Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Drake

• Citation: 26 P. 1039,46 Kan. 568
• Parties: CHICAGO, K. & W. R. CO. v. DRAKE.
• Decision Date: 06 June 1891
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

26 P. 1039

46 Kan. 568

CHICAGO, K. & W. R. CO. v. DRAKE.

Supreme Court of Kansas

June 6, 1891

Syllabus

In an action to determine the value of certain town lots condemned for the right of way of a railroad, the opinions of witnesses, as to the value of the lots at the time they were condemned, will not be deemed conclusive, but the jury may consider such opinions in connection with all the other testimony in the case, and then, for itself, determine from all the testimony the value of such lots.

Commissioners’ decision. Error from district court, Bourbon county; C. O FRENCH, Judge.

Geo R. Peck, A. A. Hurd, and Robt. Dunlap, for plaintiff in error.

A. A Harris and Henry E. Harris, for defendant in error.

OPINION

GREEN C.

The plaintiff in error condemned three lots in block 8 of Carroll’s plaza, in the city of Ft. Scott, in Bourbon county for railroad purposes. All the lots were appropriated, and the commissioners awarded as compensation for them $240. The defendant in error appealed from the award. The case was tried in the district court, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the owner of the lots for the sum of $881.93. A motion for a new trial was overruled, and judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict. The plaintiff in error contends that the jury disregarded the evidence in arriving at their verdict, and that it is contrary to and unsupported by the evidence. Six witnesses testified for, the plaintiff, upon the trial in the district court, that the lots were worth $1,500. Five witnesses, in behalf of the defendant below, fixed the value of the lots at from $240 to $375. There was no evidence from any witness fixing the value of the property at the amount returned by the jury. The defendant below requested the court to permit the jury to view the premises, but this request was denied. It is claimed that the verdict is neither in accord with the plaintiff’s nor defendant’s witnesses, and hence is unsupported by any evidence. It was the particular province of the jury to determine the value of the lots. Their value was purely a question of fact, to be determined from all of the evidence before them. They had the testimony of the witnesses, upon the part of the plaintiff and defendant, giving their opinions as to the value of these lots. There was evidence, too, of the location and condition of the lots, as well as the purposes for which they might be utilized. The testimony as to the value of the property condemned was opinion evidence. The witnesses gave their best judgment as to the value of the lots, and this evidence depended upon a knowledge of the value of real estate at the time the property was taken. Now, an opinion as to the value of a piece of property is not, strictly speaking, a fact, but is received in evidence upon the same principle as that on which the opinions of experts are admitted. In a well-considered case, decided by the supreme court of the United States, Mr. Justice FIELD observed: "The evidence of experts as to the value of professional services does not differ, in principle, from such evidence as to the value of labor in other departments of business, or as to the value of property. So far from laying aside their own general knowledge and ideas, the jury should have applied that knowledge and those ideas to the matters of fact in evidence in determining the weight to be given to the opinions expressed, and it was only in that way that they could arrive at a just conclusion. While they cannot act in any case upon particular facts material to its disposition resting in their private knowledge, but should be governed by the evidence adduced, they may, and to act intelligently they must, judge of the weight and force of that evidence by their own...