Chicago, M. & P.S. Ry. Co. v. United States

• Decision Date: 06 May 1912
• Docket Number: 2,049.
• Citation: 196 F. 882
• Parties: CHICAGO, M. & P.S. RY. CO. v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

196 F. 882

CHICAGO, M. & P.S. RY. CO. v. UNITED STATES.

No. 2,049.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

May 6, 1912

M. S Gunn, of Helena, Mont., and H. H. Field, of Seattle, Wash for plaintiff in error.

James W. Freeman, U.S. Atty., and C. M. List and Philip J. Doherty Sp. Asst. U.S. Attys.

Before GILBERT and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and WOLVERTON, District judge.

GILBERT Circuit Judge.

The United States brought an action to recover a penalty of $100 for an alleged violation of Act Cong. March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174), known as the 'Safety Appliance Act.' The violation alleged was the failure on the part of the plaintiff in error to comply with section 5 of the act, in that the height of the drawbar on the front end of a certain engine, measured perpendicularly from the tops of the rails to the center of the drawbar, was 30 inches, whereas the standard height for drawbars for freight cars on standard gauge roads as prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission was 34 1/2 inches measured from the tops of the rails to the center of the drawbars, with a permissible maximum variation between loaded and empty cars of 3 inches. The government inspectors testified that on January 10, 1910, the coupler on the front end of the engine was being used in switching cars in the yard, and, while it was attached to a string of cars, the cars broke loose from the engine on account of the defective condition of the pilot beam that holds the coupler, with the result that the drawbar was lowered; that thereafter the engine was taken to the roundhouse, turned around, and was taken down to the west end of the East Butte yard, and used to make up a transfer train for Butte, the rear end of the tender being used for this purpose.

The plaintiff in error moved for a directed verdict in its favor, but the court below directed a verdict against it. The plaintiff in error contends that this was error, for the reason that locomotives are not included in the designation 'freight cars' as used in section 5 of the act. It is admitted that in Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U.S. 1, 25 Sup.Ct. 158, 49 L.Ed. 363, in construing section 2 of the act, which prohibits the use of cars in interstate traffic unless equipped with automatic couplers, it was held that locomotives are included in the term 'cars,' but it is argued that 'cars' is a general term, and may well include all kinds of rolling stock, whereas 'freight cars' is a specific designation of certain kinds of cars, and its meaning is not to be extended beyond the precise terms used. In the Johnson Case the court said:

'Tested by context, subject-matter and object 'any car' meant all kinds of cars running on the rails, including locomotives, and this fact is supported by the dictionary definitions and by many judicial decisions, some of them having been rendered in construction of this act.'

We think, in view of the language of the act and its purpose, it was intended to include within the term 'freight cars' all cars used in the movement of freight, whether freight was actually stored in them or they were used for the purpose of moving the train, and that there is included therein the locomotive at the head of the train and the caboose at the other end. The evils to be remedied and the dangers to be averted were just as great and demanded legislation as much in the case of a locomotive as in the case of any car in the train. But all doubt is removed by Act March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1314), which amended the prior act, and enacted that its provisions and requirements relating to automatic...