered by the Commission is not controlling in determining the reasonableness of the order.

(4) That the orders of the Commission are prima facie, reasonable, and just, and, if in any way subject to the control of the courts, should not be interfered with unless manifestly abused, to the substantial injury of the complainant, and that the allegations of the bill are wholly insufficient.

Section 17, Act June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat.pt. 1, p. 557, provides:

'That no interlocutory injunction suspending or restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of any statute of a state by restraining the action of any officer of such state in the enforcement or execution of such statute shall be issued or granted by any justice of the Supreme Court, or by any Circuit Court of the United States, or by any judge thereof, or by any district judge acting as circuit judge, upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute, unless the application for the same shall be presented to a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, or to a circuit judge, or to a district judge acting as circuit judge, and shall be heard and determined by three judges, of whom at least one shall be a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States or a circuit judge, and the other two may be either circuit or district judges, and unless a majority of said three judges shall concur in granting such application.'

The purpose of this enactment is well known. It was intended to insure the concurrence of at least two of three judges, one of whom should be a justice of the Supreme Court, or a circuit judge, before a temporary injunction should issue suspending or restraining the enforcement of any statute of a state upon the ground of its unconstitutionality. Rate legislation in particular, and judicial construction of such legislation, was most prominently in the mind of the Congress. However, the law, by its terms, is not restricted to such; but manifestly the state statute, as a statute, was the subject-matter dealt with, and not the acts of state officers who are charged to have exceeded the powers conferred by a statute whose constitutionality is in nowise attacked. The bill in this case does not challenge the constitutionality of the act authorizing the Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners to determine and fix the number, kind, and character of trains for the carrying of passengers, baggage, and express, to be operated upon railroads within this state, but other constitutional guaranties require that such powers must be exercised justly and reasonably, and, if not so exercised, then the law though valid, is...