Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. United States

• Decision Date: 24 April 1909
• Docket Number: 2,787.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
• Parties: CHICAGO, B. & Q. RY. CO. v. UNITED STATES.

170 F. 556

CHICAGO, B. & Q. RY. CO. v. UNITED STATES.

No. 2,787.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

April 24, 1909

Charles J. Greene and Ralph W. Breckenridge, for plaintiff in error.

Phillip J. Doherty and Charles A. Goss (A. W. Lane and Luther M Walter, on the brief), for defendant in error.

Before SANBORN and ADAMS, Circuit Judges, and RINER, District Judge.

ADAMS Circuit Judge.

Two suits were instituted by the United States to recover penalties for violating Safety Appliance Act of March 2 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531, as amended by the subsequent acts of April 1, 1896, c. 87, 29 Stat. 85 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p 3174), and March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943 (U.S. Comp St. Supp. 1907, p. 885). Three separate violations are complained of in one suit and one in the other; but the two, having been consolidated for the purposes of a trial, will be treated as one suit with four counts.

The several counts charge the use in interstate traffic by the defendant railway company of four separate cars of insufficient coupling appliances or insufficient grabirons or handholds. They set forth all other facts essential to a cause of action in favor of the United States. After issue joined a trial was had, and, at the close of all the evidence, each side moved for a peremptory instruction in its favor. The court instructed for plaintiff, and a verdict was rendered accordingly. Due exceptions were preserved to this action, and the present writ of error challenges its correctness.

Both sides having requested an instructed verdict in their favor, under a familiar rule of practice, there are only two questions open for consideration by us: finding? and, second, did the court commit any error of law during the trial? Empire State Cattle Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 147 F. 457, 459, 77 C.C.A. 601, and cases there cited. No claim is made under the latter head, so we are left to inquire solely as to, whether the judgment below is supported by any substantial evidence. The cause is simplified by the concession of counsel for the railway company that there was evidence tending to prove the defective condition of each of the four cars as charged, and that they were all being used at the time stated in the several counts in hauling interstate commerce or as a part of a train containing other cars which were doing so.

The sole contention is that, notwithstanding this concession, inasmuch as it appears by the proof that defendant did not know its cars were out of repair and had no actual intention at the time to violate the law but, on the contrary, had exercised reasonable care to keep them in repair by the usual inspections, it is not liable in this action. Learned counsel concede, what is undoubtedly true, that sustaining their contention involves a reversal of the doctrine unanimously declared by this court in United States v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. (C.C.A.) 163 F. 517, and United States v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co. (C.C.A.) 163 F. 519, and a disregard of what they call the dictum of the Supreme Court in St. Louis & Iron Mountain Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 28 Sup.Ct. 616, 52 L.Ed. 1061; and they accordingly invite us to enter upon a reconsideration of the questions so decided.

It was held by us, and in our opinion it was necessarily held by the Supreme Court in the Taylor Case, that the duty of railroads under the statute in question is an absolute duty, and not one which is discharged by the exercise of reasonable care or diligence. Since those cases were decided, this court in the case of Chi., Mil. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. United States (C.C.A.) 165 F. 423, has again approved of their doctrine, and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the case of Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. United States (decided March 1, 1909) 168 F. 175, in considering this question, made a review of pertinent authorities, and particularly of the cases of this court as well as of the Taylor Case, and in an exhaustive opinion reached the same conclusion that we did.

The main ground for asking a reconsideration of our former rulings is presented in an argument drawn from the assumed criminal character of the proceeding against the railroads authorized by the safety appliance law. It is argued that no criminal offense can be committed when no injury has befallen any one, or when there is no intent to do the act constituting the offense, and that no such offense can be established by construction. Whether these positions are maintainable as abstract propositions of law or not, concerning which we express no opinion, they have no application to the present case. This is not a criminal case. It is a civil action in the nature of the action of debt to recover a penalty, which Congress in its wisdom saw fit to impose upon railroads to secure compliance with certain specified regulations made to promote the safety of passengers and freight carried in interstate commerce and to protect employes engaged in that service.

After making provisions for the automatic coupling devices and grabiron and handholds, the statute enacts that any common carrier making use of any car not equipped as required by the act 'shall be liable to a penalty of one hundred dollars for each and every such violation, to be recovered in a suit or suits to be brought by the United States. * * * ' Section 6 of the act of 1893. This is not the language employed in fixing punishments denounced for criminal offenses. The act made it unlawful for railroads to use cars not equipped as therein provided, and thereby imposed a duty upon railroad companies to equip cars accordingly. This was by clear and unequivocal language of the lawmaker, made an absolute duty, not dependable upon the exercise of diligence or the existence of any wrong intent on the part of the railroad companies. Whether a defendant carrier knew its cars were out of order or not is immaterial. Its duty was to know they were in order and kept in order at all times. Cases supra. A breach of this duty, like the breach of most civil duties, naturally entailed a liability, and Congress fixed that liability not as a punishment for a...