Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, Nos. 33296

• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: KLINGBIEL
• Citation: 122 N.E.2d 522,4 Ill.2d 319
• Parties: CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellee, v. Sol and Carol BLACKMAN, Appellants. CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellee, v. Grace CLARK, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 18 November 1954
• Docket Number: Nos. 33296,33312

Page 522

122 N.E.2d 522 4 Ill.2d 319 CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellee,
v.
Sol and Carol BLACKMAN, Appellants.
CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellee,
v.
Grace CLARK, Appellant. Nos. 33296, 33312. Supreme Court of Illinois. Nov. 18, 1954.

[4 Ill.2d 320]

Page 523

Henry Heineman, F. Raymond Marks, Jr., and John Erickson, Chicago, for appellants Sol and Carol Blackman.

Antonow & Weissbourd, Chicago (George S.Feiwell, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant Grace Clark.

Von Allan Carlisle and Kathryn M. Kula, Chicago, for appellee.

KLINGBIEL, Justice.

The Chicago Housing Authority, a municipal corporation, brought two separate forcible entry and detainer actions in the municipal court of Chicago, one against Sol and Carol Blackman and the other against Grace Clark. A summary judgment for plaintiff was entered in each case, and the respective defendants appeal to this

Page 524

court on the theory that constitutional questions are involved. Because of the similarity of issues the cases have been consolidated for opinion by this court.

Appellants are tenants in low-rent public housing projects owned and operated by appellee. They were served with notices terminating their tenancies for failure and refusal to subscribe to the loyalty oath required by such tenants by section 25.01 of the Housing Authorities Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 67 1/2, par. 25.01.) In the case of Grace Clark the tenancy was terminated on the additional ground that she refused to execute a certificate of nonmembership in subversive organizations, as required by a resolution adopted by appellee for its Federally aided projects. This resolution was adopted on or about December[4 Ill.2d 321] 8, 1952. At that time there was no statutory oath requirement, the latter having been added by an amendment approved July 13, 1953. Appellants attack the constitutionality of the statutory requirement on several grounds; and in the Clark appeal it is contended, in addition, that the appellee Housing Authority had no power under the statute or the constitution to require the certificate of nonmembership in subversive organizations.

Before discussing the principal questions, it is necessary to consider appellee's contentions that no constitutional issues are presented. Under the terms of the lease agreements, the tenancies are subject to termination by either party upon fifteen days' written notice. Appellee insists that since it could evict in any event merely by giving notice, the fact that it assigned as a reason therefor appellants' refusal to subscribe to the oath is immaterial and does not raise any constitutional issue. The argument, in other words, is that because the tenants have no legal right to occupy the housing accommodations, they cannot be deprived of any constitutional right by the requirements in question. The position is untenable. A similar contention was rejected in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215, 219, 97 L.Ed. 216, where State employees were required by statute to take an oath, concerning their affiliation with certain proscribed organizations, as a condition of continued employment. The court held that statute invalid, and observed: 'We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.' A like conclusion must follow in the present case. Even though appellants have no right to remain as tenants of appellee, they may not, as a condition of continued occupancy, be required to comply with unconstitutional requirements.

Appellee also insists that appellants have no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute and resolution, [4 Ill.2d 322] because they have not alleged membership in any organization advocating the overthrow of the government by force of other unlawful means. There is no merit in the contention. The designated ground for eviction is not membership or affiliation itself, but failure to take the prescribed oath. It is undisputed that appellants violated the provisions, and that the present eviction proceedings were brought against them because of such violation. Clearly they are affected by the constitutionality of the requirements, and are entitled to a...