Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Gregory

Decision Date14 June 1906
Citation221 Ill. 591,77 N.E. 1112
PartiesCHICAGO CITY RY. CO. v. GREGORY.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Appellate Court, First District.

Action by Mary A. Gregory against the Chicago City Railway Company. From a judgment of the Appellate Court, affirming a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

William J. Hynes and Franklin B. Hussey (Mason B. Starring, of counsel), for appellant.

David K. Tone and H. M. Ashton, for appellee.

SCOTT, C. J.

Mary A. Gregory, the appellee, obtained a judgment in the superior court of Cook county against the Chicago City Railway Company, the appellant, for $1,250, in a suit brought by her against said company to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by her through the negligence of appellant. The Appellate Court for the First District affirmed the judgment of the superior court, and the record is now brought to this court for review.

Appellee's injuries were occasioned by falling to the street from one of appellant's street cars on the evening of May 21, 1900. She had boarded the car, which was running east on Forty-Seventh street, at the intersection of that street and Ashland avenue, in the city of Chicago. She asked for and received a transfer to a line of cars running north and south on Center avenue. This last-named avenue crosses Forty-Seventh street some distance east of Ashland avenue. It was appellant's custom to stop its east-bound cars, as they approached Center avenue, on the west side of the avenue, in order to transfer passengers to the Center Avenue Line. The witnesses for appellant, and some of the witnesses called by appellee testified that the car in question came to a stop on the west side of the avenue, while appellee herself denied that any stop was made on that side. The witnesses for the respective parties differ materially as to what took place after the car had crossed Center avenue. Appellant's contention in the trial court was that only one stop was contemplated or usually made at Center avenue, and that was on the west side. Its witnesses testified that after the car had crossed Center avenue appellee arose from her seat, and that the conductor then signaled the motorman to stop, the car, but, before it had been brought to a full stop, appellee attempted to alight from the moving car and fell or was thrown to the ground. Appellee and her witnesses testified that, after the car had crossed Center avenue, it was brought to a stop on the east side of the avenue, and that appellee then started to alight, but that, while she was in the act of stepping to the ground, the car started with a sudden jerk, throwing her to the ground. Appellee testified that she soon afterwards boarded a south-bound Center avenue car and rode to a point about a block and a half distant from her home; that the conductor helped her off the car, and that as soon as he had let go of her she fell to the ground; that she got up and took a few steps and fell down again; tnat she continued to fall down every few steps, and was an hour and a half in walking the block and a half to her home; that when she reached her home she went upstairs, and did not tell her husband or anyone else in the house anything about the accident until the next morning; that on the morning after the accident she was unable to get out of bed; that she was confined to her bed, at intervals, for a period of two months and was unable to do any work; that before the accident she did her washing, but has not been able to that kind of work since; that immediately after the accident she could not straighten up, and ‘seemed to be broke up and nervous and all rattled and shook up’ for nearly three months; that she finally got a little better, but has never been the same since; that when she does any work it affects her back; that she weighed between 140 and 145 pounds before the accident and weighs only 118 pounds now; that she didn't have any womb trouble until this accident, but has been afflicted with it ever since; that she does not know how to describe the womb difficulties; that her menstrual flow has not been regular since the accident; that immediately after the accident the flow continued for six months; that she frequently has a sharp pain extending from her shoulders down her back to the end of her spine, especially in the small of her back.

The principal controversy in the case is as to whether or not appellee suffered to the extent described by her, and, if so, whether those sufferings resulted from the accident; appellant contending that the only injuries resulting from the accident were bruises and nervousness consequent thereon, from which she soon recovered. Appellee also testified that in November, 1896, she had a miscarriage, caused by being thrown against the side of a street car; that she was taken to a hospital, where an operation was performed, but she claimed to have fully recovered from the effects of the miscarriage and operation. Dr. Steele, who performed the operation, testified, on behalf of appellant, that the ailment of the womb when the operation was performed was such as produces an enlargment of the womb, which would be likely to produce displacement or prolapsus of that organ. A number of neighbors, relatives, and friends testified to the apparent change in appellee's health after the accident, and that she was confined to her bed for some time thereafter, and has not since performed certain kinds of work which she was accustomed to perform prior to the accident.

The only medical testimony introduced by appellee (except that of a witness in rebuttal who testified that displacement of the womb might be caused by falling upon the ground or street) was that of Dr. J. G. Craig. He testified, in her behalf, that on May 22, 1900 (the day after the accident), he was called to treat her for injuries received in an accident; that he found her suffering from bruises and nervousness and complaining of pain in her back; that he visitedher again on May 23d and 25th of the same year and found nothing except the bruises and nervousness; that in June, 1900, he was again called to see appellee, found her sick, and upon examination discovered that she was afflicted with nephritis or acute Bright's disease, and that nothing else then ailed her. The witness was then handed a written statement or memorandum by counsel for appellee, and, in response to questions, stated that it was in his handwriting; that he wrote it as a description of appellee's condition at the time it was written, but did not know what that condition was due to, nor did he know when the statement or memorandum was written, as it was not dated; that, no matter when it was written, it was a statement of appellee's condition when he treated her, or when he was treating her; that she had nervous prostration, female trouble, back trouble, and stomach trouble; that the memorandum was a statement of her sickness; and that he knew that appellee had falling of the womb. On cross-examination Dr. Craig stated that the written memorandum was merely an enumeration of the different troubles with which appellee had been afflicted from the time he first knew her, down to the time he last saw her. He further testified that the pains of which appellee complained immediately after the accident were such as would be of a muscular nature; that she had no broken bones or cuts and no fever; that there was no complaint of any pain suggesting falling of the womb at that time; that in his judgment the Bright's disease had no relation to the accident; that at the time she was afflicted with Bright's disease she also had womb trouble and nervousness and was very sick for a considerable length of time. His testimony supported the contention of appellant, and not that of appellee, by whom he was called. During the direct examination of Dr. Craig by counsel for appellee the following questions were asked and answers given: ‘Q. Do you know Mr. Smith, the gentleman sitting back here? A. Yes, I am well acquainted with him. Q. Didn't you tell Mr. Smith here-- Do you remember Mr. Smith calling to see you a year ago in March? A. I remember of Mr. Smith being there several times. Q. Do you remember of telling Mr. Smith at that time that you did not like to come and testify in this case? A. I don't remember whether I did or not. Q. You don't remember whether you did or not? A. I do not. Q. Didn't you tell Mr. Smith at that time that you were doing quite a little work for the Chicago City Railway Company-- A. I never did. Q. And didn't like to appear in any cases against them? A. I never told him anything of the kind; I never did a dollar's worth of work for the Chicago City Railway Company in my life. Q. Didn't you tell Mr. Smith-- A. I never told him anything like that. Q. Wait until I put the question; I move to strike that out. (Stricken out.) Q. Now, did you not in that interview say that the Chicago City...

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