Chicago Co v. Trust Co 25 26, 1927

• Decision Date: 21 November 1927
• Docket Number: No. 57,WELLS-DICKEY,57
• Citation: 48 S.Ct. 73,275 U.S. 161,72 L.Ed. 216,59 A.L.R. 758
• Parties: CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO. v. TRUST CO. Argued and Submitted Oct. 25-26, 1927
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

275 U.S. 161

48 S.Ct. 73

72 L.Ed. 216

CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO.

v WELLS-DICKEY TRUST CO.

No. 57.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 25-26, 1927.

Decided Nov. 21, 1927.

Messrs. J. C. James and R. Bruce Scott, both of Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.

Messrs. F. M. Miner and Robert J. McDonald, both of Minneapolis, Minn., for respondent.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Anderson was killed instantly while employed in interstate commerce by the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad. Wells-Dickey Trust Company was appointed special administrator and brought, in a state court of Minnesota, this action under the federal Employers' Liability Act, april 22, 1908, c. 149, § 1, 35 Stat. 65 (United States Code, tit. 45, c. 2, § 51 (Comp. St. § 8657)), for the benefit of a sister alleged to be dependent. Anderson had not left surviving widow, child, or father. His mother had survived him, but died before the administrator was appointed. No action was brought on her behalf. After proceedings which it is unnecessary to detail, the railroad moved for a directed verdict upon the ground that, since the mother had survived, the cause of action vested in her, and that, when she died, the cause of action died with her. The direction was denied; the plaintiff got a verdict; and the judgment for the plaintiff entered thereon was affirmed by the highest court of the state. Wells-Dickey Trust Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 159 Minn. 417, 199 N. W. 101; Id., 166 Minn. 79, 207 N. W. 186. This court granted a writ of certiorari. 271 U. S. 657, 46 S. Ct. 632, 70 L. Ed. 1136.

Whether the action lies, depends upon the construction to be given section 1 of the federal Employers' Liability Act, and presents a novel question. That section provides:

'Every common carrier by railroad * * * shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee.'

For an injury resulting in death, the act gives two distinct causes of action. One is to compensate the injured person for his loss and suffering while he lives. Under the original act, that cause of action did not survive. Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 67-68, 33 S. Ct. 192, 57 L. Ed. 417, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 176. Now, under the amendment added as section 9 by Act of April 5, 1910, c. 143, § 2, 36 Stat. 291 (45 USCA § 59 (Comp. St. § 8665)), it survives to the personal representative. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648, 35 S. Ct. 704, 59 L. Ed. 1160. The second cause of action is to compensate persons other than the injured employee for pecuniary loss suffered by them through the employee's death. While the suit thereon must be brought by the personal representative of the employee, he sues as trustee for the person or persons on...