Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman

• Decision Date: 18 November 1954
• Docket Number: Nos. 33296,33312,s. 33296
• Citation: 122 N.E.2d 522,4 Ill.2d 319
• Parties: CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellee, v. Sol and Carol BLACKMAN, Appellants. CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellee, v. Grace CLARK, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 522

122 N.E.2d 522

4 Ill.2d 319

CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellee, v. Sol and Carol BLACKMAN, Appellants.

CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellee, v. Grace CLARK, Appellant.

Nos. 33296, 33312.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 18, 1954.

Henry Heineman, F. Raymond Marks, Jr., and John Erickson, Chicago, for appellants Sol and Carol Blackman.

Antonow & Weissbourd, Chicago (George S.Feiwell, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant Grace Clark.

Von Allan Carlisle and Kathryn M. Kula, Chicago, for appellee.

KLINGBIEL, Justice.

The Chicago Housing Authority, a municipal corporation, brought two separate forcible entry and detainer actions in the municipal court of Chicago, one against Sol and Carol Blackman and the other against Grace Clark. A summary judgment for plaintiff was entered in each case, and the respective defendants appeal to this court on the theory that constitutional questions are involved. Because of the similarity of issues the cases have been consolidated for opinion by this court.

Appellants are tenants in low-rent public housing projects owned and operated by appellee. They were served with notices terminating their tenancies for failure and refusal to subscribe to the loyalty oath required by such tenants by section 25.01 of the Housing Authorities Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 67 1/2, par. 25.01.) In the case of Grace Clark the tenancy was terminated on the additional ground that she refused to execute a certificate of nonmembership in subversive organizations, as required by a resolution adopted by appellee for its Federally aided projects. This resolution was adopted on or about December 8, 1952. At that time there was no statutory oath requirement, the latter having been added by an amendment approved July 13, 1953. Appellants attack the constitutionality of the statutory requirement on several grounds; and in the Clark appeal it is contended, in addition, that the appellee Housing Authority had no power under the statute or the constitution to require the certificate of nonmembership in subversive organizations.

Before discussing the principal questions, it is necessary to consider appellee's contentions that no constitutional issues are presented. Under the terms of the lease agreements, the tenancies are subject to termination by either party upon fifteen days' written notice. Appellee insists that since it could evict in any event merely by giving notice, the fact that it assigned as a reason therefor appellants' refusal to subscribe to the oath is immaterial and does not raise any constitutional issue. The argument, in other words, is that because the tenants have no legal right to occupy the housing accommodations, they cannot be deprived of any constitutional right by the requirements in question. The position is untenable. A similar contention was rejected in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215, 219, 97 L.Ed. 216, where State employees were required by statute to take an oath, concerning their affiliation with certain proscribed organizations, as a condition of continued employment. The court held that statute invalid, and observed: 'We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.' A like conclusion must follow in the present case. Even though appellants have no right to remain as tenants of appellee, they may not, as a condition of continued occupancy, be required to comply with unconstitutional requirements.

Appellee also insists that appellants have no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute and resolution, because they have not alleged membership in any organization advocating the overthrow of the government by force of other unlawful means. There is no merit in the contention. The designated ground for eviction is not membership or affiliation itself, but failure to take the prescribed oath. It is undisputed that appellants violated the provisions, and that the present eviction proceedings were brought against them because of such violation. Clearly they are affected by the constitutionality of the requirements, and are entitled to a determination of the constitutional issues raised. See United Public Workers of America (C. I. O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 91-92, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754.

The oath required of tenants by section 25.01 reads as follows: 'I, _____, do swear that I am a citizen of the United States and the State of Illinois, that I am not affiliated directly or indirectly with any communist organization or any communist front organization, or any foreign political agency, party, organization or government which advocates the overthrow of constitutional government by force or other means not permitted under the Constitution of the United States or the constitution of this State; that I do not directly or indirectly teach or advocate the overthrow of the government of the United States or of this State or any unlawful change in the form of the governments thereof by force or any unlawful means.' Appellants contend the requirement deprives them of due process of law because it fails to distinguish between innocent and knowing membership in such organizations, and excludes tenants solely on the basis of membership or affiliation regardless of their knowledge of the purposes of the organization. It is insisted that under the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed. 216, the oath must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power. The Wieman case involved an Oklahoma statute requiring each State employee, as a condition of continued employment, to take an oath that he is not "a member of any party or organization, political or otherwise, that now advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of Oklahoma by force or violence or other unlawful means" and that he is not "affiliated directly or indirectly with the Communist Party, the Third Communist International, * * * or with any agency, party, organization, association, or group whatever which has been officially determined by the United States Attorney General or other authorized agency of the United States to be a communist front or subversive organization * * *." The question presented was whether the dueprocess clause permits the State to exclude persons from its employ solely on the basis of organizational membership, regardless of their knowledge about the organization. It was held that the oath offended due process because of the fact that under its terms membership alone was...