Chicago Housing Authority v. Abrams
| Decision Date | 24 May 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 31862,31862 |
| Citation | 99 N.E.2d 129,409 Ill. 226 |
| Parties | CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY v. ABRAMS et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Heber T. Dotson, of Chicago, for appellants.
Robert A. Snow, of Chicago (Irving Goodman and William H. Powell, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
Appellee, the Chicago Housing Authority, a municipal corporation, filed its petition in the circuit court of Cook County on February 20, 1948, to condemn an area in the city of Chicago for purposes of slum clearance, redevelopment and rehabilitation of an alleged blighted or slum area, pursuant to the Housing Authorities Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 67 1/2, pars. 1 to 27d, incl.) The area sought is bounded by Twenty-ninth Street on the north, Thirty-first Street on the south, Cottage Grove Avenue on the west, and Lake Park Avenue on the east.
On June 21, 1950, George T. Jurus and Rose E. Jurus, the appellants, who own a parcel of real estate known as 3009 Ellis Avenue, within the area embraced by the petition, filed a motion to controvert petitioner's right to condemn, and a simultaneous demand for a jury trial on the issues raised by the motion. For the most part, the motion attacked the validity of the statute, the power of the petitioner to condemn this particular area, the petitioner's failure to make a just offer of payment for the property to be taken, and it denied the power of the petitioner to sell or lease premises so acquired. The court, without a jury, heard testimony on the issues thus raised, then subsequently denied the motion. Appellants then followed with a motion to dismiss the petition, alleging that from a stipulation of fact entered into at the hearing on the first motion, it appeared that the controverted property was to be taken for a private use rather than a public use. The matter in the stipulation, referred to by appellant, relates to a contract under date of February 18, 1947, entered into the appellee corporation and Michael Reese Hospital of Chicago, a nonprofit corporation, whereby appellee agreed, following the acquisition and clearance of the property herein sought to be condemned, to sell or lease all of said property, and whereby the hospital corporation agreed to submit an offer therefor together with a plan for redevelopment; the bid to be at a price equal to the sum of the actual cost of the land plus the cost for subsequent demolition and clearance. The stipulation further recited that the hospital corporation was the highest bidder at a public sale of a portion of the property in the area not needed or necessary for any uses authorized by the Housing Authorities Act; that appellee had accepted the bid and had given a quitclaim deed for the premises to the hospital, and that all of such transactions had occurred prior to the hearing on appellants' motion to controvert. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the petition and this appeal is taken from that ruling of the court. No other errors are assigned.
It this court, appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal which was denied on January 9, 1951. Subsequently, appellee filed a motion which asks that we vacate our order of January 9, 1951, and renews the motion to dismiss. The latter motion has been taken with the case. In support of the claim that the appeal should be dismissed, appellee urges that the order appealed from is not a final and appealable order within the purview of section 77 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 110, par. 201), but is, rather, a mere interlocutory order which does not finally dispose of the proceeding, so as to give this court jurisdiction on appeal.
The proposition is not a new one. In Chicago Terminal Transfer Railroad Co. v. Preucil, 236 Ill. 491, 86 N.E. 117, 119, a...
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