Chicago & G.T. Ry. Co. v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 05 January 1882
• Citation: 11 N.W. 152,47 Mich. 265
• Parties: CHICAGO & GRAND TRUNK RY. CO. v. CAMPBELL.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

11 N.W. 152

47 Mich. 265

CHICAGO & GRAND TRUNK RY. CO. v. CAMPBELL.

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 5, 1882

Special assignments of error are not required in certiorari cases which are removed to the supreme court by writ of error those contained in the affidavit for certiorari being all that are essential.

The statute which requires railroad companies to fence their tracks has no application to station grounds and their approaches. Flint & Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. Lull, 28 Mich. 515.

Therefore a railroad company is not liable for the value of a cow killed on one of the approaches to a station, by an engine run without negligence.

Error to St. Clair.

L.C Stanley, for plaintiff in error.

Geo. P Voorheis, for defendant in error.

COOLEY J.

This action originated in justice court, where Mrs. Campbell recovered the value of a cow killed on the track of the railway company by one of its passing trains. The case was removed to the circuit court by certiorari and thence after affirmance to this court by writ of error. It is objected that there is no assignment of errors in this court; but that is not essential in such a case. The assignment contained in the affidavit for certiorari accompanies the record to the final conclusion.

On the merits the question is whether the evidence tended to establish a liability; and we are constrained to say it did not. No negligence is imputed to the company in the running of its trains; but it is agreed that it was negligent in not so guarding its track by fences that the cow could not have gone upon it. The statement of the evidence is not so full and specific as it ought to have been, but the facts seem to be the following: The plaintiff lived near Emmett station and allowed her cow to run at large. The cow wandered upon the track of the railway some 160 or 200 yards east of the station-house, and was there run upon and killed. The statute requires the company to fence its track and to put in cattle-guards at road crossings; but this requirement has no reference to station grounds. Kent, etc., R. Co. v. Hull, 28 Mich. 515.

Strictly speaking perhaps the place where this cow was killed was not within the station grounds, but it constituted the approach to it, and could not have been fenced without incommoding the company and the public in the transaction of the freight business of the road. The case is therefore within the reason of the case above...